ORIGINES SACRÆ.

BOOK I.

DISCOURSE I.

CHAP. I.

The General Prejudices againſt Religion in our Age examin'd; and the old Atheiſtical Hypotheſes *conſider'd.*

BEFORE I come to the particular Vindication of the *Truth* and *Authority* of the *Holy Scriptures*, which is my chief Deſign, it will be neceſſary to remove, if poſſible, the common and general Prejudices againſt Religion in this Age, as if it were only a cunning Artifice of ſome crafty Perſons to ſupport their own intereſt by deceiving the reſt of Mankind. If this were the truth of the caſe, none ought to be blam'd for their Contempt of Religion; nor for their endeavors to ſet the Minds of Men free from the uneaſineſs and ſlavery of a ſuperſtitious and groundleſs Fear. For this muſt be all that is imply'd in Religion, if it were at firſt begun, and is ſtill carry'd on by the Craft of ſome Men, and the Folly of the reſt. But ſuch an imputation as this ought to be very well grounded, becauſe it reflects on all Mankind (a very few excepted) and ought in common juſtice to be prov'd by the moſt clear and convincing Evidence; becauſe no Men have any reaſon to preſume ſo far upon their own Wit and Capacity above all others, as to take it for granted, that the reſt of Mankind are either *Fools* or *Knaves*. For this is the meaning of thoſe who go about to perſuade others, that Religion is nothing but *an Impoſture*, that hath appear'd under ſeveral ſhapes and diſguiſes; but ſtill the *Machine* is the ſame, and the ſame Deſign carry'd on by the different Actors, according to the Humor and Inclination of ſeveral Ages.

I could be glad, that all this might juſtly be look'd on as a feign'd caſe, only for a better Introduction to the following Diſcourſes; but none that live in our Age, and underſtand the too great prevalency of Scepticiſm and Infidelity in it, can apprehend it to be ſo. And therefore I ſhall lay down the true ſtate of the preſent Caſe, with reſpect to Religion in general. It cannot be deny'd by the greateſt Enemies to it, that there is ſtill a general Belief of the truth of it among Mankind, however they differ in their particular Notions about it. For this cannot be look'd on as a new Thing, or an Invention of the preſent Age, ſince it is manifeſt by the undoubted Hiſtory of former Times, that the ſame foundations of Religion have been generally receiv'd by Mankind; by which I underſtand the Being of GOD and Providence, and the Rewards and Puniſhments of a future State; but yet not ſo, but that there have been

in ſeveral Ages ſuch as have gone about to unſettle Mens Minds about them, and to repreſent them as an invention of *Politicians* to keep the World in greater Awe. But they have not met with ſuch ſucceſs as they expected in their Diſcoveries; for they have been oppos'd by the wiſeſt and moſt thoughtful Men in the ſeveral Ages they appear'd in; and the generality of Mankind continu'd in the ſame Belief which they had before. And yet they had then the ſame inclinations to Eaſe and Pleaſure, as they now have, and would have been as willing to be rid of the terrible apprehenſions of God and another World; they had the ſame value and eſteem for themſelves and their own intereſts, and hated all ſuch as deſign'd to cheat them; they fell into warm Diſputes and violent Heats about ſome particular Parts and Modes of Religion, which are apt to make them call all the reſt into queſtion: Yet under all theſe diſadvantages, the Foundations of Religion have been preſerv'd among them; and Mankind cannot be brought to look on them as *an Impoſture*. But thoſe who think ſo, are forc'd in great meaſure to conceal their thoughts, and to put on diſguiſes to the World, that they may appear to be of another Mind than really they are.

Whence then comes it to paſs, that thoſe who are averſe to the Practice of Religion, yet cannot be brought to ſhake off the Principles of it? That thoſe who are otherwiſe ſo fond of their own eaſe and intereſt, ſhould abhor thoſe Atheiſtical Principles, which are ſaid to be very much for the advantage of both? That thoſe Nations which have had no communication with each other, and differ ſo much from one another in Languages, Cuſtoms, and Modes of Religion, yet agree in the ſame common ſenſe of God, and a future ſtate?

It is a ridiculous thing for any to pretend to make our Religion to be *an Impoſture*, unleſs they can firſt give a juſt and ſatisfactory account of theſe things.

All that I can meet with to that purpoſe may be reduc'd to theſe three Heads; which contain the great *Atheiſtical* Pretences of this Age.

I. That the Notions of Religion were firſt ſtarted among rude and barbarous People by *Politicians*, to keep the People in better awe; and that the *Prieſts* found it their intereſt to ſupport them, becauſe they were ſupported by them.

II. That there are ſome *Peculiar Qualities in Mankind*, which join'd with their *Ignorance* and *Fear*, tend to preſerve *that ſeed of Religion which is in Man, and no other living Creature.*

III. That the Conſent of Mankind is not ſo great, as is pretended, there being ſeveral Nations now known by the late diſcoveries, which have no ſenſe or notion of God, or a future ſtate.

Theſe are the things, which I ſhall now make it my buſineſs to inquire into; and thereby ſhew the vanity and folly of theſe general Prejudices againſt Religion.

I begin with the firſt, That Religion was firſt invented and carry'd on by *Politicians* and *Prieſts*, who aim'd only at keeping the World in better awe, and Themſelves in a better condition. This hath been ſuggeſted by Atheiſtical Perſons in all Ages, where they have dar'd to appear; and was thought the moſt plauſible Artifice to draw in the People to their party; for no Men love to be impos'd upon, eſpecially in what concerns their eaſe and intereſt: But they were not able to make out the Perſons, Times, or Places, when the Notions of Religion were firſt ſpread among Mankind. For they could never produce any inſtances of Perſons who deſign'd

deſign'd to impoſe upon Mankind in matters of Religion, but they found the general Principles of Religion were entertain'd among them before; as will appear by the following Examples of the *Egyptians* and *Greeks*, which are moſt inſiſted upon.

The *Egyptians* are ſaid by *Lucian* to have been the firſt who ſet up *Religious Worſhip*; and *Herodotus* ſeems to be of the ſame opinion. *Plutarch* ſaith it was done by *Oſiris*, and *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith *it was directed by* Hermes, *who was a great Politician*, and *chief Counſellor to* Oſiris. But all that *Diodorus* ſaith, is, *that he brought the Honors and Services of the Gods into Order*; which ſuppoſes that there was Religion among them before, but he methodiz'd it. And if we believe *Sanchoniathon*, who makes him firſt Counſellor to *Cronus* Father to *Miſor* or *Oſiris*, he began *the Symbolical Images of the Gods*, which caus'd ſuch confuſion in their Worſhip afterwards. *Diodorus* ſaith *that* Oſiris *built* Thebes *or* Dioſpolis, where there was a Temple to *the Immortal God that made the World*, as appears by the Teſtimonies both of *Plutarch* and *Porphyry*. And the former obſerves, *That the moſt ancient, and univerſal and moſt credible Tradition, both of Law-givers and others, Philoſophers, as well as Poets and Divines, was, that the World was not made by chance, without a Mind and Reaſon to order and govern it.* From whence it follows, That before ſuch *Politicians* took upon them to order matters of Religion, there was a generally receiv'd Tradition of a Divine Being, which made and govern'd the World, and was the true foundation on which religious Worſhip was built. And the ſame *Plutarch* in that Diſcourſe affirms it to be *an Impious and Atheiſtical Opinion to attribute the Name of* God *to inſenſible Matter*; and adds, *that there is one univerſal Reaſon which governs the World.* *Ammianus Marcellinus* ſaith, *that the firſt beginnings of Religion were in* Egypt *long before they were in other parts.* Here therefore we muſt ſearch out for the firſt laying this deſign by *Politicians*; and here we find it fix'd upon *Hermes Triſmegiſtus*, who by the accounts given of him, was a very great Man, and that in the beginning of the *Egyptian Monarchy*. *Philo Byblius* ſaith, he was call'd by the *Egyptians Thoth*, by the *Phœnicians Taautus*, by the *Greeks Hermes*: He flouriſh'd, he ſaith, *with great reputation for Wiſdom among the* Phœnicians; who it ſeems at that time were under the Government of *Cronus* Father to *Oſiris* (or *Miſor*, as they call'd him from *Miſraim*, the Son of *Ham*, who firſt peopled thoſe Countries.) And ſo far there is nothing improbable in the Story: For the ſame Perſon being of an extraordinary Capacity, might be in favor both with *Cronus* in *Phœnicia*, and with *Oſiris* afterwards in *Egypt*. But he goeth on, and ſaith, That *Taautus* was *the firſt who took the matters of religious Worſhip out of the hands of unſkilful Men, and brought them into due Method and Order.* So that we find plainly there was Religion among the People before: But this wiſe Politician thought he could manage it better, if he appointed the Rites of publick Worſhip, ſo as to be moſt ſerviceable to Government; and for that end he ſet up the worſhip of Princes after their Death (eſpecially of *Oſiris*, after his being cut in pieces by his Brother, and joyn'd their Names with thoſe of the Stars, as viſible Deities; and of ſome Animals, as ſo many living Images of their Gods. And herein, as far as we can find, lay the politick invention of *Hermes Triſmegiſtus*; not in the firſt planting the principles of Religion, but in turning them that way, as he thought would ſerve beſt to the ends of Government, by raiſing a high veneration for deceas'd Monarchs, and deifying ſuch things as they thought moſt uſeful

Lucian. de Deâ Syriâ. *Herodot.* 2. 4. *Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſiride.* *Diod. Sicul. l.* 1. *Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l.* 1. c. 10. *Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſirid.* *Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l.* 3. c. 11. *Plutarch. ib. p.* 369. *Ammian. Marc. l.* 22. *Euſeb. Pr. Ev. l.* 1. c. 10. *p.* 40.

Πρῶτος τὰ περὶ τὴν θεοσέβειαν ἐκ τῆς τῶν χυδαίων ἀπειρίας, εἰς ἐμπειρον μοναρχίαν ἐμπειρίαν διέταξεν.

to Mankind. This was indeed playing the *Politician* with Religion. But that there was a ſenſe of Religion before among the People, not only appears by the former Saying of *Philo Byblius*, but by another in his *Proem* to *Sanchoniathon*; where he ſaith, *That the* Phœnicians *and* Egyptians *agreed (from whom other Nations took it up) to worſhip thoſe as their chief Gods, which were moſt uſeful to Mankind; and to this purpoſe they turn'd the Temples already ſtanding, and erected Pillars and Statues to their Memories, and made Feſtivals to them.* From whence it appears that there were Rites of publick Worſhip among them before; but that *Hermes* caus'd them to be imploy'd this way, joining the Worſhip of the Stars and their Kings together.

Καὶ εἰς τὸ χρεὼν καθιστάντας ναὺς μεταστιλβασάμβοι.

But there are two very different accounts concerning that Religion which was firſt ſetled by *Hermes* in *Egypt*. The one is of thoſe who believe there are ſome remainders of the old *Egyptian* Doctrine in the *Triſmegiſtick Books*, tho' with many additions and interpolations. And their Opinion is, that under all the popular Diſguiſes and ſuperſtitious Ceremonies for amuſing the Common People, he did cover the true Principles of Natural Religion, aſſerting the Being and Providence of God, and the Immortality of Souls. And for this, they produce not only divers paſſages in thoſe Books of *Hermes*, which were known in the *Egyptian* times, while their Prieſts were yet in being to have contradicted them, if they had publiſh'd Falſhoods under ſo great a Name; but from the Teſtimonies of *Plutarch* and *Iamblicus*, which cannot be ſuſpected: To which the Opinions of *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, who ſojourn'd ſo long among the *Egyptian* Prieſts to learn their Doctrine, may be added. But it is not pretended that in thoſe times this was the common and profeſs'd Religion among the People; but that it was kept up *as a Secret*, not to be communicated but only to ſuch who were prepar'd for it. According to this opinion, the deſign of *Hermes* was not to eſtabliſh any true Religion among the People, but to entertain them with Pomp, and Sacrifices, and Ceremonies; and (as ſome in *Plutarch* and *Diodorus* think) to keep up a difference among them about the ſacred Animals, to ſecure them from an univerſal Conſpiracy againſt the Monarchy. But if the true Notions of God, and Providence, and another World, were preſerv'd among the Prieſts, eſpecially at *Dioſpolis*, or the famous *Thebes*, where the chief of their reſidence was; then it appears, that theſe were not ſcatter'd among the Common People, by *Prieſts* and *Politicians*; but were kept ſecret, as not ſo fit for their capacities, which would go no further than viſible Deities, and a pompous Worſhip. So that the True Principles of Religion were not ſow'd by them to ſerve their ends, but the Corruptions of it, in order to the pleaſing and entertaining the ſenſes and devotions of the Common People, who they knew were moſt affected with what was moſt agreeable to their ſuperſtitious fancies. And there was much more of *Policy* than *Religion*, in keeping the Beſt parts of it from the knowledg of the People: but the *Politicians* knew very well, thoſe would not ſerve their turn ſo well as the fopperies of their Superſtition.

Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir. p. 380. Diod. Sic. l. 1.

But there is another opinion which depends moſt upon the credit of *Philo Byblius*, who liv'd about *Hadrian*'s time. This Man being learned, had a mind to make ſome noiſe in the World with the *Antiquities* of his own Country (for *Byblus* was a *Phœnician* Town.) He found the *Jewiſh* Antiquities aſſerted by *Joſephus* and others, and the *Egyptian* by *Apion*; and now he thought was a fit time to vie with them both. To that

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end, he produces Nine Books of the *Phœnician Antiquities*, written, as he pretended, long ſince by *Sanchoniathon*, and tranſlated by him into *Greek*; which he pretends *to have found after a moſt diligent ſearch into the* Phœnician *Monuments*. And to make it appear how credible this account of *Sanchoniathon* was, he ſaith, *He took it out of the Records of Cities, and the Monuments of Temples; which were kept up in the ſacred Ammonian Letters.* And this Man is very much commended by *Porphyry* writing againſt the *Chriſtians* for his *Antiquity* and *Veracity*. What ground there is for theſe Pretences may be examin'd afterwards; I am now only to conſider the Scheme of Religion, which is produc'd with ſo much pomp; and yet the Author of it, whoever he was, was neither Divine, Philoſopher, nor Politician, for it is one of the rankeſt and moſt inſipid pieces of Atheiſm that is to be found in Antiquity. And *Porphyry* could not but deteſt it, unleſs he had produc'd it in ſpite to the *Chriſtians*. For he doth on all occaſions declare not only his belief of GOD and Providence, but that he was the Maker of the World; as *Holſtenius* hath made it appear in his Life, *cap.* 9. and it is well known that he was a profeſs'd *Platoniſt*. But let us now ſee what an account we have from this *Phœnician Scheme*, about the making of the World. "At firſt there was a dark, "confus'd, reſtleſs Chaos, which was agitated for a long time, and no- "thing came of it. At length a mixture happened, and this was the "firſt principle of making the Univerſe: but it was ignorant of its own "making. From this Mixture came *Môt*, or a ſlimy kind of ſubſtance, "out of which iſſued the Generation of all things. There were ſome "Animals which had no Senſe, out of which came thoſe which had Un- "derſtanding, and were called *Zophaſemin*, i. e. Beholders of the Hea- "vens, and were made in the figure of an Egg: and the *Môt* ſhined "forth, and the Sun and Moon and great Stars appear'd. But it ſeems "thoſe living Creatures were faſt aſleep, till they were awaked by dread- "ful Thunders, and then they began to beſtir themſelves. This is the ſhort account of this matter, which depends not, we are told, on *Sanchoniathon*'s Authority; *but he took it out of the Records of* Taautus *himſelf*. And ſo we have the Original of the World according to this ancient *Hermes*. And if this were his true Doctrine, it is one of the moſt abſurd and ſenſleſs pieces of Atheiſm, and tends directly to overthrow all Religion in the World. For can any thing do it more effectually, than to ſuppoſe that there was nothing originally in the World but ſtupid Matter; which by its own motion, without a GOD to give and direct it, ſhould produce the Heavens and Earth, and all living Creatures; and that Senſleſs Creatures ſhould beget thoſe that had Underſtanding; and theſe not capable of acting, till they were thoroughly awaked by cracks of Thunder? Can we imagin this *Taautus* to have been any deep Philoſopher or Politician, by ſetting down ſuch extravagant and unreaſonable ſuppoſitions as theſe? But let us ſee how it was poſſible for him to advance any thing like Religion upon theſe grounds: He muſt be a Politician indeed that could do it. The firſt Men, he ſaith, conſecrated the Fruits of the Earth, by which they liv'd, and worſhip'd them, and made oblations to them. This was a very notable beginning of Religion, according to this admirable Politician, for Mankind to worſhip what they devour'd. But *Cotta* in *Cicero* thought **No Man could be ſo mad to worſhip what he did eat.* But he ſaith, *That theſe notions of Worſhip were ſutable to their weakneſs and puſillanimity.* This doth not give any account how they came to have any notions of Divine Worſhip at all. What was there

Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 1. c. 9.

Euſeb. l. 10. c. 9.

* *Ecquem tam amentem eſſe putas, ut illud quo veſcatur credat Deum eſſe?* Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 3. c. 16.

there in the Plants, which made them give ſuch Reverence and Devotion to them? They ſaw how they grew out of the Earth, and had no power to help themſelves, when they made uſe of them for food. And how was it poſſible then to give Divine Worſhip to them? which muſt ſuppoſe Power at leaſt in what is worſhip'd, or elſe it is a moſt ridiculous folly in Mankind to ſtoop to things ſo much below them. Now this original inclination to give Divine Worſhip to ſomething or other, is that which argues that there is that which ſome call a Natural Seed of Religion in Human Nature; and muſt come from ſome antecedent Cauſe, ſince there could be nothing in theſe Objects of Worſhip, which ſhould move them to it; if it had been ſo, as *Sanchoniathon* repreſents it from the ancient Records of *Taautus*.

The two firſt Mortals, he ſaith, *were* Æon *and* Protogonus; *and their Children were* Genus *and* Genea, *who inhabited* Phœnicia; *and when they were ſcorched with the heat, they lift up their hands to the Sun, whom they believ'd to be the Lord of Heaven, and called him* Beel-ſamen, *the ſame*, ſaith he, *whom the Greeks call* Ζεύς. But how came they to imagin any Lord of Heaven, if they knew that the Sun was made out of ſenſleſs Matter, as well as themſelves? It may be ſaid, *That they being weak and ignorant, did not know it.* But how then came their poſterity to know it, if the very firſt Race of Mankind were ignorant of it? By what means came *Taautus* to be ſo well inform'd? Revelation cannot be pretended, for that ſuppoſes what they deny, *viz.* a Supreme Being, above Matter, which hath Underſtanding, and gives it to Mankind. But here Mankind come to be underſtanding Creatures, by being born of Animals that had no Senſe: which is a moſt unreaſonable Suppoſition. They could not have it by original Tradition; for that fails in the Fountain-head, if the firſt pair of Mortals knew nothing of it. Then they muſt find it out by Reaſon: and how was that poſſible, if there was no Maker of the World, that there ſhould be *a Lord of Heaven?* It is a remarkable Saying of *Ariſtotle* obſerv'd by *Cicero*, (who ſaw ſeveral of his pieces which we have not, after they were brought to *Rome* by *Sylla*, and put into order by *Andronicus Rhodius*) That if there were Men bred under ground, and had there all conveniencies of Life, without coming upon the ſurface of the Earth; but ſhould only hear that there was a God and a Divine Power; and afterwards theſe Perſons ſhould come out of their Caves, and behold the Earth, Sea, and the Heavens, the greatneſs of the Clouds, the force of the Wind, the bulk, and beauty, and influence of the Sun, with the orderly motions and courſes of the heavenly Bodies: they could not but think, not only that there was a Divine Power, but that theſe things were the effects of it. And why ſhould there not have been the ſame thoughts in this firſt Race of Mankind, unleſs we can ſuppoſe that they had never heard of any ſuch thing as God, or a Divine Power in the World? But then I ask, How they ſhould come to think of worſhipping this *Beel-ſamen* or Lord of the Heavens? for ſo he confeſſes they did, and *lift up their hands to the Sun.* What could the lifting up their hands ſignify to a ſenſleſs maſs of Fire, which lately happened to be united together by chance in one body? If he had made Mankind wholly devoid of Religion, till they had been inſtructed in it by ſome crafty Politician, it had been much more agreeable to this *Hypotheſis*; but to ſuppoſe them to pray to the Heavenly Bodies ſo early, and without any Inſtructor, muſt imply ſome natural apprehenſion of a Deity, altho' they were ſo much miſtaken in the Object of

De Nat. Deor. l. 2. 37.

Divine Worſhip. But it is not reaſonable to believe this ſhould have been ſo early and ſo univerſal, but that they preſum'd the Sun, Moon, and Stars to have been the viſible Deities appointed to govern the viſible World; and that the Supreme Mind was to be worſhip'd in a way ſutable to his own Excellency, by acts of the Mind; which was the opinion of many Nations, and ſome of the greateſt Philoſophers.

Then he proceeds to relate, how after ſome of their poſterity had found out ſome uſeful Inventions as to the conveniences of Life; after their death their Children erected Statues and Pillars to their Memories, and worſhip'd and kept annual Feſtivals at them: and that after the death of *Uranus*, and *Cronus*, and *Dagon*, and the reſt, *Taautus* made Symbolical Images of them, being made King of *Egypt* by *Cronus*; and theſe things he ſaith, the *Cabiri*, by *Taautus* his own command, enter'd into Records, from whence we are to believe that *Sanchoniathon* took them, and *Philo Byblius* tranſlated them out of the *Phœnician* Language. And *Euſebius* ſeems not to queſtion the antiquity of them, but prefers this plain and ſimple Story far before the Inventions of Poets, or the Allegories of the Philoſophers. If theſe things were recorded by the *Cabiri*, the Sons of *Sydyc*, Brother to *Miſor*, the Father of *Taautus*, they do not ſeem to have conſulted the honour of *Taautus*; for they make him not barely to be chief Counſellor to *Cronus*, in the deſign againſt his Father *Uranus*, but that he made uſe of Magical Arts againſt him, (but they do not tell us who invented them, nor upon what principles they could be founded, if there were nothing but Matter in the World) and beſides this, he advis'd *Cronus*, having a ſuſpicion of his Brother, to bury him alive in the Earth. And one would think ſo great a Politician as *Hermes*, would never have commanded the *Cabiri* to have preſerv'd theſe Stories of himſelf and his Anceſtors.

However, this is the account given by *Philo Byblius*, out of *Sanchoniathon*, about the firſt planting Religion by *Hermes*, who was after worſhipped himſelf as a God by the *Egyptians*. And now let any one conſider, whether this be a reaſonable or tolerable account of the firſt *ſowing the ſeeds of Religion among Mankind*. And yet this was the foundation of that ſort of Religion which came out of *Phœnicia* and *Egypt* into *Greece*: For they pretend to give an account of *Uranus* and *Cronus*, or *Saturn* and his Sons, and of *Minerva* at *Athens*, to whom *Sanchoniathon* ſaith, *Saturn gave the dominion of it*; but the *Greeks*, as *Philo Byblius* complains, *confounded all with their Fables and Allegories*: but this, he ſaith, is the true foundation which they rais'd their *Mythology* upon.

It is evident by what is ſaid by *Herodotus*, *Diodorus Siculus* and others, that there were ſeveral Colonies that went out of *Egypt* into *Greece*, in the times of *Cecrops*, *Cadmus*, *Danaus*, and *Erectheus*; and it is very probable that they carry'd the *Egyptian* Superſtitions along with them: but the Perſon who is pretended to have ſetled Religion among the *Greeks*, was *Orpheus*, who is ſaid to have reduc'd them firſt from Barbariſm, and then to have model'd Religion among them, and to have brought out of *Egypt* the Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, and the Rewards and Puniſhments of a Future State.

This muſt therefore be more particularly inquired into. *Orpheus* is reported to have been a Man of Quality in his own Country of *Thrace*, his Father having a Command over a ſmall Territory there, called *Sithonia*, * ſaith *Pliny*, near the Mountain *Rhodope*, whence he had his Title *Rhodopeius Orpheus*. But † *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith, *That when he had accompliſhed*

* *Plin. l. 4. c. 11.*
† *Diod. Sic. l. 1. & 4.*
Euſeb. Pr. Evang. l. 2. c. 1.

compliſhed himſelf at home, he went into Egypt; *and from thence brought the greateſt part of the* Egyptian *Myſteries into* Greece, *only changing the Names from* Oſiris *and* Iſis, *to* Bacchus *and* Ceres; and ſo he did, *as to*
L. 10. c. 8. *the ſtate of the Good and Bad after death.* For, ſaith he, *The* Elyſian *Fields for the Good, and the Torments of* Hades *for the Bad, were both of* Egyptian *original.* I do not queſtion but the *Egyptian* Superſtition was in great meaſure the foundation of the *Greek*; but it is hard to determin any thing concerning *Orpheus*, ſince *Ariſtotle*, who was born in *Macedonia*,
De Nat. Deor. l. 1. *knew nothing of him*, as *Cicero* informs us, and *that the Verſes under his Name were written by a* Pythagorean. Which is not at all improbable. But not only *Diodorus* ſpeaks poſitively about him, but *Strabo* and *Pauſanias* ſeem not at all to queſtion him; and *Diogenes Laertius* mentions an Epitaph upon him at *Dios* in *Macedonia:* But I lay no weight on the Verſes under his Name; for *Suidas* mentions ſeveral antient Poets of that Name; and it is allow'd on all hands, that there have been at leaſt great Additions and Interpolations in the Verſes that bear the Name of *Orpheus.* The *Argonautics*, *Suidas* ſaith, were written by one *Orpheus* of *Crotone*, one well acquainted with *Piſiſtratus:* Others ſay, the true Author of the *Orphic Poems* was *Onomacritus*, who liv'd about that time; and the *Deſcent into Hades* was written by one *Orpheus* of *Camarine*, ſaith *Suidas.* The moſt probable Opinion is that of *Ariſtotle*, that his Sacred Poems were written by a *Pythagorean*; and therefore the *Platoniſts Syrianus* and *Proclus* might well boaſt of the agreement of the *Orphic* and *Pythagorean* Doctrines. It is no Objection, that there is no ſuch thing now to be found in *Ariſtotle*; for I think *Cicero* may be truſted, who ſaw more of *Ariſtotle* than we now have. But I confeſs if *Diodorus* were not deceiv'd by the *Egyptian* Prieſts, their mentioning him with *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, *Eudoxus*, and *Democritus*, who were certainly in *Egypt*, makes it very credible, that *Orpheus* had been there too, and carry'd many of the *Egyptian* ſuperſtitions with him: and he might the eaſier ſettle them in *Greece*, becauſe, as *Diodorus Siculus* obſerves, he had a particular intereſt in the Colony which *Cadmus* brought, and was much eſteem'd by them; and *Cadmus* himſelf was originally of *Thebes* or *Dioſpolis*; altho' *Cadmus* himſelf might call it after his own Name; or at leaſt the Caſtle, which long continued it, when the City was called *Thebes.*

But that *Orpheus* did not find thoſe parts ſo barbarous, as to be deſtitute of all Religion before, will appear from the account *Diodorus Siculus* himſelf gives of him, *viz. That he was very well inſtructed in the Theology of his Country before he went into* Egypt. How could this be, if they were a wild and barbarous People, without any ſenſe of GOD and Religion, till he return'd and planted it among them? It's true, he calls it a *Mythology*; and what elſe were the *Egyptian* Doctrines about *Oſiris* and *Iſis*, or about *Bacchus* and *Ceres*, as *Orpheus* chang'd them? But whether it were a *Mythology* or not, he calls it a *Theology*; ſuch as was then known and thought to be true Doctrine, and I am apt to think, more decent and agreeable to their natural notions of Religion, than the Myſteries which *Orpheus* brought among them from the *Egyptians.* Some have obſerv'd, that the very Name of Religion among the *Greeks* was deriv'd from the *Thracians* (Θρησκεία) and ſuch Religion they had among them, before *Orpheus* was born, as *Diodorus* himſelf confeſſes. Whether *Zamolxis* had inſtructed them in Religion before the time of *Orpheus*, we cannot determin, unleſs his time had been better fix'd: The *Greeks*, who write *Pythagoras* his Life in favor to themſelves, make *Zamolxis* his

Καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Θεολογίας μυθολογούμενα μαθὼν, ἀπεδήμησε πρὸς τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους. l. 4. p. 232.

Servant; and that he went from them to inſtruct the *Getæ*, among whom he was honor'd as a God. But *Herodotus*, who extols them *as the moſt valiant and juſt of the* Thracians, after he had told the *Greek* Story about *Zamolxis* being *Servant to* Pythagoras, he concludes, *That he thought him long before* Pythagoras. And he ſaith, *that the* Thracians *had that opinion of his Doctrine, that they deſpis'd Death, ſaying, they only went to* Zamolxis. From whence it is plain, that the *Thracians* then believed the Immortality of the Soul: and *Pomponius Mela* ſaith, *that Belief continu'd among them to his time.* But whereas *Diodorus Siculus* affirms, that Orpheus *brought all the Mythology about* Hades, *and the ſtate of the Dead, out of* Egypt, *and the cuſtoms of Burial there; for the Body was to be convey'd over the Lake* Acheron *by* Charon, *where on one ſide were pleaſant Fields, and not far off the Temple of* Hecate, *and* Cocytus, *and* Lethe: I do not deny that *Orpheus* might add particular circumſtances from what he had obſerv'd in *Egypt*; but that the whole Tradition concerning a Future State came from thence, is ſo ſo far from being true, that the *Thracians*, the *Getæ*, and *Hyperborei* had the like Tradition among them; as appears by the *Gothic Edda*'s, where we read *of the Judgment* of another World, and that the Good ſhall dwell with *Odin* in a happy ſtate, and the Bad go to *Hellen* and *Thiffulheim*: and a large account is given of the manner of Judicature in the other World, from the Braſs Tables of the *Hyperborei* in the Iſland of *Delos*, which are mention'd in the Dialogue *Axiochus* in *Plato*'s Works. And however it be not genuine, it is ſufficient to our purpoſe that all this Tradition came not out of *Egypt*. One would think, by the account given by *Diodorus*, that neither *Orpheus*, nor the *Egyptians*, believ'd any thing at all concerning a Future State: but that only ſome Ceremonies were us'd about Burials, wherein the Lives of Men were enquir'd into, and Judgment paſs'd upon them; which the Hiſtorian thinks more effectual for reforming Mankind, than the *Greek* or Poetical Fables. But that the *Egyptians* had a real Belief of another State, appears from *Diodorus* himſelf. For if any Perſon were accus'd before the ſolemn Judicature, which ſat upon him; if the matter were not prov'd, the Accuſer was ſeverely puniſh'd; if it were, the Body was depriv'd of Burial: If there were no Accuſation, then the Perſon's Virtues were remembred, his Piety, Juſtice, Chaſtity, *&c.* and they concluded with a Prayer, that he might be admitted to the bleſſed Society of the Good; and the People applauded his Happineſs in that reſpect. But *Porphyry*, who cannot be ſuſpected of Forgery in this matter, gives a more particular account of this Prayer, which he ſaith *Euphantus* tranſlated out of the *Egyptian* Language; and the ſubſtance of it is this: They firſt take out the Bowels, and put them into a Cheſt on purpoſe, and then lift it up towards Heaven; and the Perſon to whom it belongs, makes a Prayer in the name of the Deceaſed, to the Sun and all the Gods, which give Life to Men, that they would receive him into the Society of the immortal Gods. For he had piouſly worſhip'd the Gods his Parents had taught him, as long as he liv'd; he had honor'd thoſe from whom he came into the World; he had not kill'd, nor injur'd or defrauded any one, nor had committed any horrible Wickedneſs; but if he had offended in eating and drinking, it was for the ſake of that which was in that Cheſt; and ſo they took that, and threw it into the River, and intombed the reſt of the Body. By this we ſee a diſtinction is to be made between the general ſenſe of another Life, and ſome particular Superſtitions, ſuch as thoſe

Herodot. l. 9. c. 95.

Mela l. 2. c. 2.

Diod. Sic. l. 1. p. 58, 61.

Edda Mythol. c. 3.

Porphyr. de Abſtin. l. 1. c. 10.

Orpheus

Orpheus carry'd into *Greece*, where they had a notion of another World before, as well as in *Egypt*. For it is not reaſonable to preſume that the *Greeks* ſhould be worſe in this reſpect than the moſt barbarous Northern People. For, beſides thoſe already mention'd, *Cæſar*, and *Strabo*, and *Ammianus Marcellinus* ſay, *that the* Druids *aſſerted the Immortality of Souls*; and neither *Orpheus*, nor any out of *Egypt* ever convers'd among them.

Cæſ. l. 6. Strabo l. 4. Ammian. Marcellin. l. 15.

But ſome in our Age are ſo fond of the *Egyptians*, that they will by all means make the Immortality of Souls to be *a Noble Invention of theirs*. What is the meaning of this *Noble Invention?* Is it that none ever thought of it before them, and all others deriv'd it from them? That appears already to be otherwiſe, and that very diſtant and remote Nations, who had no communication with theſe Noble Inventors, held the ſame Opinions; as might, if it were needful, be prov'd by undoubted Teſtimonies, both of the *Eaſt* and *Weſt Indies*, where neither *Orpheus* nor the *Egyptian* Prieſts were ever heard of. And *Pauſanias* long ſince obſerv'd, *That the* Chaldeans *and* Indians *held the ſame*, and before the *Egyptians*; for he *makes them the firſt*. But *Herodotus* ſaith, *That the* Egyptians *were the firſt who aſſerted the Immortality of Souls*. Not abſolutely; *but ſo as to paſs from one Body to another, till at laſt it came into a human Body*. And of this *Noble Invention* let the *Egyptians* have the due honor; and not thoſe *Greeks*, who, as he ſaith, *would deprive them of it*. It is great pity they ſhould loſe it, ſince *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith, *The Soul of* Oſiris *paſt into a Bull, and that is the reaſon why they give ſo much honor to it*. It cannot be deny'd, that ſome *Greek* Philoſophers of great reputation did aſſert the *Tranſmigration of Souls*, if their Doctrine be not miſrepreſented: but neither *Pythagoreans* nor *Platoniſts* did hold it univerſally, nor in ſuch a manner as is commonly underſtood. For, they held no Tranſmigration of the Souls of Good Men, which were fit for Happineſs; but aſſerted that they went immediately to Heaven, or a ſtate of Bliſs, as may be prov'd by the teſtimonies of *Epicharmus*, *Empedocles*, *Plato*, and many others: but the difficulty lay about Impure Souls; the *Pythagoreans* utterly rejected the poetical Fables about the ſtate of the Dead; and therefore they were forc'd to think of ſome way of purifying them after Death. They had no Light to direct them, but their own Imagination; and they thought it beſt for the ſame Soul to come into another Human Body, to try if it would behave it ſelf better, that it might be happy: But for profligate and very wicked Perſons, they told them of going into ſuch Beaſts, as were moſt remarkable for thoſe Vices they were moſt addicted to; as the Cruel into Tygers and Beaſts of Prey; the Voluptuous into Swine; the Proud and Vain into Birds; the Idle and Soft into Fiſhes. This is the account given, ſaith *Beſſarion*, by *Timæus* in his Book *de Mundo & Animâ*. And when *Trapezuntius* charg'd *Plato* with aſſerting that *Brutes were informed by Human Souls*; Cardinal *Beſſarion*, a very learned *Greek*, utterly denies it, and ſaith, *That* Plato *doth not make the Soul of a Man to become the Soul of a Brute*; *but only that it is confined to it as a Priſon for a certain time, but it is not capable of acting there for want of proper Organs*. So that theſe Philoſophers Opinion was very different from the *Egyptians*. But whence came the moſt antient Philoſophers to hold the Immortality of Souls? Had they it from the *Egyptians?* *Plutarch* ſaith, That Thales *was the firſt*; not that held the Soul to be immortal; for ſo many did before him; but that maintained it as a Philoſopher by Reaſon; that is, becauſe it had the Principle

Nobiliſſimum autem eorum inventum ſuit Immortalitas Animæ. Canon. Chron. p. 217.

Pauſan. in Meſſ.

Herodot. l. 2. c. 123.

Diod. Sic. l. p. 54.

Epicharm. apud Grot. Excerpt. p. 481. Element. Alex. Str. 5. Poëſis Philoſ. p. 28.

Beſſar. cont. Calumn. l. 2. c. 7.

* Θαλῆς δὲ πεφιώσαλο πρῶτος τὴν ψυχὴν φύσιν ἀειχίνησον καὶ ἀϊδιόκινησον, *Plut. de Plac. Phil. l. 4. c. 2.*

Principle of Motion within it ſelf, and ſo could not be ſuppoſed to forſake it ſelf, or to ceaſe moving by the death of the Body. For, as *Cicero* obſerves, a Body is moved by impulſe from another Body; but the Soul finds it hath this power wholly within and from it ſelf, and therefore is immortal. *Cicero Tuſc.* 1. 23.

But *Pythagoras* is ſaid *to have learnt this Doctrine in* Egypt: He called the Soul *a ſelf-moving Number*, ſaith *Plutarch* in the ſame place, *i. e.* as he well explains it, he puts *Number* after his myſtical way for *a Mind*: and it ſeems very ſtrange to me that ſo great a Man as *Ariſtotle* ſhould think *Pythagoras* ſpake literally of *Numbers*, as tho' any Number could move it ſelf. But *Plutarch* rightly interpreted him, and the latter *Pythagoreans* from *Moderatus Gadetanus* made no ſcruple of ſaying that Pythagoras *expreſſed his ſenſe about immaterial Beings by Numbers and Figures, as having nothing of Matter in them.* And it is very probable, he learnt this way from the *Symbols* and *Hieroglyphicks* of the *Egyptians*. But *Cicero* ſaith, *That he had learnt the Immortality of the Soul from his Maſter* Pherecydes, *which he confirmed very much.* And it is obſervable, that he firſt ſuppoſes *a general conſent of Mankind as to the Immortality of Souls, from a very antient Tradition*; and then proceeds to the *Philoſophers*, who offer'd to give Reaſons for aſſerting it, of which he gives an account. And if there were ſuch a general conſent *from all Antiquity*, as he affirms, then this Doctrine could not originally come out of *Egypt* by *Orpheus* into *Greece*. *Porphyr. in vit. Pythag. Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir. p. 354. Cicero Tuſc.* 1. 16. *Cap.* 13. *Cap.* 12.

Let us now conſider the ſenſe of Religion or Divine Worſhip among the *Greeks* before *Orpheus* his time; whether they were ſuch Strangers to it, as they muſt be ſuppoſed, if he brought it firſt among them. *Plato* was a very competent Witneſs as to the *Old Greeks*; and he affirms *that the firſt Inhabitants of* Greece *ſeem'd to him to have worſhip'd no other Gods, but the Sun, Moon, and Earth, and Stars, and the Heavens, as moſt barbarous Nations ſtill do.* So that here we have the ſame *Religion* in *Greece*, that was then common to the reſt of the World; *i. e.* the Worſhip of *Viſible Deities*, and ſuch as they apprehended to have the greateſt influence upon their Affairs. The heavenly Bodies did ſtrike them with aſtoniſhment at their Vaſtneſs, and Beauty, and orderly Motion, and the Benefits they continually receiv'd from them; and theſe they were moſt ready to pay their Devotions to, as to thoſe which appear'd moſt to them; but that which did not appear, was to them, that were ſo much govern'd by Senſe, as if it were not. As if we ſuppoſe a Prince travelling with his Chariot in the Country, with the Curtains drawn up on all ſides, and a great Retinue about him; the People are much ſurprized with ſo great an Appearance, and flock about them to ſee to whom they muſt pay their Reſpects; and ſeeing no body in the Chariot, they turn their eyes to the Attendants, and eſpecially to him that ſits ſo high in the Coach-box and manages the Horſes; and immediately give him that profound Reverence which was only due to the Prince himſelf, if he had appear'd: Much after this manner it was with the Barbarous People, both in *Greece* and other parts of the World. There was ſomething ſo great, as to require Devotion from them; and they looked about them, and could ſee nothing which they thought could deſerve it better than the Sun, Moon, and Stars, which were placed very high, and were the great Movers which kept all things in their order, and made them ſo ſerviceable to them. But this is far from being an argument that they had no Religion; it being rather a ſign they had *Plato in Cratyl.* p. 397.

too much, but knew not how to govern it. But this was a far more reaſonable Worſhip than that which *Orpheus* or the *Old Poets* brought in among the *Greeks*, whoſe Stories and Ceremonies were ſo filthy and indecent, as were enough to have turn'd the ſtomachs of modeſt and virtuous Men from any kind of Worſhip, which had the tincture of ſo much Obſcenity going along with it. And it is really to be wonder'd at, that the *Orphick Myſteries* and *poetical Fables* receiv'd among the *Greeks*, did not quite overthrow all Religion among them. For, as *Plutarch* well ſaith, *Abſurd Notions of* God *have very bad conſequences both ways; for ſome are plung'd into the depth of Superſtition, and others, to avoid that, run themſelves into Atheiſm.* And if there had not been ſome very great reaſon in Nature, to have kept the Notion of a Deity in Mens Minds; it is hardly conceivable, that under all the horrible Superſtitions of *Greece*, there ſhould be any ſuch thing as a ſenſe of Religion left among them. But the evidence of that was ſo great, as made all Men of Underſtanding to put any tolerable ſenſe upon thoſe *vile Superſtitions*, which were ſo prevailing in *Greece*, after the *Egyptian Fopperies* were brought in among them. The Rule they went by was this, That Religion muſt be preſerv'd in the World, not to ſerve Politick Ends, but to ſatisfy the Reaſon and common Senſe of Mankind; and that ſince ſuch a way of Worſhip was ſo generally receiv'd, they were willing to put the beſt conſtructions upon it, and to make it ſome way or other ſerve to keep up the ſenſe of a Divine Power in the management of the World. And of this we have a remarkable inſtance in *Plutarch*, with reſpect to the *Egyptian Myſteries*, in his Treatiſe of *Iſis* and *Oſiris*. He profeſſes at firſt *a great deſire to find out the truth of theſe things that concern the knowledg of* God, *it being the greateſt Bleſſing* God *can give, and Mankind can receive; and that without it Immortality is not Life, but Duration. And the end of all*, he ſaith, *is the knowledg of the firſt and principal and intellectual Being.* But he can make nothing at all of the *Matters of fact* with relation to *Oſiris* and *Iſis*, which he looks on as very abſurd, and ſo overthrows all the *Phœnician Scheme* of *Philo Byblius*, who lived much about the ſame time under *Trajan*: But *Plutarth* ſaith, *To underſtand thoſe things of a Divine Being literally, is ſo abſurd and impious, that they deſerve to be ſpit at who offer them.* And for thoſe, *who interpret theſe things of great Princes in former times, who had Divine Honor given them, this*, he ſaith, *is the way to overthrow the natural ſenſe of a Divine Being, and ſo open the way to Atheiſm, by confounding Gods and Men together*; as he ſaith, *Euhemerus Meſſenius* had done. And therefore he was fain to turn all into *Allegory*, to avoid the miſchief of abſurd and impious Opinions concerning that Divine Power, which he owned to be in the World; and not only ſo, but he adds (as is already obſerved) that *there was a very antient Tradition in the World, among all ſorts of Men; and which had obtained a firm and unſhaken Belief in the World, not only in common talk, but in their greateſt Myſteries, and that both among Greeks and Barbarians, that the Univerſe was not made by chance, or without reaſon, but that it was made and governed by it.* From whence it follows, that there was ſuch a Tradition among the *old Greeks*, which did not loſe its Authority, when thoſe Myſteries were brought in; and that made the moſt intelligent Perſons to apply them that way. For it ſeems, by the account he gives of *Euhemerus Meſſenius*, that Atheiſtical Perſons took great advantages

Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir.

Ων τέλος μὲν ἡ τῶν περὶ τοῦ θείου καὶ νοητοῦ γνῶσις. p. 352.

P. 358.

Διὰ τὴν παμπάλαιον αὐτὴν ἐν Θεολόγων τε νομοθετῶν καὶ ποιητῶν, καὶ φιλοσόφων δόξαν τὴν ἐρχὴν ἀδέσποτον ἔχουσαν, καὶ οὐ πίστιν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ δυσεξάλειπτον, οὐκ ἐν λόγοις μόνον, οὐδὲ ἐν φήμαις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τελεταῖς, καὶ θυσίαις, καὶ βαρβάροις καὶ Ἕλλησι πολλαχοῦ διαφερομένην, ὡς ὑπ' ἄνου καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἀκυβέρνητον αἰωπῆ τοῦ αὐτομάτου τὸ Πᾶν. P. 369.

from

from theſe Stories of their Gods, to prove that there were none at all; but only that Great Men in former Ages, that had found out ſome uſeful Inventions, were deify'd after their deaths. *Plutarch* makes that a fabulous Story, which he tells of his *Golden Inſcriptions* in *Panchæa*, to prove the truth of his aſſertion, *which none ever ſaw beſides himſelf*; and he affirms, That there were no ſuch Perſons as the *Panchæi:* but others have ſhew'd that there was ſuch a place as *Panchæa* about *Arabia Fœlix*. And *Diodorus Siculus* mentions it as a conſiderable Iſland in the *Arabian* Sea, and that the Inhabitants are called *Panchæi*; and that near the City *Panara* there is a Temple to *Jupiter Triphyllius*, which was in great veneration for its Antiquity and Magnificence, which he deſcribes at large; and upon the Mountain there it is ſaid that *Uranus* of old inhabited; and the People were called *Triphyllii*, from three different Tribes which join'd there, and were afterwards driven out by *Ammon*. And to make the Story of *Euhemerus* more probable, he ſaith, the Inhabitants came firſt out of *Crete* in *Jupiter*'s time. So that *Plutarch* was very much to ſeek, when he deny'd that there was any ſuch Place as *Panchæa*, or ſuch a Perſon as *Jupiter Triphyllius*. And *Diodorus* further ſaith, there was in it a golden Pillar in the old *Egyptian* Letters, wherein there were Inſcriptions containing the Acts of *Uranus* and *Jupiter*, and of *Diana* and *Apollo* written by *Hermes*. Which is a very different account of this matter, from what *Plutarch* gives. Some are willing to excuſe *Euhemerus*, as tho' he intended nothing more, but to let the *Greeks* know, that they worſhip'd ſuch for Gods which had been Men; which was true enough. But this did not reach his deſign, according to *Plutarch*; which was to prove, *that there were no other Gods but theſe:* ſo *Plutarch* ranks him with *Diagoras Melius* and *Theodorus*, who ſaid *there were no Gods*. And the *Epicurean* in *Tully* ſaid, *that* Euhemerus *deſtroy'd all Religion*; which could not be true, if he had left any Divinity to be worſhip'd. *Sextus Empiricus* reckons him among the *Atheiſts*, and ſaith, he was *a conceited Man*; but he charges him only with ſaying, *That ſome great Men in former Ages had been made Gods*. Which was ſo evident a thing, that one would think none could have been called an *Atheiſt* merely upon that account. But *Jupiter* of *Crete* had been advanc'd a long time to the higheſt Divine Honor; and conſequently thoſe who went about to diſprove his Worſhip, were thought to deſtroy the Worſhip which belongs to the Supreme God. But *Diodorus Siculus*, in a Fragment of his ſixth Book preſerv'd by *Euſebius*, gives a very different account of him; and that from *Euhemerus* his own words, *viz.* That the Antients had deliver'd to their Poſterity two different Notions of Gods; one of thoſe that were Eternal and Immortal, as the Sun, Moon, and Stars, and other parts of the Univerſe; but others were Terreſtrial Gods, that were ſo made, becauſe they were Benefactors to Mankind, as *Hercules*, *Bacchus*, and others. And as to *Euhemerus*, he ſaith, *that he was a Favorite of* Caſſander *King of* Macedonia, *by whoſe command he made a Voyage into thoſe parts*, where he found the things before mention'd. But ſome learned Men are ſtill of *Plutarch*'s opinion, that *Euhemerus* his *Panchæa* is a mere figment of his; for which I do not ſee any reaſon ſufficient; eſpecially when the ſame Perſons do allow *Sanchoniathon*'s *Phœnician* Antiquities; and methinks *Euhemerus* his account of the Inſcriptions on Pillars of the Acts of *Uranus* and *Cronus*, and *Jupiter* and *Ammon*, and *the Sacred Letters* by *Hermes*, comes ſo near to *Philo Byblius*, that one would think he had compar'd Notes with *Euhemerus* and *Diodorus Siculus*.

Diod. Sicul. l. 5. p. 220.

Plutarch. de Placitis Philoſ. l. 7. Cicer. de N. D. l. 1. Sext. Emp. ad Mathe. p. 317.

Euſeb. Pr. Evang. l. 2. c. 2.

Bochart. Phaleg. l. 2. c. 8.

But their design was different in this respect, that *Sanchoniathon* justify'd the making Men to be Gods; but *Euhemerus* went about to prove they were *not Gods*, because they had *been Men*. It is possible that the common People might account him an Atheist for denying *Jupiter* of *Crete* to be God, or for saying, that his Sepulchre was to be found. But why should *Plutarch* charge him on this account, when he himself so much finds fault with these who made Men to be Gods? He endeavour'd, he saith, to avoid the extremes both of *Superstition* and *Atheism*; but he could but *endeavour* it, when he allow'd the Practices of the *Greeks* and *Egyptians*, and only offer'd at some forced Interpretations of them, against the general sense of the *Egyptian* Mysteries.

But however it appears from him, that the *old Greeks* did preserve the antient Tradition of *the World not being made by chance*, which is the foundation of all Religion. And *Plato*, when he enters upon the Discourse against *Atheism*, begins with two things, *viz. That the Sun, and Moon, and Stars, and the order of Seasons shew'd there was a* GOD *and Providence*; *and the consent of all Mankind, Greeks and Barbarians.* Now, how could *Plato* have said this of the *old Greeks*, if they had been without any Religion till *Orpheus* came out of *Egypt*? And we have an evident proof of the practice of Divine Worship among them, from the *Parian Chronicle*, where it is said, *That* Deucalion *after he had escaped the Flood went to* Athens, *and there offered a solemn Sacrifice for his Deliverance*; and *Pausanias* saith, *he there built a magnificent Temple.* Which are sufficient Evidences of the Religion of the *old Greeks*, even before they had the Name of *Hellens* from the Son of *Deucalion.* But I have not yet done with *Diodorus Siculus*, who lets fall several Insinuations, as tho' he were of the mind of *Euhemerus Messenius*; and that the old Religion, both in *Egypt* and elsewhere, was nothing but a *Politick Contrivance.* For in the beginning of his History, he pretends to give an account of the beginning of all things: but it is such a one as plainly shews he was no friend to Religion; for he takes away the very foundation of it, by supposing the World to be produc'd without any Intellectual Cause. He saith at first there were two Opinions among the Philosophers and Historians: One was, that the World had been always just as it is; the other, that there was a beginning of Mankind, and of other things. But how? This he undertakes to explain after this manner. At first there was a Chaos, or a confus'd mixture of Heaven and Earth and all together; then follow'd a Separation of Bodies from each other, and thence came the present Frame of the World. The lighter Bodies mov'd forward, as the Air and Fire, by which Motion came the Sun, Moon and Stars: But the grosser and more heavy parts subsided together; the moister made the Sea, and the dry the Earth, which was very moist; but being quicken'd by the heat of the Sun, swell'd up in several Tumors with thin Skins containing the Materials of living Creatures, which having strength brake thro' those Skins, and thence came all sorts of Animals. But the heat of the Sun and the Winds hardening the Surface of the Earth, no more of such Swellings appear'd; and so the Animals are since continued by Propagation. But the Men which were thus born were very wild at first, but by degrees they came to understand one another, and to find out the conveniencies of Living. This is the short Abstract of the Account he gives, which is just the *Epicurean Hypothesis* in other Terms, which was much in vogue in the time of *Diodorus Siculus*, (which, saith *Suidas*, was that of *Augustus*) especially after *Lucre-*

Plato de LL. l. 10.

Marmor. Arundell.

Pausan. in Atticis.

Lucretius his Poem was in ſuch reputation: For, he ſaith, he very well underſtood the *Latin* Tongue, and had great helps to his Hiſtory from *Rome*; and whoſoever compares this with *Lucretius*, will ſcarce find any difference. And *Euſebius* obſerves, that he does not ſo much as once mention the Name of GOD in it, but leaves all to Chance and a fortuitous concourſe; and as it is expreſs'd in *Plutarch*, where the *Epicurean Opinion* is deliver'd much to the ſame purpoſe, the World is ſaid to have come together at firſt by a Motion of Atoms without Providence. Where there muſt be ſomething defective in the beginning, to ſhew this to have been the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*; for as it ſtands, it ſeems to be *Plutarch*'s own opinion, which is directly contrary to what he had ſaid before in the foregoing Chapter, where he blames *Anaximander* for leaving out the efficient Cauſe; for, ſaith he, Matter alone can do nothing without it. And the ſame he repeats againſt *Anaximenes*, and ſaith plainly, * That it is impoſſible that Matter alone ſhould be the Cauſe of Things, as it is for Metals to form themſelves into Pots and Cups without an Artiſt. So that *Plutarch* muſt be clear'd from that Opinion, which he ſo juſtly oppoſes; and he commends *Anaxagoras* in a particular manner, for adding Mind as the Efficient Cauſe to Matter, which brought it out of confuſion into that order that appears in the World. *Pliny* ſaith of *Diodorus*, *Apud Græcos deſit nugari*; but he only applies it to the Title of his Book, and it is not true of the Beginning of it. *Pliny* himſelf took the World to be an Eternal Being, which he calls *God*, and ſo was againſt *Diodorus* his Making of the World. But *Diodorus* quotes *Euripides* the Scholar of *Anaxagoras* for his Chaos: but that is not the point, whether there were ſuch Confuſion at firſt, but how the World came out of it. It's certain that *Anaxagoras* did not only hold a *Chaos* at firſt, but an *Eternal Mind*, which order'd the World, and brought things into that Beauty and Uſefulneſs which they have. *Diogenes Laertius* ſaith, that *Anaxagoras* follow'd *Linus*, and he was before *Orpheus*: If it were only in that of *the Chaos*, there was nothing extraordinary in that; for all that ſuppoſed the World to be made, aſſerted it; but if it were of the Mind as the Efficient Cauſe, that is a conſiderable teſtimony of the antiquity of that Opinion among the *old Greeks*. And *Orpheus*, as *Suidas* gives an account of his Doctrine, ſaith, *That he held a Chaos, and before that an Æther of* GOD's *making, which was the great Inſtrument in framing the World.*

Euſeb. Pr. Evang. l. 1. c. 7. *Plutarch. de Placit. Phil. l. 1. c. 4.* * Ἀδυνάτον γὰρ ἐξ ἀχλώος μίαν τῆς ὕλης τῆς ἐνούσης, ἐξ ἧς τὰ πάντα ὑπάρξαι· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν οἰκίον χρὴ ὑποτίθεναι. *Plutar. de Plac. Phil. l. 1. c. 3.* *Plin. N. H. l. 1. c. 1.* *Lib. 2. c. 1.* *Laert. in Proëm.*

But *Euſebius* charges *the moſt part of the* Greek *Philoſophers with being of* Diodorus *his mind in this matter*: but I hope to make it appear otherwiſe in the progreſs of this Diſcourſe, being now only to conſider this Aſſertion as we find it in him. And I cannot but take notice of the unfairneſs of it; for he repreſents it, as if there had been but two Opinions among the Philoſophers, that *of the Eternity of the World*, and its *being made by Chance*; as if he had never heard of an *Eternal Mind* among them: which it is impoſſible ſo inquiſitive and learned a Man ſhould be ignorant of. But he offers no kind of proof of the truth of what he lays down; not ſo much as the Inſcriptions of *Hermes*, or the *Commentaries* of *Taautus*, which *Sanchoniathon* and *Philo Byblius* pretended to. He gave no manner of Reaſon how the confus'd Matter was put into motion, or how the ſeparation of the lighter and heavier Bodies was effected; how the heavenly Bodies came to have diſtinct *Vortices*, without interfering with each other; how the moiſter and heavier parts came to be divided, ſo as to make two ſuch great Bodies, as the Earth

Euſeb. de Præp. Ev. l. 1. c. 8.

and

and Sea to be ſo diſtinguiſh'd and parted from one another: which are conſiderable Difficulties, and ought to have been clear'd. It may be ſaid, *That he writes not like a Philoſopher, but as an Hiſtorian, and only in general lays down the Principles that had been receiv'd by Philoſophers.* But this doth not vindicate him: For then he ſhould have ſet down all their Opinions, which he doth not; but purpoſely avoids that which would have reſolv'd theſe Difficulties. For if an Eternal Mind be ſuppos'd to give and direct the Motion of Matter, then we may eaſily conceive, not only whence Motion it ſelf came; but whence Gravitation, or the tendency of Bodies towards their Center; whence the ſeveral great Bodies of the Heavens came to have their diſtinct circumvolations; and whence the Earth and Sea came to be ſo divided, and parted from one another.

But *Diodorus* was ſenſible that there would be great Objections made againſt *the production of Animals out of the Earth*, without any other Cauſe than *the heat of the Sun, and moiſture and putrefaction of the ſlimy ſubſtance of the Earth.* And therefore to anſwer them, *the* Egyptians, he ſaith, *produce this Experiment among them, that about* Thebes, *when the Earth is moiſtened by the* Nile, *by the intenſe Heat of the Sun falling upon it, an innumerable multitude of Mice do ſpring out; which being done after the Earth was ſo much hardened, and the firſt Influences abated, much more might all kind of Animals come out of the Earth at firſt.*

I. But in the firſt place, we have nothing but the teſtimony of theſe *Egyptians* for the original truth of this, who brought it as an Argument to juſtify their own *Hypotheſis.* And from them other Writers have taken it, without examining the truth of it, as *Ovid, Mela, Pliny,* &c. *Ælian* goes farther (who liv'd in *Hadrian*'s time) for he ſaith, *in his way between* Naples *aud* Puteoli, *he ſaw ſuch imperfect Animals, half Mud, and half living Creatures*;

Ovid. Metamorph. l. 15.

Plin. l. 9. 58.

Altera pars vivit, rudis eſt pars altera tellus;

As *Ovid* deſcribes them. But this is very far from making any tolerable proof; for they might be perfect Animals, and only one part appear out of the Mud or Dirt, and the other be cover'd over with it. And this in all probability was the caſe in *Egypt.* For theſe were ſeen only *in the Mud*, after the *Nile* was return'd into its Channel, as *Mela* affirms, *Ubi ſedavit diluvia & ſe ſibi reddidit, per humentes campos quædam non perfecta animalia,* &c. Now this was a very ill time for any Perſons to go farther than as to what appear'd to them at a diſtance: and becauſe they ſaw but ſome Parts, they concluded the reſt to be nothing but Slime. But this is a very ſlight and imperfect way of making *Experiments.* Did any of the *Egyptians* take and diſſect any of theſe *Imperfect Animals*, and ſhew how it was poſſible in the formation of them, for one part of them to be nothing but Mud, when the reſt had all the proper Organs belonging to ſuch Animals? If the internal and vital parts be firſt form'd (as no doubt they are) and the Blood paſſing thro' the Heart into the outward Parts, be the great Inſtrument of perfecting the *Organs* of Senſe and Motion; how is it poſſible to conceive that where the inward Parts are perfect in their kind, one main part of an Animal ſhould have nothing like Organs, but merely be a Maſs of Dirt? And by what means could that afterwards be join'd with the other to make up one perfect Animal? It is agreed among the beſt Obſervers and moſt curious Inqui-

Inquirers into theſe things, that the Heart is the firſt of the ſolid parts, and the Blood of the Fluid; but whether it be by a dilatation of the *Punctum ſaliens*, or red beating ſpeck into ſeveral parts, whereof one is for the upper, and the other for the lower and remoter parts; or it be by extention of the ſeveral parts in little, as an *Embryo*, (as it is in Plants) or by a fermentation raiſed in the fluid matter by an active fluid conveyed into it, upon the conjunction of male and female; (which are the ſeveral *Hypotheſes* of the moſt inquiſitive Perſons in this Philoſophical Age) which way ſoever we take it, this *Egyptian Hypotheſis* of *Imperfect Animals*, is repugnant to the moſt accurate Obſervations, which have been made about the Generations of Animals. And however ſuch things might then paſs among ſuch who take all upon truſt from the *Egyptians* or others who never examin'd them; yet it would be the only proof of *Imperfect Animals*, to find any in our Age to defend thoſe crude and abſurd Opinions. As tho' any thing were to be believed rather than the moſt reaſonable things in the World, *viz.* GOD and Providence; which appear moſt conſpicuouſly in the production of Animals. Inſomuch that our ſagacious Dr. * *Harvey* after all his diligent and exact Inquiries, confeſſes *that the power and preſence of the* DEITY *is no where more obſervable than in the formation of Animals.* And he could find no ſatisfaction in any *Hypotheſes* of the greateſt Naturaliſts, without taking in *the immediate Power and Providence of* GOD. And even Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf, who was as unwilling to call in the help of Providence as another; yet is forc'd to give up the Cauſe in this matter; and freely confeſſes, † *That if Men examin the ſeveral Machines in order to Generation and Nutrition, and think they were not ordered by an intelligent Being to their ſeveral offices, muſt be ſaid to be without Underſtanding themſelves.* And yet he ſets down the words of *Diodorus Siculus* in the beginning of that Chapter; and thinks *that is as far as Men can go by Phyloſophy, without Revelation.* How can theſe things conſiſt? For Men *without Revelation* may find out all the *Machines in the Body*; and therefore may be convinc'd that there was an Eternal Mind which gave a Being to theſe things; which is more than *Diodorus Siculus* or *his Philoſophers* could find: For they affirm'd, *That Animals were form'd by Chance, out of Mud and Putrefaction without any Mind*; and therefore according to him they had none themſelves. And ſome of our moſt experienc'd and ſkilful *Anatomiſts*, after all their debates about the ſeveral *Mechanical Hypotheſes* concerning the Production of Animals, have concluded that || *it is impoſſible that mere Matter and Motion, of whatſoever figure the particles of Matter be, ſhould make up the Body of an Animal; but that we muſt have recourſe to a moſt Wiſe and Omnipotent Agent, which alone is able to do it.*

* Neq; ſane uſpiam alibi, quam in Animalis fabrica, Omnipotens Creator in operibus ſuis aut manifeſtius conſpicitur, aut præſentius ejus Numen adeſt. *Exercitat.* 49. Quapropter rem recte pieq; (mea qui dem ſententia) reputaverit, qui rerum omnium Generationes, ab eodem illo æterno atq; omnipotente Numine deduxerit, à cujus nutu rerum ipſarum Univerſitas dependet. *Exercitat.* 50.

Quod ubique præſens, ſingulis rerum naturalium operibus non minus adſit, quam toti Univerſo, quod Numine ſuo ſive providentia, arte ac mente Divina cuncta animalia procreet. *ibid.*

† Qui ſi machinas omnes, tum Generationis tum Nutritionis ſatis perſpexerint, nec tamen eas a mente aliqua conditas ordinataſque ſua quaſque officia viderint, ipſi profecto ſine mente eſſe cenſendi ſunt. *Hobb. de Homine, l.* 1. *c.* 1. *ad fin.*

|| Interea ratum maneat juxta normam optimæ Philoſophiæ fieri non poſſe, ut Particulæ ſive Corpuſcula quomodocunque figurata ſolo motu fortuito in corpus humanum aut belluinum ſponte coaleſcant: Sed neceſſario ad hoc opus omnino ſapientiſſimum potentiſſimumque Architectam requiri, qui Animalium Machinas tam affabre & artificioſe componat. Adeoque Deum ſolum formare cuncta animalia, & fœcunditatem ovis addere. *Exercit. Anatomicæ & Medicæ Peieri & Hardeci, p.* 126.

And thoſe who plead moſt for the Motion of the Particles of Matter in forming the Body, yet confeſs, That it is hardly poſſible to conceive

Etmulleri Inſtit. Medicæ, c. 23.

ceive how the kinds of Animals can be preſerv'd, unleſs there be ſomething beyond that, to regulate and determin that Motion; but what that is, they are not able to explain. Let now any Perſons that have the uſe of Underſtanding, conſider whether this *Egyptian Hypotheſis* have the leaſt credibility in it; ſince it is grounded on ſo little Authority.

II. But that is not all. For we ſhall prove it to be repugnant to the moſt certain accounts we have of the *Nature*, as well as the *Production of Animals*; both which are impoſſible to be conceiv'd to be the mere reſult of a fortuitous Motion of Matter, by the heat of the Sun upon the ſlime of the Earth. As will appear by conſidering the moſt neceſſary and vital parts of Animals themſelves, and what relates to the ſeveral kinds and the Preſervation of them: For the *Egyptians* argued from their Mice to all other Animals. The moſt neceſſary and vital parts of *Animals*, are ſuch as the *courſe of the Blood* and *Reſpiration* depend upon, without which it is impoſſible for them *to live*. The *Courſe of the Blood* ſuppoſes *the Heart*, as the great Machine in the Body; and the ſeveral Arteries are as ſo many veſſels to convey the Blood into the ſeveral parts. But here is ſo much wiſdom and contrivance in this, that unleſs the Heart had been fram'd in ſuch a manner, and the Blood put into ſuch a Motion as it is, the preſervation of Life had been impoſſible. And Life it ſelf is ſomething beyond the mere Coalition of the Particles of Matter: For if that were ſufficient, then there muſt be Life in all parts of Matter united together; (but neither Stones nor Plants are *Animals*) and they become *Animals* by that which makes the difference between them and inanimated things; which are the conſtant courſe of the Blood, and the diſtribution of Nouriſhment to the ſeveral parts of the Body in order to their ſupport; and when theſe are at an end, the Life of an Animal is gone. Now in order to this courſe of the Blood, the Heart hath its peculiar and wonderful frame and motion; for therein is the chief ſeat of that which is called *the Flame of Life*; which is nothing elſe but that briſk and vigorous motion of the Blood, which actuates and enlivens the whole Body. But both the natural heat and motion of the Blood are unaccountable in the Mechanical way. To ſay the natural heat is caus'd by Fermentation, can give no manner of ſatisfaction; for from whence comes this fermentation, but from heat? And ſo heat muſt be ſuppos'd in order to the producing heat; and there can be no end in ſuch kind of Suppoſitions. And if the particles did of themſelves give it, then it muſt be diſcern'd as much at firſt as afterwards; but the contrary is obſerv'd in Animals: For the Blood is more fixed at firſt, and its heat riſes by degrees, as the parts are forming. If it be ſaid, *There is a Spiritus Genitalis which cauſes all that heat and motion*; I aſk, Whence that ariſes? Not from mere matter and motion. But it muſt be ſomething of a higher nature, and from a ſuperior cauſe. But if Heat and Mud can produce Animals, there is no need of any ſuch *Spiritus Genitalis* in Nature, but all muſt ariſe from mere motion, and the continuation of Animals might as well have been without any diſtinction of ſexes. But how came Matter of it ſelf to form ſuch a diſtinction, with parts ſutable to ſuch a deſign? How come the Inſtincts of Nature in *Animals* to be ſo violent to ſuch an end; when if there be nothing but *Matter*, there can be no ſuch end deſign'd? How come ſome *Animals* (as *Mules*) not capable of propagating their kind, when

Unde autem aliter calor hic perennis enaſcatur, haud facilè dixerim, ſiquidem ad fermentationis operam recurrere inane auxilium eſt, quoniam ipſamet ſine calore nihil egerit. *Ent. Apologia, p.* 204.

upon

upon Anatomical ſearches no kind of defect hath been found in them as ſome imagined? How come the *Species* of *Animals* to be ſo determined and limited, that in the revolution of ſo many Ages no new *Species* have appeared, altho' they are ſo different in ſome Countries from others? How comes the number of ſome *Animals* ſo very much to exceed others? i. e. How come the *Beaſts of Prey* to fall ſo much ſhort of the moſt tractable and *uſeful Animals* to Mankind, as *Sheep* and *Oxen?* And thoſe are obſerved to be moſt fruitful, which afford the beſt Food for them. Can we ſuppoſe *the heat of the Sun and ſlime of the Earth* ſhould regard ſo much the benefit of Mankind? How comes the difference of *Animals* as to the manner of their production? i. e. How come ſome to hatch their young ones within their own Bodies, and others to bring forth eggs, and ſo to bring them to maturity by incubation? And how comes this difference to have always continu'd without alteration? Whence comes that difference in Animals, that ſome do *Ruminate*, and others do not? Did mud quickened by the Sun deſign to ſupply the want of teeth for *Maſtication* by thoſe ſeveral ventricles, and the muſcles belonging to them? How come ſome Animals to have their ſenſes more exquiſite than others, according to the nature of their food; as ſight in ſome, and ſmelling in others? How come Birds and Fiſhes ſo very much to exceed Mankind in the frame of thoſe nerves, which ſerve for ſmelling? Whence comes that wonderful ſagacity in ſome Animals to purſue others meerly from the ſcent left upon the ground at ſome diſtance of time, and to diſtinguiſh it from all others of the ſame kind? Whence comes that wonderful care and tenderneſs of their young ones in the moſt cruel and fierceſt Animals? If heat and mud could produce the Beaſts themſelves, yet what influence could they have upon their Brood? How comes the change of the paſſage between the lungs and the heart, when a young Animal is come into the open Air, from what it had in the Womb? What particles of matter cloſe up the *Foramen Ovale*, and direct the paſſage of the Blood another way? What makes the milk to come into the proper Veſſels of the breeding Animal juſt at ſuch a time, and to decay when there is no farther Occaſion for it? Whence came the wonderful contrivance of Birds in making their neſts; and feeding and preſerving their young? What particles of Matter diſpos'd them to find out their proper food and Phyſick? How come the ſeaſons of bringing forth to be ſo ſetled, that there is a ſufficient proviſion to ſupport the young Animals when they come into the World, by the Milk ready prepar'd for them, and ſuch conveniences for the young to ſuck it? How come they to run ſo naturally to their dams without any director, and to avoid ſuch as would deſtroy them? What had the particles of Matter to do in all this? If we go to *Inſects*; How came the Silk-worms to hatch their eggs when the Mulberry-trees are ready for their food? The Bees to come forth in *May*, when there is moſt plenty of dew? The Waſps near Autumn, when the fruit is grown ripe to ſupport them? How come the ſeveral Inſects by that ſagacity to find out the moſt proper places to lay their eggs in? It being obſerv'd of them, by thoſe who have moſt curiouſly inquir'd about theſe matters, *That all the ſeveral ſorts of Inſects lay their eggs in places moſt ſafe and agreeable to them, where they are ſeldom loſt or miſcarry, and where they have a ſupply of nouriſhment for their young, ſo ſoon as they are hatched and need it.*

Cicer. de N. Deor. l. 2.

Neque alia parte ingenia avium magis admiranda ſunt. *Plin. N. H. l.* 10; *c.* 33.

Mr. Ray *of the Creation, p.* 115.

But there are ſome things yet further to be conſider'd in the neceſſary vital parts of Animals, which ſhew that they could not be the reſult of a fortuitous motion of Matter. The main vitals of Animals are the ſame; and where there is any obſervable difference, theſe two things are remarkable: 1. That they are alike in the ſame kind. 2. That it is for the greater conveniency of thoſe kinds. As the poſition of the heart is higher in Mankind, than in creatures that put their heads down to eat; becauſe if the Heart of Mankind were in the center of the Body, and not in the upper part, there could not be ſo eaſy a paſſage of the Blood from the heart to the head, which is ſo neceſſary for the ſupport of life; but in thoſe creatures which hold their heads downwards, altho' the paſſage may be longer in ſuch which have long necks, yet no inconvenience comes by it, becauſe of the eaſineſs of the deſcent in holding down their heads. But how comes a fortuitous production of Animals to cauſe ſuch an agreement in the ſeveral parts of living Creatures? That all have the ſame vitals, *Inſects* excepted (in which the heart is the whole Body) none wanting the heart with its arteries carrying out the Blood, and the veins returning it; nor the lungs for reſpiration, nor the brain for ſenſe and motion (to name no more;) How comes a blind motion of Matter to hit ſo exactly on all theſe, and to put them into ſuch a convenient ſituation for the preſervation of Life? How comes the heart to be endued with ſuch ſtrong fibres, unleſs it were intended not merely to receive the Blood in its paſſage, but to diſperſe it again by its contraction of it ſelf? How come the coats of the arteries about the Heart to be ſo much ſtronger than in the outward parts, but that there is the greateſt neceſſity of their being ſo, to receive the Blood in its firſt heat and quickeſt motion? How come the veins to be ſo diſpers'd in all parts of the Body, but to receive the Blood in its return; and ſo to keep up the life and warmth of all parts? What motion of Matter could frame the *Valves* in the *Veins*, ſo as to give free paſſage of the Blood towards the heart, but oppoſe the paſſage of the Venal-blood the other way? (which gave the firſt occaſion to the diſcovery of the Circulation of the Blood, as Mr. *Boyle* tells us from Dr. *Harvey* himſelf.) What is it which keeps the Blood in its conſtant courſe for ſo many years, as ſome Animals live to? And what makes the very different periods of their lives, when we can ſee no reaſon from their mechanical frame, why one ſhould in an ordinary courſe ſurvive another, for ſo great a compaſs of years? What is there in the texture and coalition of the parts of a Stag, to make it outlive an Ox or a Horſe ſo many years; when *Ariſtotle* ſaith, *They ſeem to be leſs made for long life than other Animals, as far as he could judge by their bearing and growth:* but *Pliny* ſo long after him ſaith, *Vita Cervis in confeſſo longa eſt; it was a thing taken for granted that they lived long.* But I meddle not with any improbable Stories about it; for my argument depends not upon any thing but what all grant to be true, *viz.* That there is a great diverſity in the Lives of *Animals*; of which I ſay no account can be given from mere Matter and Motion.

Tota Cor ſunt. *Harv.*

Boyle *of Final Cauſes, p.* 157.

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 6. *c.* 29.

Plin. N. H. l. 8. *c.* 32.

III. There is no probability of any kind of *Animals* ariſing from *Putrefaction*, which the *Egyptians* and *Diodorus Siculus* make their foundation. *After the inundation of the* Nile, *a ſudden heat of the Sun falling on the ſlime, cauſes a putrefaction, and from thence an innumerable company of Mice came.* But *Theophraſtus*, a very great Philoſopher, in a

Diod. Sic. l. 1. *p.* 8.

Fragment

Fragment preſerv'd in *Photius*, ſaith, *That the great number of Mice is to be found in dry Soils, and not in moiſt; for Water is a great Enemy to them, and they are certainly deſtroy'd by it.* How comes *Theophraſtus* to differ ſo much herein from *Diodorus Siculus* and the *Egyptians?* Or muſt we ſuppoſe that the Water of *Nile* was quite of a different nature from all other Waters to them? *Proventus eorum in ſiccitatibus*, ſaith *Pliny*; where he ſpeaks of the great Increaſe of them. How then came they to multiply in ſuch moiſt places, where the *Nile* hath overflow'd? *Rain-water kills them*, ſaith *Ariſtotle*; how then comes the *Nile* to produce them? If it be ſaid, *that* Ariſtotle *ſpeaks of great Showers which drown them*; it is eaſily anſwer'd, That at their going off, upon theſe Principles, they produce more, and ſo the greateſt numbers would be after great Rains. But what *Theophraſtus* ſaith before of *ſmall Frogs* will hold of theſe *Mice* too; *they do not come from the Water, but that diſcovers them, and brings them out of the places where they were before.* And *Pliny*'s words are remarkable, when he ſpeaks of this matter, *Detegente eo* (Nilo) *muſculi reperiuntur*, &c. And ſo the late Editor confeſſes it was in the beſt MSS. So that the going off of the *Nile* is that only which brings them to light. And before, *Pliny* ſaith, the *Gyrini* (the Name given to theſe ſmall Frogs) do come from other Frogs, and not from *Putrefaction: Pariunt minimas carnes nigras, quas Gyrinos vocant, oculis tantum & cauda inſignes; mox pedes figurantur*, &c. Theſe are called *Tadpoles*, and ſeem imperfect at firſt, but by degrees do come to all their Parts. But as to *Animals* ariſing from *Putrefaction*, learned and inquiſitive Perſons of our Age have taken great pains to diſcover the truth of it in ſeveral Countries, but with no ſucceſs. In *Italy*, *Franc. Redi* undertook the Diſcovery of this matter with incredible diligence, and great variety of Experiments; but after all, could not find *that any putrified Fleſh would produce Animals*, much leſs putrified Water or Slime; *but that leſſer Animals hide themſelves under Dirt and Slime, and therefore have been ſuſpected to have come out of it; and if thoſe who firſt broached this Opinion had examined this matter more ſtrictly, they would have found them only covered over, or at leaſt ſome part of them, with that Earth which they thought had brought them forth.* And *for the little Frogs*, he ſaith, *that they are ſo much of the colour of the Earth, that they might eaſily be miſtaken for parts of it; but upon opening of them, their Stomachs and Inteſtines are full of Food and Excrements.* Which is a plain demonſtration againſt their original from the Earth; and he concludes it a thing *impoſſible for any ſuch Creatures that are part Mud and part Animals, to be produced by the inundation of the* Nile. There is a remarkable Paſſage in *Olaus Wormius* concerning the *Norway* Mice, which ſeem to come out of the Clouds, *that aſſoon as they are fallen, they have found green Herbs in their Bowels*; (and I do not think any Graſs grows in the Clouds:) But he thinks *Scaliger*'s Opinion not improbable, *that they come from putrefied Water in the Clouds*; and he ſaith, *The Seamen have found them fallen into their Veſſels, and that the Clouds ſtink and hinder their breathing*; but at laſt he thinks *they may be only carried by ſome violent Storms from the Mountains and Iſlands where they breed in great abundance.* And *Etmullerus*, a *German* Phyſician, concludes all *Æquivocal Generation to be impoſſible.* Some of our own moſt diligent Inquirers, after all their Searches, declare that they can find no ſuch thing as a *Spontaneous Generation* of *Animals*; and I remember I have formerly read a Diſcourſe in MS. of Mr. *Boyle*'s to that purpoſe. Our ingenious and learned Mr. *Ray* poſi-

Phot. Bibl. Cod. 278.

Plin. N. H. l. 10. *c.* 65.

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 6. *c.* 29.

Plin. N. H. l. 9. *c.* 58.

Cap. 51.

Fr. Redi de Gen. Inſect. p. 195, *&c.*

P. 208.

P. 209.

Muſeum Wormian. l. 3. *c.* 23. *p.* 326.

Exercit. 192. 3.

Etmuller. Inſtit. Med. c. 23.

Liſter in Goedart de Inſect. p. 47.

Ray of the Creation, part. 2. p. 71.

tively affirms, *That there is no ſuch thing in nature, as Æquivocal or Spontaneous Generation, but that all Animals, as well ſmall as great, are generated by animal Parents of the ſame ſpecies with themſelves.* And becauſe ſome were offended at it, he goes about to juſtify his Aſſertion, not only *from Reaſon*, but from the *Authority* of *Malpighius*, as well as *Redi*, *Swammerdam*, and *Lewenhoek*, and many others, who have examin'd this matter *carefully and circumſpectly*; *and therefore their Authority ſways more with him than the concurrent ſuffrages of a thouſand others*, as he ſaith.

But there are ſome things not yet ſufficiently clear'd as to this matter, eſpecially as to Animals breeding in Human Bodies, of particular Times, and in ſome Diſeaſes: but as to Plants and ſome Inſects about them, in which *Redi* himſelf gives up the cauſe, *Malpighius* contradicts him, and

Micrograp. p. 189.

ſo do *Swammerdam* and others; particularly Mr. *Hook* ſaith, *He obſerv'd little Eggs in the Protuberancies of Plants, which became Worms with Legs, which eat through the Womb which inclos'd them: And in all Galls*, he ſaith, *there be either holes where the Worm hath eat out its paſſage, or a place where it had been.* All which he attributes to the particular deſign of Providence, in taking care for the conveniencies of the meaneſt Animals. But there ſeems to be more difficulty in the *Apiarium marinum* mention'd by *Piſo*; for it is hard to underſtand how *thoſe blue Worms* came to the bottom of the Sea, *which coming up with a ſpungy ſort of ſhrub growing upon the Rocks, and being expos'd to the heat, turn'd to little Animals like Bees.* But this matter is not deliver'd diſtinctly enough to form any Argument upon, as Mr. *Hook* hath well obſerv'd.

Piſo Hiſt. Nat. Braſil. l. 4. c. 2.

Micrograp. c. 43.

I ſee no difficulty in the *Ephemeron* or *Hemerobion*, as it is deſcrib'd by the Authors at the end of *Goedart*, who give the beſt account of it; for it ſeems to be of the nature of other Inſects: and the only difficulty is, why ſo much pains for ſo ſhort a life? for it is produc'd by ſuch Changes as other Inſects are. But it cannot be deny'd, that there have been among us two very learned Men, who have aſſerted a kind of Spontaneous Generation of Animals; I mean Dr. *Harvey* and his *Apologiſt*.

Redi p. 19.

For Dr. *Harvey*, *Redi* obſerves, *That altho' he aſſerts every Animal to come of an Egg proper to its kind, yet he was of opinion that theſe Eggs are not always contain'd in the Bodies of Animals, but are diſpers'd up and down by the Air, and after become Animals in an equivocal manner:* but he ſaith, *he hath not clear'd the grounds of his Opinion*, ſave only *that it comes from the Omnipotent Hand of God.* So that Dr. *Harvey* held a true Spontaneous Generation from mere Matter and Motion to have been impoſſible, as appears by what is ſaid of him before. And ſo his *Apologiſt*

Ent. Apol. c. 17. p. 379.

ſuppoſes *a ſaline Spirit to be diſpers'd in Nature, which meeting with proper Matter and a moderate Heat, may produce Inſects, and ſuch kind of Animals:* but he was very far from thinking this could be done without a Power far above Matter and Motion, which at firſt order'd the World,

P. 245.

and all things in it. But he thinks *ſuch Inſects come nearer to the nature of Plants than Animals, and live chiefly by the Heat of the Sun*; *and therefore in the Winter they are torpid and without Motion, and are reviv'd at Spring when the Heat increaſes.*

IV. Suppoſing it to be granted that there were ſuch an Æquivocal Generation of Mice and Frogs on the Bank of the *Nile*, how doth it from thence follow that Mankind had the ſame kind of Original? It is a ſay-

Plin. N. H. l. 11. c. 1.

ing of *Pliny*, which hath been carry'd too far, *Quam Natura rerum nuſquam magis quam in minimis tota ſit*; where he compares Inſects with the

greater Animals, and ſeems to admire the Workmanſhip of one far beyond the other: His words are, *Nuſquam alibi ſpectatiore naturæ rerum Artificio.* And ſo he falls into admiration of the perfections of ſome Inſects, as to the quickneſs of Senſe and Motion, and of others as to their peculiar Properties. I think *Ariſtotle* was very much in the right when he held, *they were to be blam'd who deſpiſed the leaſt things in Nature; for in all of them* ἔνεσί τι θαυμαστὸν, *there is ſomething which deſerves admiration:* And particularly in *Inſects*, the Contexture of their Parts, the manner of their Transformations, the difference of their Kinds, the variety of their Food, and their time of taking it, have ſomething in them, which cannot be accounted for by mere Matter and Motion: But yet there is a great difference in the inward make of theſe Creatures from more perfect Animals. For *Redi* affirms, that *Steno* and he opening ſome Inſects together, they could find no other inward Parts, *but one long Channel thro' the whole Body, about which there were Filaments in a confus'd ſeries, which they thought might be inſtead of Veins and Arteries.* When all their inward Parts were taken out, and the Head taken off, *they ſtill lived and moved as other Inſects do, and laid their Eggs.* By which we ſee what a vaſt difference there is between the principles of Life in Mankind from thoſe in theſe admirable Inſects. *Jul. Scaliger* extremely deſpiſes *Cardan*'s way of reaſoning, *Mus è putredine poteſt naſci, ergo & homo poteſt:* and ſaith, *That the Woman in* Eſop's *Fables, who was aſked by her Huſband how the Child came without him, and ſhe anſwered, Out of the Snow; might have made a better anſwer from* Cardan's *Philoſophy*, viz. *out of the Mud.* And it is wittily ſaid by *Scaliger* of him in another place, *They who ſtick in the dirt, while they lift up one Foot to get out, ſet the other faſter, and therefore it is beſt to keep out of it altogether.* But *Cardan* ſeem'd to be ſo little concern'd to get out of it, that he aſſerts *that every Putrefaction produces ſome Animal or other; and that all Animals come out of it: which*, ſaith *Scaliger, is a wicked and profane Speech.* And yet *Andr. Cæſalpinus* undertakes to defend *Cardan*, chiefly from the Generation of Inſects; without regarding the difference between them and more perfect Animals, if his ſuppoſiton had been true. *Ariſtotle*, who had all poſſible advantages for writing his *Books of Animals*, by the bounty of *Philip* or *Alexander*, or both, coming to ſpeak of ſuch *as had no Blood*, (among which are all Inſects) he ſaith, *They have no Veins, nor Bladder, nor Reſpiration; but ſomething that ſerves inſtead of a Heart, without which they could have no Life; but they have the Parts which ſerve for Nutrition:* and therefore their Life differs little, according to *Pliny* himſelf, from that of *Plants* and *Fruits*; but he would have them *ſpirare ſine Viſceribus*, breathe without Lungs; and he grants they have neither them, *nor Heart, nor Liver.* And altho' there be ſome higher degree of Life in ſuch *Animals* as *Diodorus Siculus* ſpeaks of, yet thoſe fall ſo far ſhort of Mankind, that it is a wonder Men of ſenſe could imagin the Production of one could be an Argument for the other. For, if we go no farther than *Nutrition*, *Mice* and *Frogs* are eaſily provided for; but how ſhould Mankind live that were produc'd out of Slime and Mud? But nothing can be more abſurd and ridiculous than the accounts given of the ſeveral ways of producing Mankind by a Spontaneous Generation, as will appear by a particular examination of them.

Ariſt. de par. Anim. l. 1. c. 1.

Redi de Gen. Inſect. p. 218. Nihil intus, niſi admodum paucis Inteſtinum implicatum. *Plin. l. 11. c. 4.*

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 4. c. 6.

Scaliger. Exercit. 193.

Exercit. 180. 2.

Exercit. 190, 193.

Andr. Cæſalpin. Qu. Peripat. l. 5. c. 1.

De partib. Anim. l. 4. c. 5.

Franc. Redi hath reckon'd up the ſeveral *Hypotheſes* to our hands: The firſt is, that of *Democritus, That Mankind came into the World like Worms,*

Redi de Gen. Inſect. p. 14.

Worms, which by degrees grew up to the figure and ſhape of Men. I wiſh we had more of *Democritus* his own Writings left, that we might better judg what his true Opinion was; but by what remains it doth not appear that herein he differ'd from *Epicurus*. It's certain he did, as to the firſt Principles of all things being made of Atoms; but whether he did, as to the immediate Production of Animals, is not ſo clear. For they did not imagin that Animals were form'd immediately by Atoms, which was too general and indefinite a Principle; but that the Atoms firſt came together in one form, and then another, till they came to the perfection of Animals. And ſo 'tis ſaid, that *Democritus* held Mankind to have appear'd firſt in the faſhion of Worms. *Petronius Arbiter* ſaith, that *Democritus* ſpent his days in making Experiments, *Ætatem inter Experimenta conſumpſit*; and *Columella* particularly takes notice of his Experiments *about Inſects*; and it is not improbable that from his Obſervations about their Transformations he might form his *Hypotheſis* about Mankind. His original Notion was, as appears by *Plutarch*, *That there were infinite Atoms diſpers'd in a void ſpace, which had no kind of Qualities inherent in them; but as they caſually hit upon each other, they produc'd Water, and Fire, and Plants, and Men; which were nothing but a congeries of Atoms*; which, ſaith *Plutarch*, he calleth *Ideas*. And it appears by another place in him, that *Democritus* only held Bulk and Figure in his Atoms; but *Epicurus* added *Gravity*, without which he found *his Atoms could not move*. And altho' *Epicurus* deriv'd the main of his Principles from *Democritus*; yet it is plain by *Plutarch*, that his Followers ſet themſelves to leſſen the credit of *Democritus*, as one that overthrew the certainty of our Senſes, and reſolv'd all into Reaſon. To which purpoſe there are ſeveral Paſſages, in *Sextus Empiricus*, of *Democritus* himſelf. Wherein he affirms, *That the things we call Qualities, are only Names impos'd upon Opinions* (which he calls Law) *and ſo Bitter and Sweet, and Hot and Cold, are only Fancies and no Realities; and that there is nothing real but what is not ſeen but only apprehended by the Mind*, as *Atoms and Vacuity*; and in ſeveral other places, that there is no *Certain Knowledg*, but *only Opinion by our Senſes*. And he quotes *Democritus* his own words to prove, *that the Knowledg we have by our Senſes is dark and obſcure, but that which is genuine depends only upon Reaſon.* The *Epicureans*, who follow'd their Maſter, as to the certainty of Senſe, could by no means brook this Doctrine of *Democritus*, who ſaw far beyond *Epicurus*, and knew what Blunders he muſt fall into by the judgment of Senſe, as about the bigneſs of the Sun, which he poſitively ſaid, was *no greater than appear'd to our Senſes*, i. e. *two Foot over*, ſaith *Cicero*, or *a little more or leſs*; which was ſo notorious a Blunder, that *Democritus*, he ſaith, *could not fall into, being ſkill'd in Geometry*; *but* Epicurus *not only deſpis'd it, but perſuaded* Polyænus *it was falſe*. And his late great Defender hath little to ſay for him, but that *Socrates* underſtood as little *Geometry* as he; but *Socrates* was far enough from aſſerting ſuch ſtupid *Paradoxes*, and making *Geometry* nothing but a piece of *Sophiſtry*; as *Epicurus* did, and made a Mathematician think ſo too. Which ſhew'd his Authority ſway'd more than his Reaſon. But the *Epicurean* in *Plutarch* rejects *Democritus* his Doctrine, for that which *Plutarch* ſaith, *doth as well follow from that of* Epicurus; for if there be nothing but Atoms, then Qualities are only Appearances; and when we judg by our Senſes, we cannot judg truly of things, but of what they appear to us. But if nothing, ſaith he, can be produc'd out of nothing, and no Generation

Columel. l. 11. ult.

Plutarch. adv. Col.

De Placit. Philoſ. l. 1. c. 3.

Sext. Emp. p. 163.

P. 164.

Cicero de Fin. l. 1. c. 6.

Acad. Qu. l. 4. c. 33.

can be of that which already is; how can indiviſible Atoms, which cannot be chang'd, produce Plants or Animals? Either therefore *Democritus* ſhould not have aſſerted ſuch immutable Principles, or he ſhould not have overlook'd the Conſequence, *i. e.* that there can be no Generation. But *Epicurus* impudently holds the ſame Principles, and yet would deny the Conſequence, and aſſert true Generation; juſt as he deny'd Providence, and yet aſſerted Piety; held Friendſhip to be only for Pleaſure, and yet that a Man muſt undergo any hardſhip for his Friends; made an Infinite Space, and yet placed an upper and lower Region in it. But he declares he can by no means underſtand, how Bodies indu'd with Qualities, ſhould be produc'd by Atoms that have none. There can be no Generation without Heat; how comes there to be Heat, when the Atoms themſelves have no Heat in them, nor become hot when they are join'd together? for if they are capable of Heat, then they are not impaſſible, nor without Qualities. So that according to the general Principles of *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, there can be no ſuch thing as a Generation of Animals.

But Democritus *obſerv'd ſtrange alterations in the Bodies of Inſects from Worms to flying Animals; and why might not Mankind have come into the World after the ſame manner?* If this were his Opinion, it is one of the wildeſt and moſt extravagant Opinions that could have enter'd into the head of ſuch a Man, and would make one think that the People of *Abdera* were not out in their judgment of him, if thoſe *Epiſtles* about him were genuine between *Hippocrates* and them.

There are wonderful alterations in the Bodies of *Inſects*, as appear beyond all contradiction by the many Experiments of thoſe who have apply'd themſelves for many years to obſerve them. But what then? Do not all theſe *Inſects* come out of Eggs, which have been laid by other *Inſects* before them? and therefore Mankind could not be *Worms* firſt, but there muſt have been Eggs before. And how ſhould theſe Eggs be tranſform'd into the Worms? What force was there in Nature to make ſo ſtrange a Transformation as is continually obſerv'd in them? And the very ſame Perſons, who have obſerv'd their *Transformations*, have as well obſerv'd the incredible number of Eggs that are laid by them, and the great and ſudden increaſe of them from thoſe Eggs. Even in the *Ephemeron*, which was ſo great a rarity taken notice of by *Ariſtotle* upon the River *Hypanon*, (but is ſo frequent upon ſome Rivers in *France* and the *Low Countries*, as is obſerv'd by *Scaliger*, *Auger. Clutius*, and others) it is agreed, *That they come out of ſuch a Transformation as other Inſects do, with four Wings and ſix Feet, and are very careful where they lay their Eggs, to keep them from the Water, in which they die, after they have ſpent their ſhort life in flying in great numbers together, at Sun-ſetting*, ſaith one from his own Obſervation. *Scaliger* ſaith, thoſe he obſerv'd *began to live at night, and dy'd by morning.*

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 5. c. 19. Scaliger. Exercit. 194. 5. Aug. Clut. de Hemerobio. Joh. de Mey Append. ad Goedart. Swammerdam Anatom. de Ephem. apud Thevenot. Amer. Sept.

But there are ſome things which deſerve a particular obſervation about Inſects, which plainly ſhew that they were not form'd by a caſual Coalition of Atoms, but by a wiſe Providence. As, that thoſe that have Wings have them ſtronger or weaker, more or leſs, according to their buſineſs and occaſion for uſing them; thoſe that have Feet, have an equal number on both ſides, altho' the numbers differ ſo much according to their kinds; thoſe which have neither Wings nor Feet, have Repoſitories made for them with proper Food in the Leaves of Trees or Plants. Concerning which there are ſeveral things very obſervable. (1.) Their

great niceneſs as to their Food. *Goedart*, who made it his buſineſs to obſerve them 40 years, (as *Ariſtomachus Solenſis* did *Bees* for 58 years, ſaith *Pliny*) found it very difficult ſometimes to find the proper Food for them; for they would eat no other, and expreſs'd their joy when they had it. Dr. *Liſter* adds, *That Inſects would rather die than eat any thing elſe, not from want of Organs, but from a natural accuracy of Taſt.* And he ingeniouſly obſerves, that from hence may be found the beſt way of keeping Ships from Worms, by finding out that ſort of Wood which thoſe Worms will not touch. (2.) The different ſorts of Food in their different ſtates. While they are mere *Erucæ*, they eat a hard ſort of Food, as the Leaves of Plants; but when they come to have their Wings and to fly abroad, they live only on Honey and liquid things: which is very different from ſuch Animals as have Blood; for when they are *Embryo*'s they live on Liquids, but as they grow up they like harder Food. (3.) That thoſe which feed on Leaves of Plants growing, will not touch them when they are taken off or decaying: which *Goedart* ſaith he obſerv'd both as to Garden-herbs and Graſs. (4.) That thoſe flying Inſects which have very ſhort Feet, take their Food out of Flowers by the help of their Tongues as they fly. (5.) That thoſe which are moſt afraid of Birds, eat only in the night, when they are moſt ſecure from them; which argued a wonderful care of their own Safety. There are many other Obſervations to be made uſe of concerning the manner of their Transformations, the change made by them in the very Bodies of theſe Inſects, and the different times of continuance under them, and the ways to ſecure themſelves from Injuries of the Weather in cold Seaſons: but theſe are ſufficient to my purpoſe, which was to ſhew that *Democritus* made a very ill choice of Worms, as the inſtance of a fortuitous Production. But if they had been ſo, it was a very extravagant Fancy to think that Mankind ſhould undergo ſuch Transformations as Worms do, before they come to their perfection. For theſe Changes are evident to Senſe to all that obſerve no more than Silk-worms; but Mankind continue in one uniform ſtate, from an Embryo to a perfect Man, and while he is an Embryo hath one ſort of nouriſhment from the Mother, which is wholly different from what all ſorts of Worms do live upon; and the parts of Mankind are extremely remote from the ſhape, number and uſe of all ſorts of Worms. Inſomuch that *Democritus* might much better have fanſy'd, that Mankind were at firſt a ſort of Trees ſet with their Roots upwards: for the Head to Man is what the Root is to the Tree; and Trees come from an Embryo in the Seed, and are preſerv'd in the Womb of the Earth, and are fed with a Dew from above, and have Paſſages like *Lymphæducts* in their ſeveral parts; only they happen to want the Inſtruments of Senſe and Motion, which are needleſs to them, ſince their Food is brought home to them, and they grow up in the ſame uniform manner without Transformations, as Mankind do.

Plin. N. H. l. 11. c. 9. *Goedart de Inſectis. N. 5.* *Ed. Liſter. p. 13. 33.* *N. 14.* *N. 14.* *N. 15.*

The next *Hypotheſis* was that of *Anaximander*; and he makes them *to be bred up as Embryo's in the Bowels of other Creatures.* Of which *Plutarch* gives the fulleſt account: In one place he only ſaith, *That the firſt Animals were produc'd in moiſture, cover'd over with a certain Bark*, like the rind of a Cheſnut, ſaith *Redi*; *and when it grew dry it crackt, and the Animals ſtarted out, but liv'd not long.* Was not this a hopeful Beginning in the early days of Philoſophy? For *Anaximander* ſucceeded *Thales*, who was the firſt Philoſopher of *Greece*, and a much wiſer Man than his Scholar, as will afterwards appear. But we muſt now purſue

Plutarch. de Placit. Philoſ. l. 5. c. 19.

Anaximander: and *Plutarch* in another place tells us, *That he was of opinion that Mankind were first bred in the Bellies of Fishes; and when they were strong enough to help themselves, they very fairly cast them upon dry ground and left them to shift for themselves.* Is not this a very good philosophical account of this matter? And he was in the right, when upon this ground *he dissuaded Men from eating of Fish*, lest they should be like *Cannibals.* It is a known saying, *That there is nothing so absurd, but it was said by one Philosopher or other.* I think *Anaximander* may put in for the first, who broach'd his own dreams and idle fancies under the name of Philosophy. And yet *Empedocles* in this matter, rather outwent him. For he saith, *Animals were not intire at first; but came into the world by pieces*; and so arms and legs, and all other parts happening to joyn together, made up one perfect Animal. *Hæc non sunt Philosophorum judicia, sed delirantium somnia*, may be much better apply'd here, than it is by the *Epicurean* in *Cicero* to their opinions of the Gods. But I rather think *Empedocles* his opinion is mis-represented; since the Author of the Book *De Mundo* (which is very ancient, if not *Aristotle*'s) gives another account of him; and saith, *He deriv'd the forming of Animals from* GOD; and his *Verses*, as they are in *Simplicius*, do not deny it; but only shew, *that all things except* GOD, *came from different principles.*

Plutarch. Sympos. l. 8. c. 9.

Plutarch. de Placit. l. 5. c. 19.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1.

But we are not deceiv'd in the third *Hypothesis* of *Epicurus* and his followers; which as *Redi* represents it is, *That Mankind and other Animals were inclos'd in certain Coats and Membranes in the womb of the Earth, which being broken in due time, they were all expos'd naked, without any sense of heat or cold, and sucked the Earth for nourishment, but the Earth grew too old for such births; and therefore was contented ever since to bring forth nothing but Insects.* This is so well known to be the *Epicurean Hypothesis* from *Lucretius*, *Censorinus*, &c. that there needs no farther proof of it. But whether it can be thought reasonable, is the thing now to be consider'd. And herein these two things are suppos'd: (1.) That there was a fit disposition of the Earth to produce them; and a capacity in it to form Wombs and Bags to preserve them till they were able to take nourishment; and that the Earth did afford a sort of Milk to support them. (2.) That the use of all the parts of human Bodies came only by chance, and were not form'd with any design. Both which are very unreasonable suppositions.

How can they make it appear that there ever was any such disposition of the Heavens and Earth to produce Animals more than there is still? When they were told *that if the Earth could at first produce Animals, why not still?* Their answer was, *The Seasons are changed, the Heavens were more benign, and the Earth more fruitful than they have been since.* (1.)

> *At novitas Mundi nec frigora dura ciebat,*
> *Nec nimios æstus, nec magnis viribus auras;*
> *Omnia enim pariter crescunt & robora sumunt.*
>
> Lucret. l. 5.

And *Lactantius* sets down their opinion more distinctly, *That certain motions of the Heavens are necessary to this production of Animals, as well as the freshness of the Earth; and that then there was no Winter nor Summer, but a perpetual Spring.* But how came such a *Proper Season* for this purpose at that time; and never since? *Animals*, say they, *can never since propa-*

Lactant. l. 2. c. 12.

gate themſelves: But what is this to the *Seaſon?* Do the *Seaſons* alter, as there is occaſion? Then there is a Superior Mind to direct them. If there be a natural courſe of the Heavens, which caus'd the Earth to be then prolifical; that muſt return and put a new vigor into the Earth, and make it young again. And this our modern Atheiſtical Philoſophers in *Italy*, ſuch as *Cardan*, *Pomponatius* and others, ſaw very well; and therefore aſſerted *that upon certain Conjunctions of the Heavens, the ſame effects would follow.* So *Berigardus*; who ſaith, that *Cardan* and *Pomponatius* laid much weight on this Story in *Diodorus Siculus* about *Animals produc'd by the Nile*; and he adds another very ridiculous, as he pretends out of *Camerarius, of ſeveral parts of human Bodies, which are ſeen to appear every year riſing out of the Earth about* Grand Cairo: and he thinks *they were like the Egyptian Mice, part Earth and part Animals.* What will not ſuch Men be inclin'd to believe rather than the truth! As when he adds, *of the two Green Boys in* England, *which came out of a Wolf's den 500 years ſince; and the Blew and Red Men out of the Mountains of* Armenia. Which are ſuch incredible Fictions, that it is a wonder any one that pretends to common ſenſe could repeat them. But as to the Egyptian Story in *Camerarius*, it relates not at all to the firſt making of Bodies; but *to the Reſurrection from the dead. Camerarius* neither pretends to have ſeen it himſelf, nor that his Friend did; but that his Friend heard one that had been a great Traveller ſay, *That in a certain place not far from the Pyramids, at a certain time of the year, a great multitude met to ſee the Reſurrection of the Dead, as they call'd it; and then he ſaid ſome part of the Body ſeem'd to come out of the Earth, ſometimes the Head, ſometimes the Feet, and ſometime the greater part of the Body; which were afterwards hid under the Earth again.* And another Friend of his ſhew'd him an old *Itinerary* to the ſame purpoſe; *and that the place was two Miles from the* Nile, *in an old Burying place; and that it laſted three days, and then no more were ſeen that year.* But he added, That *they were not ſeen riſing up or walking*; and he ſaith, *That he ſaw it not himſelf.* But *Camerarius* himſelf cenſures it as a *ſuperſtitious folly. Martinus à Baumgarten*, ſaith, *That at* Cairo *it was believ'd in his time, that at a certain Moſque near the* Nile, *the Bodies of the dead do ariſe out of their Graves at the time of Prayers, and there ſtand, and diſappear when they are over*; which he calls a *Diabolical Illuſion.* But when our Ingenious Mr. *Sandys* was in *Egypt*, the ſtory was chang'd; for then it was affirm'd, *That not far from the* Nilus, *upon Good-Friday, the Arms and Legs of a Number of Men did appear ſtretch'd forth of the Earth, to the aſtoniſhment of the multitude.* Which he not improbably conjectures *to have been taken out of the Mummies not far off by the Watermen, (who gain very much by it) and plac'd conveniently in the Sand to be ſeen,* as they thought would raiſe the greateſt admiration. Since his time Monſ. *Thevenot*, who was upon the place ſaith, *That at* Grand Cairo *it is generally believ'd that on three days in Paſſion-week, ſome part of the dead Bodies lie out of the graves, and then return into the Earth. He had the curioſity to go and ſee, and there found ſome ſkulls and bones, which they ſay confidently came out of the Earth; but he looked on it as a contrivance of the Santons.* But if this prove any thing, it is not what *Berigardus* brings it for, that Mankind came firſt out of the Earth, but that there ſhall be a Reſurrection of the Dead: for he ſaith, *It was in a place where many dead Bodies did lie buried*; and not far from the *Mummies*; which was the moſt famous place for Burials in all *Egypt:* an account whereof is

Berigard. Circul. 10. p. 636. part. 5.

Camerar. Operæ ſubciſ. Cent. 1. c. 73.

Martin. à Baumgart. Peregrin. l. 1. c. 18.

Sandys's Travels, p. 99.

Thevenot Voyage de Levant, part 2. ch. 12.

Bellon. l. 2. c. 47.

Pietr. della Valle Vol. 1. Lett. 11. §. 8.

given by *Bellonius*, *Peter della Valle*, *Buratine* in *Thevenot's Collection*, Prince *Radzivil* and ſeveral others: Prince *Radzivil* obſerv'd, *That there were vaſt numbers of ſkulls and bones ſcatter'd up and down, where the fleſh had been taken off, and ſold away for Mummy.* But beſides theſe *Mummies* (as they are call'd) there was continu'd a place of ſolemn Burial near to *Grand Cairo* by the *Turks*; ſo that there were always Bodies ready that were not proper *Mummies*, to make this annual ſhew with, to deceive the ſimple. But *Berigardus* is aware of the difficulty *of aſſigning the manner how Animals come out of the Earth*; and therefore he thinks it ſufficient to ſhew that the Earth can produce them one way or other, and afford them *Nouriſhment* when they are produc'd; this he thinks *abſolutely neceſſary*, and he ſuſpects that *Lucretius* his *Folliculi* will not do the buſineſs; *becauſe it is impoſſible for Children to ſubſiſt, if they did break the bags they were inclos'd in, which were faſtened to the Earth:* But if there were ſuch a *Milky Subſtance* in the Earth for new born Children to ſuck, is that all that is neceſſary for their ſupport, when they are ſo unable to help themſelves? Of all things one would not expect to find Milk in the breaſts of the Earth; and it muſt be ſome very happy Conjunction of the Planets to make the Earth to give ſuck. How much would thoſe who are friends to Religion have been deſpis'd and laugh'd at, if they had made ſuch abſurd and ridiculous *Hypotheſis* as theſe? If ſuch a thing did ariſe from natural and neceſſary Cauſes, it muſt continue; and ſince we are certain it hath never been ſince, we have no reaſon to think it ever was. If it were by chance; what hinders the ſame effect, unleſs Chance were ty'd up to one certain time? and by what Laws can Chance be bounded? If it were by particular deſign at that time for the ſupport of new born Animals, then there muſt be a Providence owned; and yet all this was invented on purpoſe to exclude Providence: which ſhews how weak and inconſiſtent this *Hypotheſis* is.

Thevenot Relat. part. 1. ad fin. Peregrin. Principis Radzivil, p. 187.

We account it a wonderful work of Providence, that at the ſame time the Child is form'd in the womb of its Mother, there ſhould be ſo ample and ſutable proviſion made for its nouriſhment in the Mother's breaſts againſt its coming into the World. Whether it be by turning the Blood into Milk, as was generally thought, or by a paſſage of the Chyle from the Ventricle thither, as ſome of late think; it cannot but be look'd on as a work of Deſign, to turn the nouriſhment another way on purpoſe to ſerve the neceſſities of the new born Child. But this is not all; but continual care and watchfulneſs of the Nurſe is neceſſary to preſerve it, otherways, as well as by feeding it. But theſe unadvis'd and fanciful makers of Mankind think they have done their buſineſs, if they can but imagin the Earth to afford ſome *Milky Subſtance*, to ſupport the poor helpleſs Infants to a little ſuck from the Earth: why did they not as eaſily find out all other conveniencies for them? But there is ſo much abſurdity in the whole Suppoſition, that *Berigardus* concludes, *That Mankind muſt come full grown out of the Earth, and able to ſhift for themſelves; or elſe that ſome other Animals muſt come out before them to afford Milk for them, as the Wolf did to* Romulus *and* Remus. Such miſerable ſhifts muſt thoſe run into, who will not allow a wiſe Providence to have brought Mankind into the World.

But how came Mankind, if they came into the World ſo by chance, II.
to be ſo admirably provided in all parts of their Bodies of ſuch inſtruments of ſenſe and motion, that look as like a deſign as any thing can

poſſibly do? The Bodies of Men are not like meer lumps of dirt and water put together, for there is not the leaſt part about them, but is made up of ſuch a *Wonderful Mechaniſm*, that there cannot be a diſcompoſure in it without a diſorder in the whole. But, ſuppoſe the fleſhly and bony parts could be made by the mixing and tempering ſeveral particles of Matter together; yet what can be imagin'd as to the *Muſcles* and *Nerves* and *Fibres*, which are ſo conveniently diſpers'd over the Body? The Heart it ſelf is found to be a very ſtrong Muſcle, conſiſting of abundance of Nerves, and all kind of Fibres complicated within each other, and a ſtrong Tendon at the Baſis of it; by virtue whereof it is able to contract it ſelf, and ſo makes the Blood to paſs into the Arteries, which convey it to all parts of the Body. Now let any one think with himſelf how it is poſſible for a meer Lump of Earth made in ſuch a form as the Heart is, to have ſuch a force and power to contract it ſelf to ſuch a degree as to ſend out ſo much Blood continually, and to receive it in again by the relaxation of it ſelf. How comes this Motion to begin in ſuch a piece of Clay made with a Baſis and a Cone? How came the inward cavities to be form'd, and kept ſo diſtinct from each other? For, if there were any ſtop of the paſſage, Life is at an end. How comes ſuch a Motion to continue ſo long and ſo uniform? Thoſe who have moſt narrowly ſearch'd into it, have found that no other account can be given of it, but that the Wiſe Creator that form'd the Heart, doth both give and continue its motion. And as to all the other Muſcles of the Body, if we conſider their number, their poſition, the contexture of their parts, and their continual uſefulneſs; we can never imagin that all theſe things could be the reſult of Heat and Mud, or a caſual conflux of the dull particles of Matter. Every Muſcle hath its proper Fibres laid upon one another, and its oppoſite Tendons, with an inward cavity, and the Artery, Veins and Nerves belonging to it, and a Membrane to cover all; and all parts capable of motion have ſeveral Muſcles peculiar to themſelves, for diſtinct uſes and different ſort of motions; as may be ſeen at large in all that treat of theſe matters. Who tell us generally that the Eyes have ſix, the Noſe four pair, the Cheeks two pair, the Lips four Muſcles, the nether Mandible five, the Ears ſix, the Tongue ſeven, &c. I need go no farther: and altho' there be ſome difference in the way of numbring them, yet they all agree, there are ſo many as are impoſſible to be made out by heat and mud, or any force of the Sun or Earth. And what is it which makes all theſe Muſcles ſo ſerviceable to Mankind, that upon the leaſt command they move the parts they ſerve in what manner we direct them? The Reaſon of *Muſcular Motion* is a thing as much out of our reach as that of the *Heart:* Some talk of *Elaſtick Spirits*; others of *the weight of the Blood*; others of *a nervous liquor diſtending the carnous Fibres*; others of *a Succus nutritius from the Nerves meeting with the Animal Spirits, and fermenting together, which being thruſt into the carnous Fibres, ſwells and dilates them ſo as to make them contract themſelves*; *from whence*, they ſay, *Local Motion proceeds.* But all theſe are but mere conjectures, and hardly anſwer to the moſt common appearances of Muſcular motion. And the Mechaniſm of our own Bodies, both as to Senſe and Motion, baffles all the attempts of the moſt ingenious and ſubtle Philoſophers; who may eaſier teach us the ways to talk about it, than to underſtand it. But there is one thing yet farther fit to be obſerv'd in this place concerning the Muſcles; which is the different Figure of them, according to the uſe they ſerve for; as the

Lower *de Corde. p.* 85.

the Muſcle called *Deltoides* on the Shoulder, the Circular Muſcles, where their uſe is to open and ſhut; if ſuch things do not argue contrivance and deſign, it is not eaſy to imagin what doth. What can thoſe who follow *Diodorus Siculus* make of the whole *Syſtem of Nerves*, which are in the Body of Man? Did theſe come out of ſlime with *the heat of the Sun?* How came the different Riſe of the *Nerves*, ſome within and others without the Brain? What reaſon is there in the bulk, and figure, and texture of that ſame Subſtance, that it comes to be ſo divided, ſo as part of it to continue within the Brain, and the other to be continued down to the loweſt part of the Back, by ſeveral diſtinct *Vertebræ?* How came Matter of it ſelf to form ſuch a paſſage down from the Brain, and to ſecure it in ſuch a manner; and to compact the ſeveral parts together, ſo firmly as if they were but one bone, and yet ſo flexibly as to ſerve beſt for motion? What made the *Perforation* for the *Spinal Marrow* to paſs in the middle and on the ſides, for the ſeveral *Nerves* to go from thence to the ſeveral parts of the Body? Whence came that *Ligament*, which joyns the *Vertebræ* of the Back together, and covers the other Membranes of the *Spina Dorſi?* There is a wonderful curioſity obſerved by our greateſt *Anatomiſts*, in the order and placing of the *Nerves*, the *Arteries*, *the Veins* and the *hollow places* belonging to it: which they found by opening the *Vertebræ* in *Embryos*, and taking out the ſpinal Marrow, and injecting liquors into the ſeveral veſſels. And ſtill the farther any have gone in theſe ſearches, the more reaſon they have ſeen to admire the wiſdom of Providence: and ſo it hath been in other parts. *Ariſtotle* mentions a ſtrange ſaying of *Empedocles*, *That the reaſon why the Back-bone appears as if it were made up of ſeveral pieces, was that it was at firſt broken, and then put together; and ever ſince it hath ſo continued.* But how came the *Vertebræ* then to be ſo well faſtened together, and to be ſo much more convenient for motion than an intire bone would have been? Beſides in an *Embryo* that which is properly the *Spina*, doth not then appear, as being inconvenient for its poſture in the womb; which ſhews both the intention of Nature, and the deſign of Providence. How came the *Vertebræ* to be in other Animals as well as Mankind? And even *Ariſtotle* himſelf was therein miſtaken, for he affirms, *That a Lion hath no* Vertebræ *in his Neck-bone, but that it is all one continued bone:* But *Borrichius* in his Anatomy of one, declares *that he found the ſeveral* Vertebræ *in the Neck plain and diſtinct.* And the ſame learned Perſon obſerves, *That in a Crocodile, which he diſſected, he found in four foot length of the Back ſixty* Vertebræ; *which were of a ſpongy nature, fit to receive nouriſhment*; and from *the different formation of ſome parts of them*, he concludes it moſt probable that they grow ſo much longer than other Animals. But *Ariſtotle*'s miſtakes, about *the Lion's having no* Vertebræ *in his Neck*, had been diſcover'd by *Scaliger*, and confirm'd by ſeveral Diſſections ſince: So that the *Vertebræ* are of the original deſign of Nature. But to proceed: What made the ſeveral paſſages out of the Skull, for the Nerves which ſerve for the ſeveral Senſes of *Smelling*, *Seeing*, *Hearing* and *Taſting?* How come the ſeveral branches of the *Par Vagum* to be ſo diſpers'd, and to make ſuch knots with the *Intercoſtal Nerves?* Theſe, and many more ſuch Queſtions might be aſked relating to the wonderful *Syſtem* of *Nerves*, but theſe are ſufficient to my purpoſe, to ſhew that theſe wonderful contrivances for Senſe and Motion, could not come from meer fortuitous and unthinking Cauſes. But let us look now upon the moſt obvious parts of the Body, which lie to the view

Willis de Cerebro, c. 29.

Ariſt. de Partib. Anim. l. 1. c. 1.

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 4. c. 10.

Hermet. Sapient. vindic. c. 10. p. 245. p. 272.

Exercit. 208.

view of all Men, the *Eye*, the *Ear*, the *Mouth*, and the *Hand*; one would think it hardly poſſible for any Men pretending to Reaſon, to think theſe to be the reſult of Chance. Let us well conſider the ſtructure of *the Eye*, and we may well think *Lucretius* had no lucid interval when he wrote,

Illud in his rebus vitium vehementer & iſtam
Effugere errorem, vitareque præmeditator,
Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata,
Proſpicere ut poſſimus. Lucret. l. 4.

That we muſt have a great care to avoid the miſtake of thoſe that ſay, that Eyes were made for Seeing. For could any Man in his right Senſes think the Eye could be form'd for any other uſe but to ſee with? *But the uſe is after the thing is form'd.* What then? May it not be deſign'd for ſuch a uſe by him that form'd it? *But that which is form'd for a particular uſe, muſt be later than that for whoſe uſe it is form'd, as a Bed for a Man to ſleep on, a Cup to drink out of, Armour to defend himſelf; but a Man might ſleep, and drink, and defend himſelf, before thoſe things were found out.* What is the meaning of all this? No one is ſo ſenſleſs to queſtion, Whether Men be not before they find ſome conveniencies for their particular uſes; but the Queſtion here is, Whether when a thing is ſo form'd as to ſerve only for ſuch a uſe, it be not reaſonable to conclude that it was made on purpoſe for that uſe? But ſaith *Lucretius*,

Nil ideo quoniam natum'ſt in corpore ut uti
Poſſemus, ſed, quod natum'ſt id procreat uſum.

Nothing is made in the Body that we might uſe it, but when it is made we find out the uſe of it. As tho' it had been poſſible for Mankind to have found ſuch an uſe of the Eye, unleſs it had been purpoſely made for it, The Act of Seeing is no doubt ſubſequent to the making of the Eye; for we cannot ſee without Eyes; but if we could make no other uſe of Eyes; but to ſee with, is not this a plain evidence they were made for us to that end? This is not like a uſe we make of things which we alter the faſhion of for our conveniences. For, we do not make our own Eyes; they are very early form'd in the Body, and therefore were within the primary intention of Nature; and aſſoon as we come into the World, we do not deliberate whether we ſhould uſe Eyes or not, for we preſently ſee with them. And how can the Eye being made teach us the uſe of it, when we preſently make uſe of our Eyes without any previous deliberation? We may hinder the uſe of them, if we pleaſe, by blinding our ſelves, but we cannot turn them to any other uſe. If *Lucretius* in the extravagancy of his imagination, might fancy the uſe was arbitrary, then Men might have heard with their Eyes or have ſeen with their Ears, or have taſted with their Noſes, or ſmelt with their Tongues: But this I ſuppoſe none can think that he meant. What was it then? that Men could not uſe them till they were made? We grant it. But doth it follow thence that they were not made deſignedly for ſuch a uſe? How can we judge of that, but by examining the ſeveral parts? and if they were fitted for ſuch a uſe and no other, we have reaſon to conclude they were ſo intended. Now

what could the *Muſcles* and *Tunicles*, and *ſeveral Humours* of the Eye be made for, but for Sight? How came that *Cavity* to be form'd in the Forehead in which the Eyes are plac'd? What motion of the particles of Matter made two ſuch hollow places in the Skull? How came one not to be ſufficient? How come the *Eye-lids* to be ſo plac'd? Could they be deſign'd for any other uſe? How come the *Glands* to be fix'd in the corners of the Eyes, and with the *Lymphatick Veſſels* belonging to them? Could they have ſerv'd for other uſes? How comes the *Optick Nerve* to be continued to the three Tunicles of the Eyes? and that which partakes moſt of the ſubſtance of the Brain to be the chief organ of Sight, as fitteſt to tranſmit the images to the Brain? What was the *Chriſtallin Humour* deſign'd for, but to receive the impreſſions of outward objects? How comes the *Optick Nerve* to be ſo inſerted into the Eye, not directly behind, but on one ſide, but only for the more intire tranſmitting the Images receiv'd by the Eye? Can now any one think that the Eye could be ever made for any other uſe, but for ſight? And we do not therefore uſe it, becauſe we find it ready prepar'd? but it was therefore ſo prepar'd, that we might uſe it to ſuch a purpoſe. And as to his general ſaying, *That nothing in the Body is made for uſe, but that the uſe follows the making of it*; let us apply it to other Animals, and it will appear ridiculous. What could any Man anſwer ſeriouſly to one that ſhould ſay, that four-footed Animals had not Feet given them to go with; but that finding ſo many Feet, they did go with them? And ſo for the Wings of Birds, and the Fins of Fiſhes; and the particular ſhapes of ſome Animals for their particular uſe: As, the long Neck of the Swan, for going deeper in the water for his food; will any one ſay, that the Swan finding his Neck ſo long, us'd it for that purpoſe? Or that *Shell-fiſh* finding their hard Shells ready made as a defence againſt the Rocks, crept into them for that end? Whereas all the Muſcles they move by, are cover'd over with a hard bony Subſtance; and ſo they are the neceſſary parts belonging to them. What can be ſaid to the thick horny ſubſtance of an Eagle's Eye, which makes it bear the ſtrongeſt beams of the Sun; was this only us'd for that purpoſe, but not intended by Nature? Whence came that outward covering of the Eye, not only in Eagles but in other greater Birds, which they can draw over it as they pleaſe, and is ſo ſtrong a defence againſt light, that Anatomiſts tell us, by the help of it put to their open Eyes, they could look on the Sun without trouble, as *Borrichius* informs us? *Steno*, upon the obſervation of the wonderful Mechaniſm of the Eye both in Mankind, and Beaſts, and Birds, ſaith, *That if a Man firſt underſtands Mechanicks, and then curiouſly examins the fabrick of Animals, he muſt either put off his Reaſon, or he muſt admire the wiſdom and contrivance of Providence.* And he underſtood the frame of theſe things far beyond what either *Lucretius* or *Epicurus* did.

Borrich. Hermet. ſap. p. 259. Act. Dan. l. 2. Obſ. 127.

And ſo for the Ear *that was made*, ſaith *Lucretius*, *long before any Sound was heard.*

Multoque creatæ ſunt prius Aures,
Quam ſonus eſt auditus.

No doubt of it. For how ſhould we hear without Ears? But can any Man imagin they could be made for any other uſe but to hear with? How came they to be plac'd in the Head and not in any other part of the

the Body? Were there any form'd before with Ears in other parts, which did not do ſo well? In other caſes they ſay, *Nature was put to try divers Experiments, becauſe the imperfect Animals could not ſubſiſt*; But this cannot hold here: For Mankind might have lived without Ears in other places, but the Head is certainly the beſt for Sounds, being received and tranſmitted to the Brain. How comes the outward part of the Ear to be ſo framed as it is, but for the better gathering and more diſtinct conveyance of the Sounds, as appears by the confus'd noiſe which thoſe have who have loſt that part? What made the inward paſſage ſo winding, and ſuch an exquiſite Membrane at the end of it, and a Cord behind it, but for the advantage of the Sound? How come the three cavities behind, the firſt with little Bones of an extraordinary figure, whereof one triangular, the better to give paſſage to the Air; the ſecond called *the Labyrinth*, and the third with *Spiral Windings* and *an Internal Air*, and all particularly ſerving the purpoſe of Hearing, by the Sound paſſing from one to another? Whence came all theſe ſubtle and intricate paſſages, if our Bodies were made by chance? And yet, if any of them be not in their due order, our ſenſe of Hearing is prejudiced; which ſhews that this contrivance was neceſſary in order to it. And which is again obſervable, the greater diſcoveries have been made in theſe matters, the more reaſon we have to admire the contrivance of them. As in this ſenſe of Hearing, the lateſt diſcoveries about the ſmall bones of the firſt cavity, call'd *the Hammer*, *the Anvil*, and *the Stirrup*, and another in the joyning the two laſt, acquaint us with more than what the Ancients knew; ſince there are two things remarkable about them. 1. *That they do move each other*; the Drum moves the Hammer, the Hammer the Anvil, that the Stirrup, which opens the paſſage into the ſecond cavity. 2. *That theſe bones are as big in an Infant, as in grown Perſons.* Now how comes this to paſs in a way of *Mechaniſm?* How come theſe Bones not to increaſe as the other parts of the Body do; ſince the moſt ſolid of them, *the Hammer* and *Anvil*, as well as the *Stirrup*, have manifeſt Pores in them to receive nouriſhment? But not only theſe, but the other ſmall bones in the inner cavities, the *Semicircular paſſages* and the *Cochlea* only receive a greater *firmneſs* and *hardneſs* by Age. Theſe things I can only mention, and refer the Reader to Mr. *Du Verney* and others, who have treated moſt exactly of them.

The frame of the Mouth as it is, is neceſſary for *Reſpiration*, and *Nouriſhment*, and *Speech*. For *Reſpiration*, the Mouth opened affords a Paſſage to the Air, and there are inward Veſſels fitted to convey it to the Lungs, and without breathing it is impoſſible to live. But how came the two different Paſſages for the *Air* and *Food?* How came the *Valve* to ſecure the Paſſage to the Lungs from ſuch things which may prejudice it, and paſs the other way? As to *Nouriſhment*, the Mouth not only takes in the Food, but the Teeth are conveniently plac'd for the preparing it for its farther paſſage and alteration in the Stomach, in order to Nutrition; for which end there are Veſſels prepar'd with wonderful variety and contrivance. How come thoſe *Channels* into thoſe hard Bones in the Mouth, which we call *Teeth*, by which an Artery, a Vein and a Nerve ſpread themſelves in branches to each particular Tooth? How come the figures of them to vary according to their uſe, and to have ſtronger Roots where the work is harder? And becauſe *Speech* is one of the peculiar excellencies of Mankind, there is an Inſtrument fram'd on

purpoſe for it in the Mouth (which ſerves for *Taſting* likewiſe) and without this, all the communication of Mankind with each other by words had been loſt. And I cannot ſee how mere Matter and Motion could help Mankind either to frame words, or to utter them to others without a *Tongue*; nor, how it could be fram'd by it.

The *Hand* is ſo provided with *Joints*, *Muſcles*, and *Tendons*, for the great variety of neceſſary uſes it ſerves Mankind for, that he that can think it could be ſo contriv'd by chance, doth thereby ſhew that ſome can think only by Chance without any Reaſon; and it is a vain thing to hope to convince them. I ſhall not need to inſiſt on the curioſity of the contrivance of all the Muſcles of the Hand; but it is impoſſible for any Man to give an account of the *Perforation* of thoſe Muſcles, which ſerve for the uſe of ſome of the Fingers and Toes, from mere Matter and Motion; or the Ligaments about the Tendons of thoſe Muſcles, for the greater eaſineſs of their motion. *Ariſtotle* hath a Diſcourſe about the great uſe of a Hand to Mankind: *Anaxagoras*, he ſaith, *ſaid that Man was the wiſeſt Animal, becauſe he alone had Hands*; but, ſaith he, *therefore Man had Hands, becauſe he was the wiſeſt, being beſt able to make uſe of ſuch an excellent Inſtrument. For that is the Wiſdom of Nature to do as a wiſe Man would do*, i. e. *to give the beſt Inſtruments to the beſt Workman. Now*, ſaith he, *the Hand is the moſt uſeful Inſtrument to him that is capable of making a good uſe of it.* And therefore he blames thoſe that ſaid, *Man was the worſt provided for of any Animals; for they have but one help afforded them by Nature, but the Hand is inſtead of all, for it can make uſe of all.* And for that reaſon he ſhews how very convenient the make and faſhion of the Hand is, and the diviſion of it into five parts, on which he inſiſts at large. So that *Ariſtotle* was fully ſatisfy'd that the production of Mankind was no caſual or ſpontaneous thing, but the effect of Wiſdom and Underſtanding.

Riolan. Anatom. l. 5. c. 28.

Ariſtot. de Part. Anim. l. 4. c. 10.

Theſe things I have here laid together at firſt, becauſe this *Hypotheſis* of *Diodorus Siculus* hath been thought by ſome in our Age to be *the natural ſenſe of Mankind without Revelation*; whereas in truth it is the foundation of Irreligion, and the reproach of Mankind; but not the ſenſe of the wiſeſt part of them. And to make out this more effectually, I ſhall now proceed to conſider and compare the ſenſe of the moſt *antient Philoſophers* on both ſides as to this point, whether the World was the effect of Chance, or of a wiſe Providence. For if the World were made by a wiſe and intelligent Being, it can never be ſuſpected that Religion is an Impoſture, or a contrivance of Politicians; for then it will appear to be built upon the trueſt Reaſon. And I ſhall the more carefully inquire into the Opinions of the eldeſt Philoſophers, becauſe they were neither *Prieſts* nor *Politicians*, having no Intereſt to carry on by the practice of Religion. And ſome of them were born in a very good condition, and quitted their Eſtates, or neglected other buſineſs, the more freely to attend on their philoſophical Inquiries. And therefore we have the more reaſon to ſearch into their Opinions, ſo far as relates to theſe matters.

It cannot be deny'd that after Men began to be inquiſitive into the philoſophical Reaſons of Things, there were ſome who ſet up for material Cauſes only, without an Efficient. And there were two different ſorts of theſe, and the other Schemes may be well reduced to them.

The firſt was of thoſe who were the immediate Succeſſors of *Thales*. For I ſee no reaſon to put him in the head of them, if what *Cicero*, *Diogenes Laertius* and *Plutarch* report of him be true. For it is ſaid in

Cicero, *That* Thales *made* God *to be the Mind that form'd all things*. And to what purpoſe ſhould *Velleius* ſay this, if this had not been then known to have been his Opinion? For it had been better for his deſign to have made ſo great a Man as *Thales* was eſteem'd, to have excluded God and Providence. *Diogenes Laertius* ſaith, *That he not only made* God *an Eternal Being, but that the World was of his making*. And he was no more partial in this caſe, than the *Epicurean* in *Tully*. It is obſervable, that when *Plutarch* blames *Anaximander* and *Anaximenes* for *leaving out the Efficient Cauſe*, he takes no notice of *Thales* on that account; which he ought to have done, as being the Head of that Sect of Philoſophers called the *Ionick*, as himſelf acknowledges in that place. And *Stobæus* ſaith, *That* Thales *own'd a Divine Power, which paſs'd thro' and gave motion to the fluid Matter, out of which he ſuppos'd all things to be made*. The great Objection againſt this, is, that ſeveral of the antient Writers ſay, *That* Anaxagoras *was the firſt Philoſopher, who attributed the making of the World to an Infinite Mind*; and that *Plutarch* himſelf, in the Life of *Pericles*, ſaith the ſame. But the true anſwer to this, is, that *Anaxagoras* was the firſt who own'd this in writing, whoſe words are produc'd by ſo many; but *Thales* wrote nothing about it that appear'd, and therefore his Scholars going another way, there might be ſome preſumption againſt him. For it is too evident that *Anaximander*, his Diſciple, did never mention a God in the making of the World; *but he mentions ſeveral Gods made out of the World*, *Dii nativi*; a ſort of *Phœnician Gods*, which roſe out of Matter; and ſuch as the *Poets* had poſſeſs'd the People with among the *Greeks*. I have already obſerv'd from *Plato*, *That the old* Greeks *worſhip'd the Sun, Moon, and Stars*, &c. *as other barbarous Nations did*. Now herein lay the artifice of *Anaximander*, that he took care to aſſert the *Popular Deities*, and ſo avoided the imputation of *Atheiſm* among the People, who look'd no farther, than whether Men own'd the Religion in vogue: But whether there were an Infinite Mind ſuperior to thoſe Gods they worſhip'd, they look'd on as a Speculation too deep for them; and therefore they let thoſe alone, who ſpake nothing againſt the Gods they ſolemnly worſhip'd. And this was the true reaſon of the different uſage of *Anaximander* and *Anaxagoras*. The former aſſerted the Beginning of all things to have been from Infinite Matter, without an Efficient Cauſe: The latter ſaid this was impoſſible; but there muſt be an Eternal Mind to give motion to Matter, and to direct it. Now one would have thought that *Anaxagoras* ſhould have been in favor with the People, who hated *Atheiſm*, and *Anaximander* puniſhed: But on the contrary *Anaximander* kept up his Intereſt among the People where he liv'd, at *Miletus* in *Aſia*, and at laſt carry'd a Colony along with him to *Apollonia*. The reaſon was, the People of *Miletus* had a wonderful veneration for the *Sun* and *Moon*, under the names of *Apollo* and *Diana*; and as long as *Anaximander* comply'd with them, as to theſe *Dii nativi*, they let him alone in his Philoſophy. But *Anaxagoras* coming to *Athens*, and being there in favor with *Pericles*, a leading Man in the City, but oppos'd violently by a different Faction of *Thucydides Mileſius*, who took all advantages they could againſt *Pericles* his Party: They finding that *Anaxagoras* had ſhew'd too much of his Philoſophy, when he call'd the Sun a *Maſs of Fire*; this ſet them all in a flame, and made ſuch a diſturbance about it, that *Anaxagoras* was accus'd of *Atheiſm*; and *Pericles* with all his Intereſt and Eloquence could not ſave him from Baniſhment, in which he died, as appears by Laertius and *Ælian*. *Anaxagoras*

Cicer. de Nat. Deor. l. 1. 25.

Plutar. de Plac. Phil. l. 1. *c.* 3. *Stob. Eclog. Phyſ. c.* 1.

Ælian. l. 3. *c.* 17. *Strab. l.* 14.

xagoras was very clear as to the main point of *Atheiſm*, for he aſſerted an Eternal Mind which made the World; this *Anaximander* deny'd, but he aſſerted the Common Deities: and altho' the *Epicurean* in *Tully* argues well againſt *Anaximander*'s Opinion, *Sed nos Deum niſi ſempiternum intelligere quî poſſumus?* We can have no true Notion of GOD not eternal; yet ſuch philoſophical Reaſons ſignified little; he allow'd the ſame Worſhip which they practis'd, and this was enough to ſatisfy them.

I am not ignorant, that ſome have gone about to excuſe *Anaximander*, as tho' he were ſo intent upon the Material Cauſes, that thro' *Incogitancy* only *he left out the Efficient*. A ſtrange piece of *Incogitancy* in a Philoſopher to leave out the main point. For the juſt fault which *Anaxagoras* found, was that he went about to make a World without an Eternal Mind before Matter; and he knew very well what the ſenſe of *Anaximander*, and his Scholar *Anaximenes* were, by whom he was inſtructed. And why ſhould *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Theophraſtus*, &c. look on it as ſo extraordinary a thing in *Anaxagoras* to aſſert an Eternal Mind, as the firſt Cauſe, if his Predeceſſors meant the ſame thing? But there is a paſſage in *Ariſtotle* which ſeems moſt to favour *Anaximander*, viz. *That he own'd an infinite firſt Principle, which did contain and govern all things, and was Immortal and Incorruptible.* And this *Aug. Steuchus Eugubinus* in his learned Book *De perenni Philoſophia*, inſiſts much upon. (A Book written with ſo good a deſign, and bating ſome ſuppoſititious Authorities, ſo well manag'd, that the Elder *Scaliger*, as his Son tells us, commended it particularly to a great Friend of his, too inclinable to *Atheiſm* (as was too much the faſhion then as well as ſince, among ſome who would ſeem to have more Wit than others) and it had ſo great ſucceſs therein, that he utterly renounc'd all Principles tending that way.) The Paſſage which he produces is certainly in *Ariſtotle*, and it ſeems ſo capable of a good meaning, that *Clemens Alexandrinus join'd him with* Anaxagoras *in ſuppoſing an Infinite Being above the Elements:* And it cannot be deny'd that the Author of the Book *de Mundo* (who, as I before obſerv'd, was very antient, if not *Ariſtotle*) doth uſe the ſame Expreſſion concerning GOD, *that he doth contain and govern all things:* but yet laying the Paſſages in *Ariſtotle* together, there is too great reaſon to ſuſpect that *Anaximander* did not aſſert an Eternal Mind, as *Anaxagoras* did. He is there giving an account of the different Notions Philoſophers had concerning *the firſt Principle: Some aſſerted it to be Infinite, as* Anaxagoras *and* Democritus; *the former held things to be made out of one another, and that there was one firſt Principle of all, which he called Mind; the latter held no Generation of things out of another, but that one Common Matter or Body was the only Principle of all things, and that the parts differ'd only by bulk and figure.* Thus far *Ariſtotle* is clear; then he goes on to ſhew, *that the firſt Principle muſt be Ingenite and Incorruptible*; and then it *muſt contain and govern all things*; *as all do hold, who do not aſſert* other Cauſes, *as Mind* (as *Anaxagoras*) *or Friendſhip* (as *Empedocles.*) *And this is the* Τὸ Θεῖον *the Divine Being, which is immortal and incorruptible,* as was aſſerted by *Anaximander* and *the moſt of thoſe* he calls *Phyſiologiſts, i. e.* who went no farther than the bare Nature of things. Now here it is plain, that he doth diſtinguiſh *Anaximander* and his Followers from *Anaxagoras*, who aſſerted an Eternal Mind: and he diſtinguiſhes his Opinion both from that of *Democritus* and *Anaximander*. It may be ſaid, *that it is plain from hence, that* Anaximander *did aſſert a Divine Being*; but at laſt it came to nothing but *Infinite Matter*, which was the Ori-

De Perenni Philoſ. l. 11. 5.

Joſ. Scalig. de vit. Julii Scaligeri p. 50.

Clem. Alexandr. Protrept. p. 43.

Nat. Auſ. l. 3. *c.* 4.

ginal and Mother-God to his *Dii Geniti*, as he called them. In another place he ſpeaks yet more plainly, viz. *that thoſe Philoſophers before* Anaxagoras *went no farther than Matter, and made all things to come out of it, and to be diſſolv'd into it again, being it ſelf one and immutable under all the variety of changes.* He ſaith, *They differ'd about the firſt Material Principle: Thales*, and one *Hippon* called *the Atheiſt* (the firſt of that Order that we read of) *held it to be Water*; but *Ariſtotle* beſtows a very ſevere character upon him, viz. *that he did not deſerve to be mention'd for the meanneſs of his capacity.* (It ſeems Wit and Atheiſm did not begin together.) *Anaximander* would go no farther than Infinite Matter in general; but *Anaximenes* was for *Air*, and ſo was *Diogenes Apolloniates*, who liv'd in the time of *Anaxagoras*; but it ſeems by *Demetrius Phalereus* his Apology for *Socrates* (now loſt) *that he fell into ſome danger at* Athens (poſſibly for being againſt the Worſhip of Fire, as *Anaxagoras* was:) But upon the whole matter, I do not ſee how *Anaximander* can be excus'd, altho' he left the *Popular Gods*, and beſtow'd the name of *Divinity* upon his *Infinite Matter*.

Metaphyſ. l. 1. c. 3.

Διὰ τὴν ἀ-ϑέλειαν αὐτῶν τῆς διανοίας.

But there was another *Succeſſion* of *Philoſophers* deriv'd from *Xenophanes*, who liv'd in *Sicily*, ſaith *Laertius*, and was Contemporary with *Anaximander*: and he was neither a Follower of *Thales* nor of *Pythagoras*; but from a Town near the Sea in *Italy*, whence his chief Followers came, it was called the *Eleatick Sect*. He was a great Enemy to *the poetical Fictions about the Gods*, as he had reaſon; for they ſtrangely corrupted the Minds of the People, and took away all inward Reverence towards the Deity. And altho' *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks with ſome contempt of him; yet others have ſhew'd that he miſunderſtood him, and that he aſſerted *One Infinite and Eternal Mind*; and the ſame *Simplicius* ſaith of *Parmenides* and *Meliſſus*: But ſince the learned Author of the *Intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe*, hath very well clear'd that matter, I intend not to tranſcribe him, but to refer my Reader to him, and proceed to thoſe who changed the firſt Notions of the *Eleatick Sect*, and ſet up for the making a World without a Deity. And thoſe were *Lucippus* and *Democritus*; and yet *Stobæus* ſaith, *that* Leucippus *wrote a Book about Mind*, wherein he hath this Saying, *That nothing is done in vain, but all things are done from Reaſon and Neceſſity.* How theſe two things came to be ſo put together is hard for us now to conjecture, unleſs that Book of his had been preſerv'd. *Plutarch* ſaith, That *Democritus* held that God *was an Intellectual Fire, and the Soul of the World.* But it appears by *Cicero*, that *Democritus* did not ſtick at making ſome very ſubtle *Effluvia* of his Atoms to be Gods, both thoſe without us, and thoſe within us, *viz.* thoſe which make up our intellectual Faculties. It is very hard to ſay what his true Notion of *Divinity* was, unleſs we could have ſeen his Books about *Mind* and *Providence*, which *Laertius* ſaith *that he wrote.* But whatever he might write for the amuſing the World, (as *Epicurus* did afterwards) if he made the Origin of all things to have been *without Mind or Providence*, no Titles of Books will be a ſufficient Excuſe for him.

Beſſario c. Calumnia. Plat. lib. 2. c. 10, 11.

Stob. Eclog. Phyſ. c. 8.

Plutarch. de Placit. Philoſ. l. 1. c. 7.

Cicero de N. Deor. l. 1.

And I confeſs it is all one to me, whether thoſe who fram'd the *Atheiſtical Hypotheſes* proceeded in the way of *Forms* and *Qualities*, or of *Atoms* and *Vacuity*; becauſe I think the one way as impoſſible as the other. For as *Ariſtotle* hath well obſerved, the great difficulties as to the firſt Principles lay in two things, *The beginning of Motion, and the Order of the World:* and in both theſe the different *Hypotheſes* of *Anaximander*

and

and *Democritus* were equally defective. But whether the World were made by *the Circumvolution of Infinite Matter, endued with contrary Qualities*; or *by the motion of Atoms, which had nothing but Bulk and Figure*, ſignifies nothing as to the main point. I do not deny but one *Hypotheſis* may in ſome reſpects be more intelligible than the other, and tend more to explain the difference of Body and Mind. But there are ſtill difficulties on both ſides: Some things may be taken for *Real Qualities*, which are not; and the many Experiments of this Age have fully prov'd it: but then there are other things, eſpecially relating to *Animals*, which can never be explain'd in the Mechanical way, to the ſatisfaction of any reaſonable Man.

But altho' *Anaximander* and *Democritus* ſtarted theſe two different *Hypotheſes* about the Origin of the World; yet thoſe who aſſerted an Eternal Mind to be the firſt Cauſe, had in common Reaſon very much the advantage of either; ſince it was impoſſible for them to give an account how the motion of Matter began, or how it fell into that Order, and Beauty, and Uſefulneſs, which we find in thoſe parts which make up the viſible World. All that we can learn of *Anaximander*'s *Hypotheſis* is, *That the Heavens and Infinite Worlds* (for why ſhould they ſtop, when they could make Worlds ſo eaſily) *were produced by an infinite circumvolution of all things; that theſe had in them very different Qualities from each other, ſome hot ſome cold, ſome dry ſome moiſt*, &c. *that theſe being in continual motion, a mixture of them happened, and according to the different mixtures of Qualities, the ſeveral ſorts of things did ariſe.* This, as far as I can apprehend, was his Scheme of the Production of things. *Plutarch. apud Euſ. Præp. Evæ. l. 1. 8.*

There is little difference between the two *Hypotheſes* of *Anaximander* and *Democritus*, but only in the point of Mixture, which one attributes to Qualities, and the other to the Bulk and Figure of Atoms. They both aſſert the Production of things by the circumvolution of the parts of Matter; both held infinite Worlds, and that the things of this World came together of themſelves, without any ſuperior Cauſe.

But were not all the Philoſophers of their Mind? No; ſo far from it, that the beſt and greateſt of them utterly rejected this Doctrine, as unſatisfactory to Human Reaſon. Of which we have an evident proof from *Ariſtotle*, who cannot be ſuſpected of any partiality in this matter. In the beginning of his *Metaphyſicks* he gives an account of the Opinions of *Philoſophers before him about the firſt Principles of things.* I know that he is hardly thought of by many for miſrepreſenting the Opinions of thoſe before him, and that he endeavour'd to leſſen their Reputation to advance his own; but I can ſee no manner of reaſon for it in this caſe. 'Tis poſſible, as to the *Pythagorean* and *Eleatick Sect*, he might not repreſent their Opinions ſo fairly as they were capable of: but as to theſe *Phyſiologiſts*, as he calls them, he charges nothing upon them, but what they own'd; only he makes *Thales the Head of them*, for which I have offer'd Reaſons to the contrary. But in general he ſaith, *That thoſe who began firſt to philoſophize, look'd upon Matter as the only Principle, out of which all things came, and to which they did return; the Subſtance remaining the ſame, and the Affections only chang'd: As* Socrates *is the ſame Man, altho' his inward Habits were chang'd.* But what this Material Principle was, they were not agreed. Thales, *the firſt of them, thought it to be Water*; Anaximenes *and* Diogenes *Air*; Hippaſus *and* Heraclitus *Fire*; Empedocles *to them added Earth.* Hitherto, ſaith he, we find nothing but the Material Cauſe; but, ſaith he, when they had *Metaphyſ. l. 1. §. 3.*

Περιόντος δ' ἔτως αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὁδοποίησεν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνωλάγκασε ζητεῖν.

gone ſo far, the very Nature of things carried them farther in their Inquiries. For whatever change he made in Generation and Corruption, there muſt be ſome Cauſe why it ſo happened. For mere Matter doth not change it ſelf. As Wood doth not make it ſelf into a Bed, nor Braſs into a Statue; but ſome Artificer doth it. *But the ſeeking this, is looking after another Principle*, which he calls *the Principle of Motion. Which thoſe who aſſerted from the beginning, ran themſelves into difficulties, altho' they aſſerted Matter to be one; but thoſe who went no farther than Matter, whether Water, or Fire, or Earth, were never able to clear the Production of things; and therefore were forc'd by Truth it ſelf,* (ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας) *to ſeek for another Principle.* Where it is very conſiderable that *Ariſtotle* ſaith, That there were ſome from the beginning who aſſerted both Principles; and that thoſe who aſſerted only a Material Principle, ran themſelves into ſuch difficulties which they could never ſee their way through; but were forc'd at laſt by the mere power of Truth to ſeek for another Principle. Which not only ſhews his own Opinion, but that others, upon conſideration, were fain to ſet up a new *Hypotheſis* againſt theſe Materialiſts, not wholly new, as he ſhews, but new in oppoſition to them, who thought at firſt, by pretending to ſkill in Philoſophy, to have run down the antient Opinion of Mankind, founded on ſuch a Tradition, of which none could trace the Original. Of which I have already produc'd the teſtimonies of *Plato* and *Plutarch.* But now the humor of philoſophizing coming among the *Greeks*, the firſt ſetters up of this were very apt to contemn any thing that was built on Tradition; for that gave no Reaſon of things, which it was their buſineſs to do. In ſome things then unknown as to the natural Cauſes of them, they wonderfully ſurpriſed the common ſort, who thereupon admired them as Men that could do any thing. Being thus puffed up with a vain opinion of their own ſkill, they attempted to give an account of the very beginning of the World; and finding out what they thought the main Principle of which things were compoſed, they had no more to do, but to ſuppoſe them all reduced to a Maſs or Chaos; and then they fancied that by the motion of theſe ſeveral parts of Matter, things would fall into that ſtate we now ſee them in the World. But as much as they pleas'd themſelves with theſe Speculations, thoſe who came after them found them extremely defective, both in the beginning of this Motion, and the Order of it. For they found Matter to be a dull unactive thing of it ſelf, and that no Matter could form it ſelf without an Agent; and therefore they ſaw it neceſſary to add a Supreme Efficient Cauſe, which ſhould both put the parts of Matter, however qualified, into motion, and direct and regulate the courſe of it. For otherwiſe it was impoſſible to conceive, that there ſhould be ſuch diſtinct Syſtems or Bodies of Matter, as there are in the World. For how come the ſeveral *Vortices* not to interfere with each other? What made the Centers of them to be diſtinct from one another, ſo as that the Matter within ſuch circumference ſhould move about that alone? And without this it is impoſſible to conceive there ſhould be ſuch Bodies as the Sun, Moon, and Stars are; ſo great, and yet ſo diſtinct from each other. But what Cauſe then was found ſo neceſſary to be ſuperadded? *Ariſtotle* ſaith, That the Order and Fitneſs of things, which he calls Εὖ καὶ Καλῶς, muſt proceed from an Intelligent Cauſe; for theſe things could never come either from mere Material Cauſes, as Fire, Earth, *&c.* or only by Chance. And therefore he ſaith, *Anaxagoras* wrote like a Man in his ſenſes, in com-

pariſon of thoſe before him; which ſhews that he look'd on the others Speculations as Dreams and idle Fancies. And he will not allow *Anaxagoras* to have been the firſt that aſſerted this; but he did it φανερῶς, openly and plainly, in oppoſition to ſuch as had ſet up another *Hypotheſis*. For before him, he ſaith, *Hermotinus Clazomenius* had ſaid the ſame thing, as to a ſuperior Cauſe: And ſo no doubt had many others; but he mentions him as a Philoſopher of the ſame City from whence *Anaxagoras* came. But it ſeems the reputation of *Thales* and his Scholars had obtain'd ſo much in the *Greek* Colonies where they inhabited, that they buried the name of others, altho' *Clazomenæ* were a City of *Ionia* too.

But that *Anaxagoras* was a Perſon of a juſt eſteem, appears by the great value which *Pericles* ſet upon him; who not only had him for his Counſellor, but ventur'd his intereſt to preſerve him: and altho' he was over-rul'd by the contrary Faction, as to his Baniſhment; yet he took care of him in it. And as *Plutarch* ſaith, he obtain'd the name of Νοῦς; he cannot tell, whether it was for his Opinion, or the reputation of his Wiſdom. And after he was buried at *Lamſacus*, a City of *Aſia Minor* near the *Helleſpont*, there were two Inſcriptions on the Altar erected to his Memory, which teſtify'd the very great Eſteem of him in two words, the one was Νοῦς, and the other Ἀλήθεια. And what can be ſaid greater of a Philoſopher, than that *Underſtanding* and *Truth* belong'd to him? *Timon*, who was not very civil to the memories of moſt Philoſophers, gives him a high character in *Laertius*: who ſaith likewiſe, *That he was born to a conſiderable Eſtate; but he had a Mind above Riches.* And *Sextus Empiricus* ſaith, *he was the moſt ſkilful in Natural Philoſophy*; and he was blam'd both by *Socrates* and *Ariſtotle*, for running too far into Natural Cauſes, as tho' he made uſe of his Supreme Mind only to help him out, when nothing elſe would. But therein he ſhew'd that it was not for want of underſtanding Natural Cauſes, that he aſſerted *an Eternal Mind, pure and unmix'd*, which was the firſt Cauſe of things; but it was his true ſkill in Philoſophy, which brought him to it. For he fix'd on the Principle of *Gravitation*, as the main foundation of Union and Compoſition; but the other *Hypotheſes* of *Vortices*, or *Circumlations* without it, he look'd on as weak and inſufficient. So vain is that Saying of *Lucretius* and a modern Philoſopher, that *Ignorance of Cauſes inclin'd Men to Religion*; eſpecially as to the Heavenly Bodies:

Τοῦτον ὑφ' ἑνὸς τ' ἀνδρὸς θαυμάσας ὁ Περικλῆς. *Plutarch. in Pericle.*

Ælian. l. 8. c. 19.

Sext. Empir. p. 153. Plato in Phædr. Ariſt. Metaph. l. 4. Plutarch. in Pericle.

Leviathan. ch. 12.

Præterea cœli rationes ordine certo,
Et varia annorum cernebant tempora verti,
Nec poterant quibus id fieret cognoſcere cauſis;
Ergo perfugium ſibi habebant omnia Divis
Tradere, & illorum nutu facere omnia flecti.

Lucret. l. 5.

For the trueſt and exacteſt ſearcher into Natural Cauſes, we ſee, was the moſt firm and ſteddy aſſerter of a GOD. *Lucretius* magnifies his Heroe, *that neither the common Fame, nor the Thunder and Lightning had frighted him into any ſenſe of Religion; but that he had gone beyond the Clouds by the ſtrength of his Wit, and had ſetled all the bounds of Nature.*

Quem nec fama Deûm, nec fulmina, nec minitanti
Murmure compreſſit cœlum, &c.

Which was all becoming the more than Poetick fury of *Lucretius* to ſay. But *Plutarch* in the Life of *Pericles* ſaith, That *Anaxagoras* explain'd to him the Natural Cauſes of thoſe Meteors which are ſo apt to terrify Mankind, and thereby took away an ignorant Superſtition; but inſtead of that he ſettled in his Mind ἀσφαλῆ μετ' ἐλπίδων ἀγαθῶν εὐσέβειαν, *a firm Devotion accompanied with good Hopes.* And is not this far beyond the utmoſt *Lucretius* attributes to his *Hero*? ſuppoſing he had ſuch ſucceſs, as he imagin'd; which we have only the Poet's word for.

Quare Relligio pedibus ſubjecto viciſſim
Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cælo.

But we can find no ſuch victory that he ever obtain'd over Religion, by his fooliſh and precarious *Hypotheſis*, which the more learned pretenders to *Atheiſm* in our Age are aſham'd of, becauſe of its vanity and inconſiſtency; and therefore there is now leſs need of inſiſting upon it. But what reaſon had *Lucretius* to make ſuch extravagant boaſting of *Epicurus* his ſucceſs againſt the Principles of Religion; when *Cicero* of the ſame age and time, and a friend to *Lucretius*, had ſo very mean an opinion of it, and hath expos'd it ſo much to contempt in more places than one? But poſſibly he may mean, *it had ſo at Athens:* nothing like it. For it was obſerv'd, that none were more forward to comply with the *popular ſuperſtitions*, none more reſerv'd as to their real opinions about the *Deity* than *Epicurus* and his followers. What need all this mean complyance, this caution and reſerve, if they were ſuch Conquerors, as he repreſents them? They never oppos'd the common ſentiments, as *Anaxagoras* did, and ſuffer'd for it; but inſtead of it, they induſtriouſly labour'd to perſuade the People, that they were *for Piety and Veneration of the Gods*; *and Epicurus* wrote about it: whether in earneſt or not, I diſpute not; but he was in earneſt concern'd for his own ſecurity. Are theſe the marks of a *Conqueror?* And yet in his time the *fear of the Areopagus*, after the time of *Ephialtes* was in great meaſure remov'd. It is obſerved by *Joſephus*, *That by the Laws of* Athens, *it was death without mercy, to ſpeak againſt the eſtabliſhed Religion*; and we find with what difficulty *Anaxagoras* eſcaped: But in *Epicurus* his time the Government was ſunk, and the *Macedonian* Empire was continually growing upon them; and all People took greater liberty to ſpeak their Minds, and without any ſuch oppoſition as the Philoſophers before him met with, when their Laws were obſerved more ſtrictly; as when *Protagoras* and *Diagoras* were forced to abſcond for fear of their lives; and *Ariſtotle* upon a ſuſpicion of a profane *Hymn* to withdraw to *Calcis*. But in the time of *Epicurus*, the ſtate of the City was altered, and the Government was in the hands of *Alexander*'s Succeſſors; for *Epicurus* lived with his Scholars in *Athens*, when it was ſo cloſely beſieged by *Demetrius*, as *Plutarch* informs us, who ſoon after had the poſſeſſion of it delivered to him. Now in buſy and diſorder'd times, ſuch as *Epicurus* might be far more ſecure than at another time; and yet even then he was afraid of giving any diſtaſt, as to his opinions about Religion; and ſtill aſſerted his owning *the Anticipation of a Deity*, altho' not conſiſtent with his own grounds of certainty. But where was *the victory the mean while over Religion*, which *Lucretius* boaſts of? His Defenders ſay, *It was over the ill effects of Superſtition*; but we find nothing like that effected by him. The World was not made one jot

Plut. adv. Colot.

Joſ. contr. Apion. l. 2.

Plut. vit. Demetrii.

the better, but a great deal the worſe for his Principles; for the very name of a Philoſopher went a great way with Perſons of bad inclinations: and they do not govern themſelves by any Reaſon; but when they can bring an Authority of a Perſon of any reputation, they inquire no farther, but go on with greater confidence in their former practices; and then they charge *Ignorance* and *Superſtition* on thoſe that contradict them. I do not deny but ſome of the Defenders of *Epicurus* in our Age, have been Perſons of Wit and Learning, and they have utterly diſown'd his irreligious Principles: but yet the very undertaking to defend the Author of ſo much impiety, hath done unſpeakable miſchief to the Age we live in; and all the diſcoveries of Natural Philoſophy can never make amends for it. We are now comparing the Notions of *Epicurus* and *Anaxagoras* as to religion; and that method which *Plutarch* tells us *Anaxagoras* took, as to the freeing the Mind of *Pericles* from *Superſtition*, was far better than that of *Epicurus*. For *Anaxagoras* ſatisfy'd him, that there were natural cauſes of Thunder and Lightning, but theſe were the effects of a Divine Providence, which order'd the affairs of Mankind for the beſt, as well as the Meteors in the Air; and therefore there was no reaſon why any wiſe and good Man ſhould not entertain a comfortable Hope of Divine Protection: but in the way of *Epicurus* there is a bare account of Natural Cauſes, which whether true or falſe, can give no ſatisfaction to a thinking Man. For the utmoſt comes to this; Such and ſuch Effects do naturally follow ſuch Cauſes. And what then? *Then if ſuch things happen, we cannot help it.* And what follows? Nothing more. And is this all the comfort of *Epicurus* his Inquiry into Cauſes? To underſtand this better, I will put a Caſe, which lately happened in the place where I live at preſent, to a Man working in his Garden near a great River: while he was there buſy, a violent ſhower of Rain fell of a ſudden; and the Man thinking to divert it, the Rain beat down a great heap of earth above him, and carried it through his Garden, and took away the Man with its force into a precipice hard by, and with great violence hurried him down into the River, which made him ſtupid and ſenſleſs; but it pleas'd GOD he was taken up, and recover'd. Now let us conſider what would tend moſt to the ſatisfaction of this Man's Mind, when he was in that deplorable ſtate, if he had been then ſenſible of his caſe: What comfort would it have been to him to have been told, that as things were, the earth above him falling down, and there being ſuch a precipice below him, there was no help for him, and he muſt be contented to ſuffer? But would it not be far greater ſatisfaction to be told, there were thoſe above who ſaw him fall, and pitied his caſe, and would be ſure to help him out, and give him what was neceſſary for his relief and remedy? Now this is the caſe of *Neceſſity* and *Providence:* the one gives only that heavy comfort, *Things muſt be ſo, and we cannot help it*; the other ſtill keeps up reaſonable hope, and the expectation of ſomething better. So that no one can deny, that upon mere principles of Natural Reaſon, this is the more deſirable *Hypotheſis*; and nothing but invincible arguments ſhould remove Mankind from it: but neither *Democritus* nor *Epicurus* could offer any thing but a very precarious *Hypotheſis* againſt it.

From *Anaxagoras* I now come to *Socrates* (for *Acheloüs* purſued his Principles at *Athens*, where *Socrates* was his Diſciple.) He was a Perſon of great vogue at *Athens*, for the *Natural ſharpneſs of his Wit*, and

the freedom he us'd in converſation with all ſorts, without regard to his own intereſt. And for this he appealed to his Judges, and to the whole City, that he was far from any deſign to enrich himſelf, as they all knew: he did not deny but that he had great preſents offer'd him; but he took no more than to keep him from poverty, as in the caſes of the King of *Macedonia* and *Alcibiades*: and none could blame him for being refractory to their Laws about Religion; for he declar'd that to be his Principle, *That* God *ought to be worſhip'd according to the Laws of the City where a Man liv'd.* And for this, *Xenophon* ſaith, *he truſted to the* Pythian *Oracle*; which was thought of good Authority among them: however ſome in our time have repreſented it as *ſo groſs an Impoſture*, that it is hardly credible any Men of common ſenſe could be deceived by it, much leſs the *Athenians*; who for all that we can perceive had as good an opinion of it, as the *Bœotians* themſelves.

Plato in Apol. Socr.

Xenoph. Mem. l. 1. c. 3.

Van. Dalen Diſſert. de Orac. Ethn.

This was a very hard point at that time among Men of better underſtanding, and who had a true ſenſe of God and Providence, how they ſhould behave themſelves with reſpect to the Popular Superſtitions. There was no difficulty, as to ſuch as had no Religion at all; for their Principle was to keep fair and to ſecure themſelves; and they look'd on ſuch as *Protagoras* and *Diagoras*, as Perſons who deſerved to be puniſh'd for their folly. But for Men who truly believ'd a wiſe God to govern the World, as *Socrates* and his two excellent Scholars *Plato* and *Xenophon* did, the caſe was very difficult: For, if they did not comply, they were ſure to be proſecuted as guilty of impiety; if they did, this ſeem'd to juſtify all their Superſtition.

The way which *Socrates* took was this: He avoided giving any offence as to the contempt of their publick worſhip. Nay, *Xenophon* ſaith, he was ſo far from any Impiety that way, that he was rather more remarkable for his diligence therein; and that no Man ever heard him ſay or do any thing that tended to the diſhonor of Religion; ſo that from the whole courſe of his life, he might be well concluded to be Εὐσεβέσταϖ, *a very devout Man.* *Cicero* had a very particular eſteem of *Socrates* not only for *the greatneſs of his Wit, but for his Wiſdom and Goodneſs*; and from him we learn what the grounds were which ſuch Men went upon. They found the World horribly corrupted with Superſtition, which was to be remov'd in the beſt way they could; but there was great danger, leſt under that pretence, all Religion ſhould be deſtroy'd. And they ſaw an abſolute neceſſity of keeping up that, ſince *the Beauty and Order of the World, was ſufficient to convince Mankind that there was an Excellent amd Eternal Being, which was to be adored and worſhip'd by Mankind.* This was their fundamental Principle; and they rather choſe to comply with the follies of their Superſtitions, than not keep the ſolemn worſhip of the *Deity.* And to ſatisfy themſelves, they put ſuch interpretations upon the publick Rites, as made them ſerve to ſome part or other of natural worſhip, with reſpect to the benefits God beſtows on the World; and thus, even the *Eleuſinian* Myſteries were underſtood by them.

Propter ejus magnitudinem Ingenii. *De Orat.* 1. 54. Qui quum omnium ſapientiſſimus eſſet, ſanctiſſimeq; vixiſſet. *Ib.*

Eſſe præſtantem aliquam æternamque Naturam, & eam ſuſpiciendam admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo Mundi, ordoque rerum cœleſtium cogit confiteri. *Cic. de Div. l.* 2. *c.* 72.

But how then came *Socrates* to be ſo ſeverely proſecuted at *Athens*? 'Tis true, that his enemies charg'd him with *Impiety* and *Atheiſm*, as appears both by *Plato* and *Xenophon.* In *Plato's Apology* we find that *Melitus*

Melitus downright accus'd him *that he thought there were no Gods. Socrates* being much ſurpriz'd at this charge, aſk'd him what ground he had for it; and all the proof he offer'd was, that he was of *Anaxagoras*'s Opinion that the Sun and Moon were not Gods: which *Socrates* deny'd; and ſaid his charge was inconſiſtent, for he both accus'd him of bringing in new *Deities*, and aſſerting that there were none at all. But in the concluſion of his Apology, he fully own'd *a Divine Providence taking care of good Men living or dying; but whether of the two were better for a Man, he thought* GOD *alone knew.*

But to ſhew more plainly what *Socrates* his judgment was as to the Production of the World: *Xenophon* gives this account of it. *That he look'd on it as a great piece of folly in Mankind to attempt it from Material Cauſes; and he wonder'd that they did not find out, that theſe things were above their reach.* And he thinks thoſe * *Philoſophers argued like mad Men; neither agreeing with one another, nor with the nature of things: for ſome ſaid, that it conſiſted of One thing; others, of Infinite: ſome ſaid, all things were in motion; others ſaid, there was no motion at all: ſome ſaid, that all things were generated and corrupted; and others, that nothing at all was.* Plato in his *Phædo* lets us know how he came to be unſatisfy'd even with *Anaxagoras* himſelf, altho' he mightily approv'd his fundamental Notion of *all things being produc'd by an Eternal Mind.* When he was a young Man, he ſaith, he was a great admirer of Natural Philoſophy, and endeavoured to find out the Cauſes of things; but at laſt *he found they were too hard for him*, and ſo fell into a kind of *Scepticiſm:* but he had heard of a Book of *Anaxagoras*, wherein he aſſerted that *Mind* order'd all things; this pleas'd him well: but he expected that from hence he would have ſhew'd how that Eternal Mind did frame every thing for the beſt, τὸ ἑκάστῳ βέλτιστον· but finding him to falter there, and to run to mere Natural Cauſes as others had done, he gave over his purſuit of Natural Philoſophy, and applied himſelf to matters of Morality; as more certainly known, and of greater uſe to Mankind.

Θαύμαζε δ' εἰ μὴ φανερὸν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν, ὅτι ταῦτα ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εὑρεῖν. *Xenoph. Mem. l. 1. c. 1.*

* Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοὺς μέσιον φερωνύμας ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τοῦτον λέγειν ἃ ταῦτα δοξάζειν ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μαινομένοις ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. *Ibid.*

Butas to Providence, *Xenophon* is very particular in it, *That it extended to all things ſaid or done, altho' in never ſo great ſilence; and that* GOD *was preſent in all places.* To the ſame purpoſe *Diogenes Laertius* mentions a ſaying of *Thales*; *Being aſked, whether a man could do an unjuſt action without* GOD*'s knowing it: No*, ſaith he, *not if he only thinks to do it.* Which ſaith *Valerius Maximus*, was intended to keep Mens Minds clean and pure, as well as their hands. But the Atheiſtical Club at *Athens* in *Socrates* his time turn'd this another way. For they ſaid, *This was only a contrivance of ſome cunning man, to keep Mankind more in awe.* And that this was their ſenſe, appears by the Verſes ſtill preſerv'd in *Sextus Empiricus*; and part in *Plutarch* and others; but by the former they are attributed to *Critias*, and by the latter to *Euripides*, both of *Socrates* his time. But there ſeems to be far greater probability as to the former, becauſe ſuch a ſaying was very agreeable to the Character of the Man. For *Critias* was one of the *thirty Tyrants* ſet up by *Lyſander* at *Athens*; a Man of Wit, and addicted to Poetry; as *Socrates* himſelf owns in *Plato*'s *Charmides*, that he deriv'd it from *Solon:* He and *Alcibiades* had been both under *Socrates* his care, as *Xenophon* tells us, but they both forſook him, and changed their Manners upon it. *Critias* went into *Theſſaly*, and there fell into lew'd

Xenoph. l. 1. c. 1. ad fin. & c. 4. ad fin.

Valer. Max. l. 7. 2. §. 8.

Sext. Emp. p. 310. Poeſis Phil. p. 75.

and debauch'd company; and from thence came to hate *Socrates*, whom he had admir'd before: and when he was one of the *thirty Tyrants*, he and *Charicles* ſhew'd a particular diſpleaſure againſt him; for *Socrates* had ſpoken too freely againſt their Government. He was the head of the number, as appeared by *Theramenes* drinking a health to *Critias*, when he took off his Poiſon; and when *Thraſybulus* came to deliver *Athens*, upon his being kill'd, the whole Faction ſunk. Nothing can be more agreeable to the Character of ſuch a Man, than to make him look on all Religion as an impoſture and contrivance of ſome crafty Politician. But nothing of it agrees with that of *Euripides*, who was Scholar to *Anaxagoras*, a friend to *Socrates*; and on all occaſions wrote decently with reſpect to Piety and Vertue. But *Plutarch* ſaith, *he wrote the Verſes in the Name of* Siſyphus *for fear of the* Areopagus. It cannot be deny'd, that Author (whether *Plutarch* or not, for ſome queſtion it) doth ſay ſo. But if *Plutarch* had ſaid it on good ground, how came *Sextus* after him, ſo poſitively to give them to *Critias*? And which is more to the purpoſe, the ſame Author had but a little before quoted a paſſage of *Euripides* very agreeable to a Scholar of *Anaxagoras*, *That the Heavens were* Καλὸν ποίκιλμα τέχνου & σοφῦ, *The beautiful Workmanſhip of a wiſe Architect*; and from thence we come to the Notion of God. How different is this from the ſenſe of thoſe Atheiſtical Verſes! But it is no eaſy matter to judg what the true ſenſe of a Poet is, when it is his deſign to perſonate others. And ſo *Euripides* might introduce *Siſyphus* as ſpeaking agreeable to his own Character, who is repreſented as *an ill Man, and given to fraud*; and therefore it is no wonder ſuch a Man ſhould look on Religion as ſuch a contrivance. For either *Siſyphus* or *Critias* might be well ſuppos'd to utter ſuch things, but the queſtion is, how far *Euripides* is to be charg'd with them; and whether he ſpoke his own ſenſe under the name of *Siſyphus*, for fear of the *Areopagus*. This ought certainly to be prov'd ſome other way: and if not, it ſeems to be a very unjuſt imputation; eſpecially ſince *Socrates* expreſs'd ſuch an eſteem for *Euripides*; which he would never have done, if he had ſuſpected that under the Perſon of *Siſyphus* he had overthrown the foundations of Religion.

P. Petit. Miſcell. l. 1. c. 1.

Plutarch. de Placit. Philoſ. l. 1. c. 6.

Ælian. l. 2. c. 13.

But what the true ſenſe of *Socrates* was, may be ſeen by his Diſcourſe with *Ariſtodemus*, of which *Xenophon* hath preſerv'd the remembrance. This *Ariſtodemus* was one of thoſe that not only neglected Religion himſelf, but deſpiſed and laugh'd at thoſe that regarded it. *Socrates* finding what ſort of man he was, takes him to taſk after his dry manner. And are there no Perſons, *Ariſtodemus*, ſaid he, that you have any eſteem of for being wiſer than others? Yes, ſaid he briſkly and like a Man of Wit, *I admire* Homer *for an Epick Poem*, Melanippides *in Dithyrambics*, Sophocles *in Tragedy*, Polycletus *in the Art of making Statues, and* Phidias *in Painting*. The Man we ſee was a kind of *Virtuoſo* in other things, but without any ſenſe of God or Religion. Well! ſaid *Socrates*, *and would you not admire thoſe more who make living and moving Statues, than ſuch only as have neither ſenſe nor motion?* No doubt the former, *Ariſtodemus* reply'd, if they are made by Deſign, and not by Chance. Of that, ſaid *Socrates*, we may beſt judg by the uſe, they are intended for. For thoſe things which are for a manifeſt uſe are moſt agreeable to Deſign. As for inſtance, the Senſes of Men are ſo plainly given them for particular uſes, that we cannot reaſonably think, but that he that made Mankind at firſt, gave them them for that

Xenoph. Mem. l. 1. c. 4.

purpoſe; as he particularly inſtances in the Fabrick of the Eye, and the care of Nature to preſerve it, (which he calls a work of Providence) and ſo for the Ears, Noſe and Mouth, which are ſo fram'd, as to be προνοητικῶς πεπραγμένα, done by a wiſe Deſign, and not by Chance. And I cannot, ſaith *Socrates*, look upon them otherwiſe than as the Workmanſhip Σοφῆ τινὸς δημιουργῆ καὶ φιλοζώου, of a wiſe contriver, and a lover of his own Workmanſhip. The ſame he ſhews in the propagation of Animals, and the love and care of their Young, *&c.* but as to Mankind, he ſaith, there is Φρόνιμόν τι, a reach beyond other Animals; and they have not only a Body made out of Earth, but a Mind which we perceive within our ſelves. And can theſe great and wonderful things come to paſs δι' ἀφροσύνην τινά, without Mind or Underſtanding? To which our *Virtuoſo* had nothing to ſay, *but that he could not ſee the Artificer here, as he did in other caſes.* Well! and do not you contrive and deſign things in your own Mind? And yet you can no more ſee that, than the wiſe contriver of theſe things. All that *Ariſtodemus* had to ſay, was, that he did not diſown or deſpiſe a Divine Being; but he thought it too great to regard his Service. Hold a little, ſaid *Socrates*; for the greater he is, the more he ought to be honor'd by Mankind. Then he queſtion'd, whether there were ſuch a thing as Providence, with reſpect to human affairs. For that, *Socrates* again bad him look to the frame of Human Nature, and the ſeveral parts of Man's Body, and he could not but ſee a Providence in the contrivance of the ſeveral parts of the Body; but eſpecially the Mind, which he hath inſpir'd into Men. Τῷ ψυχῷ κραλίσλω τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐνέφυσε, Not *blowing ſome ſubtile Air into Man*, as ſome modern Philoſophers would tranſlate it; or giving *a mere Vital Motion.* But *Socrates* was far from thinking *an Incorporeal Subſtance* within us to be *a Contradiction*; nor that it was any abſurdity to take a Metaphor from *Air*, to expreſs the infuſion of an Immaterial Soul. And he ſhews the excellency of the human Soul above others, becauſe it alone apprehends the Being of GOD, who made and contriv'd the greateſt beſt things, and alone is capable of doing him ſervice. Beſides, that it hath Prudence and Memory above all others. So that Mankind are as ſo many Gods among inferior Creatures. If a Man had the Body of an Ox and the Mind of Man together, he could not do what he would; nor if Brutes had Hands and wanted Minds, could they do much with them. But you, ſaid he to *Ariſtodemus*, have both, and can you think there is no care of Providence about you? Can you think, ſaid he, that the Gods (as he ſpeaks) ſhould plant in Mens Minds an opinion that they are able both to reward and puniſh, if it were not ſo? And that Mankind ſhould be always deceiv'd in this matter, and not be ſenſible of it? *Do not you ſee*, ſaith *Socrates*, *that the moſt antient and wiſeſt Cities, and Nations, and Ages, have always ſhew'd the greateſt regard to Religion?* This is a very remarkable teſtimony of *Socrates* concerning the ſenſe of former Ages about the foundations of Religion; and that the Atheiſtical temper ſome were then fallen into, was a late Innovation, and in probability occaſion'd by that ſmattering in Philoſophy, which was crept in among the *Greeks* from the Principles of *Anaximander* and *Democritus.* But *Socrates* aſſures us *the beſt and wiſeſt Ages* had a very different ſenſe of theſe matters. And this *Xenophon* tells us he had from *Socrates his own Mouth, and that he heard this Diſcourſe between them.*

And what now is to be ſaid to ſuch a Teſtimony as this, concerning the ſenſe of Mankind about Religion? Have we any reaſon to miſtruſt ſuch

ſuch a Teſtimony as that of *Socrates*, who was ſo much valu'd for his Integrity, and loſt his Life, becauſe he could not flatter nor diſſemble? For any one that will carefully examin the circumſtances of his Trial, will find the true reaſon of his proſecution was, that he had diſobliged ſo many ſorts of People by his Plain-dealing: For, as he told his Judges, his way was when he heard any Man had a great opinion for his own Wiſdom and Skill above other Men, to talk with him on purpoſe, to ſee whether there were any ſufficient ground for ſuch an Opinion: which was one of the moſt diſobliging courſes in the world; conſidering how fond Men are apt to be of themſelves, and to think themſelves wiſer than others; at leaſt in that which they moſt pretend to. By which means he diſobliged the *Politicians*, who hate any Man that would pretend to find them out; the Sophiſts, whom on all occaſions he expos'd, and in the moſt publick manner: and the Men of Wit and the Poets were enrag'd againſt him, becauſe he ſlighted their way, as tending only to entertain the Fancy, and not to make Men wiſer; and in their happieſt ſtrains, there was only a *Natural Enthuſiaſm*; and altho' they ſaid many fine things, yet they were not one jot the wiſer Men. The Artificers he found had many pretty knacks; but becauſe of their Skill in ſuch little things, they preſum'd wonderfully at *Athens* upon their Underſtandings, and would never bear long any Great Men among them, when things went by majority of Votes: As *Socrates* found, when Sentence came to be paſt; for altho' he had many good Friends, yet when it came to the numbring of Votes, he was caſt by a great Majority. But as the People of *Athens* were ſo opinionated of themſelves, that they could not bear any Man, whoſe Reputation leſſen'd theirs; ſo when they had done ſuch things which made them ill ſpoken of abroad, then they were for redeeming their own honor; either by recalling them from Baniſhment, if living; or if dead, by puniſhing the inſtruments made uſe of in the Proſecution. So it happened in the caſe of *Socrates:* when they found his Death brought an *Odium* upon the City, one of his Accuſers was *put to death*, another *baniſhed*; and *Plutarch* ſaith, *ſome of the reſt were ſo weary of their lives, that they put an end to them by hanging themſelves.* And to ſhew their great eſteem of him, they caus'd a Statue made by *Lyſippus*, to be ſet up in a publick place in the City, as a perpetual Monument of his Wiſdom, and their own Folly. And his carriage at his death was with ſo much courage, and conſtancy, and evenneſs of Mind, that they were all ſatisfy'd as to his integrity and freedom from any ill deſign. What reaſon can there be then to ſuſpect his Teſtimony in this point of Religion, when there was not the leaſt conſtraint or biaſs upon him, and this atteſted by ſo unexceptionable a witneſs as *Xenophon*; a Perſon of great honor and judgment, and whoſe Writings are ſuch, as could hardly be counterfeited by any ſince him, by reaſon of their *unaffected ſweetneſs*, for which the antient Criticks ſo much admired him; even *Cicero*, as well as *Dionyſius Halycarnaſſeus*, and *Quintilian?*

Platon. Apolog. Socr.

Plutarch. de Odio & Invid.

Cicero de Orat. l. 2. Dionyſ. Halycarn. ad Pomp. Quint. X. Cicero ad Quint. l. 1.

From *Socrates* I go on to *Plato*, who in *Cicero*'s opinion (and he was a very good judg) was *Princeps Ingenii & Doctrinæ*, the *Top of antient Wit and Learning*; and to the ſame purpoſe *Quintilian*, whom *Valla* eſteem'd above all other Criticks. But I need not go about to ſet up the Reputation of *Plato:* He was deſcended from *Solon* by his Mother, and by his Father from *Codrus*; he was nearly related to *Critias*, the firſt of the *thirty Tyrants*, and head of the Atheiſtical Club at *Athens*; and there-

fore it will be worth our while to find out his true ſenſe and opinion about theſe matters; to which I ſhall confine my Diſcourſe concerning him. And in his *tenth Book of Laws* he gives an account of three Opinions then in vogue among the looſer ſort of People at *Athens*. *One was, that there was no* GOD *at all: The 2d, that tho' there was a* GOD, *yet there was no Providence: The 3d, that if both were allow'd, yet that* GOD *would accept of Gifts and Sacrifices, as a compenſation for their faults.*

As to the *Atheiſtical Hypotheſis* it is obſervable, what character he gives of the Perſons who were for it, *that they were the looſer and more diſſolute ſort of Men among them; and eſpecially in the heat of their Youth. And that he never knew any Man who continued in it from his Youth to his Old Age*; and he calls it *the plague of young Men.* The *Hypotheſis*, as he lays it down, is much the ſame with *Anaximander*'s, viz. *That Nature and Chance produced all things out of a ſtrange Chaos, wherein were all ſorts of Qualities jumbled and confounded together, and at laſt by mixture came to that we call the World. But that Religion and the differences of juſt and unjuſt depended upon human Laws and Contrivances, for the better Government of Mankind.*

This is the ſubſtance of their *Hypotheſis*, which *Plato* in a long Diſcourſe ſets himſelf to refute, by ſhewing that theſe things could not come together by mere Nature and Chance; but were according to *right Reaſon, the product of a Superior Mind.* And whatever they pretended, as to ſkill in Natural Cauſes, this opinion did proceed from *great Ignorance about them*, and that their Reaſonings were both *Impious and Incoherent.* That their fundamental Miſtake lay in ſuppoſing ſuch Motion and Mixtures in Matter, before any Principle to begin or to direct it. For the firſt Motion muſt be from that which hath a power to move it ſelf, as well as other things; and therefore there muſt be a Mind antecedent to Matter, in order to the Production of things. This is the force of his Reaſoning. Then he ſhews how unreaſonable it is to ſuppoſe a GOD without Providence; becauſe it muſt argue either *Weakneſs* or *Neglect*, which were both inconſiſtent with *the Divine Perfections:* and ſo he proves was the laſt Opinion, and that it tended to overthrow *the practice of Virtue.*

In his *Epinomis* (which I ſee no reaſon to miſtruſt) he undertakes to prove *Religion to be the trueſt Wiſdom of Mankind*, the firſt Principle whereof is, *that there is an Eternal Mind before all Matter*; and then ſaith, *That there is no greater Virtue belonging to Mankind than Piety, or a due regard to the Divine Being.* So far was he from looking on Religion as an Impoſture, or Trick put upon Mankind in order to their better Government. *Epinom. p. 989.*

But *Ariſtotle* may be more ſuſpected for this, who wanted no Wit, but is generally thought to have been of no Religion; and he was by no means fond of *Plato*'s *Notions*, eſpecially thoſe he took from the *Pythagoric School:* but yet I hope to ſhew, that in the main foundation of all, as to the Being of GOD, and the Happineſs of Mankind, he agreed with him at laſt: I do not mean at his death, according to the ſtory in *Cælius Rhodiginus*, that then he ſaid, *Cauſa Cauſarum miſerere mei*; and which *Suarez* quotes *Laertius* for; but there is nothing like it in him, and *Cælius* had it out of a trifling Book *De Pomo:* But I go upon the Principles deliver'd by him in his beſt conſider'd Books. In his *Politicks* indeed he recommends Religion to a Prince, *in order to his eſteem among the People, that they may look on him as under the particular care of Providence.* *Cæl. Rhod. l. 17. c. 34.* *Ariſt. Polit. l. 5. c. 11.*

Now this *Ariſtotle* is charg'd to have utterly deny'd himſelf; and *Atticus* the *Platoniſt* in *Euſebius* makes him worſe than *Epicurus*, *becauſe he put his Gods quite out of the World, which* Ariſtotle *did not*; *but*, ſaid he, *he overthrew all Religion by denying Providence.* And *Lactantius* is very ſharp upon him, and makes him *a contemner of* GOD *and Religion:* but to do him right, he ſaith at other times, *That he plac'd one Mind over the World*; and *that* Ariſtotle *and his Followers were of the ſame mind with* Antiſthenes, *that there was but One* GOD *in Nature, and many popular Gods. But was not* Ariſtotle *charg'd with Impiety at* Athens, *and forc'd on that account to withdraw to* Chalcis, *where he died*; *or as ſome ſay, was poiſoned?* So *Eumelus*, and the anonymous Author of his Life, publiſh'd by *Menagius.* It cannot be deny'd that there was a proſecution againſt him by *Eurymedon* and *Demophylus*; but ſo there was againſt *Anaxagoras* and *Socrates:* but the pretence againſt *Ariſtotle* was not for *Impiety in his Doctrine*, but for a *profane Hymn* which he was ſaid to have made on his Friend *Hermias*, ſuch as were wont to be made to *Apollo.* This *Athenæus* denies, and *Ariſtotle* ſent an Apology for himſelf to *Athens*, but it was not receiv'd. The truth was, *Ariſtotle* found it was time for him to be gone; leſt, as he told his Friends, *that City ſhould offend twice againſt Philoſophy:* For, as he ſaid in his Letter to *Antipater*, *He found the City abounded with Sycophants*; and he was fallen under *Alexander*'s diſpleaſure, on the account of *Caliſthenes* his Kinſman; and in a Letter of his to *Antipater* he had ſaid, *he would be reveng'd on the Sophiſter*; and he publickly affronted him by the great Preſent he ſent to *Xenocrates*, and none to him: which was ſufficient intimation to his Enemies, which he never wanted, ſaith *Ariſtocles*, *becauſe of the intereſt he had in Princes.* And if *Pliny*'s Story be true, (which *Plutarch* and *Appian* intimate too) as to *Antipater*'s deſign, *Alexander* had cauſe for his diſpleaſure. But *Ariſtocles* ſaith, *That* Apellicon *(to whom his Books came) wrote ſo full a Vindication of him, that thoſe who read that need no more.* But they are his Principles which we enquire after, and not his Practices. *Alexander Aphrodiſienſis*, who is thought to have underſtood *Ariſtotle*'s Mind as well as any Commentator, owns *that* Ariſtotle *without doubt aſſerted, that there was one Eternal Mind, which gave the firſt motion to Matter, and that thereby things were put into ſuch an order, not by Chance, but from the firſt Mover, ſo as to produce the variety of Species in the World, and to make them uſeful to each other, and for the good of the whole*; *and ſuch an univerſal Providence*, he ſaith, Ariſtotle *did hold.* So much then is confeſs'd by one who was thought his moſt judicious Interpreter. But let us ſee, whether *Ariſtotle* may not be reaſonably preſum'd to go beyond this: For (1.) he blam'd *Anaxagoras* for making *no more uſe of his Eternal Mind, than merely to ſet things in order at firſt.* Then it follows, that according to him, GOD muſt be more than a mere *Firſt Mover.* (2.) He makes this famous concluſion of his *Metaphyſicks*, *That things are beſt govern'd by one Head*; which ſignified nothing, if there be no Providence. *Clauſulam hanc tam inſignem amplector & laudo*, ſaid one of his moſt bitter Enemies; and it cannot be denied, that he there compares *the Government of the World* with *that of an Army or Family, wherein are there ſeveral Ranks and Orders of Men for different purpoſes*; *which muſt ſuppoſe a particular inſpection and care.* (3.) He makes the complete Happineſs of Mankind to be Θεῖόν τι, *a Divine thing*; and muſt ſuppoſe *Providence*, as I ſhall now make it to appear. He affirms that a Man's complete Happineſs depends *upon ſomething Divine in him, in*

Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 15. c. 5. *Lactant. de Ira Dei, c. 19.* *De falſ. Rel. l. 5.* *De Ira Dei c. 11.* *Beſſario c. Calumn.* *Athen. l. 15.* *Suid. in Ariſt.* *Ælian. 3. 36.* *Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 15. c. 2.* *Plin. N. H. l. 30. c. 16.* *Alexand. Aphrodiſ. in Ariſt. Phyſic. l. 2. c. 8.* *Met. 1. 4.* *Metaphyſ. l. 14. ult. P. Rami Schol. Metaphyſ. l. 12. c. 10.* *Eth. l. 1. c. 10.* *Eth. l. 10. c. 7.*

the exerciſe whereof his happineſs conſiſts. And therefore he adviſes thoſe that ſtudy to be happy Ἀναθανατίζειν, *to draw themſelves off from mortal things, and to live according to that which is the beſt thing in us,* viz. *our Minds; which altho' they do not ſo appear in bulk, yet in reality are far greater and of more value than other things.* By which he plainly owns ſuch a Principle in Mankind as is capable of a greater Happineſs than the things of this World can give him, becauſe his Mind is of a higher Nature than they. But then the Queſtion ariſes, whether Mankind can make themſelves happy by this Divine Principle within them? He grants in one place, *That if there be any gift from* God, *it is moſt reaſonable it ſhould be that which is beſt for them*; but he avoids *the diſpute there*, becauſe his buſineſs was to put Men upon uſing their own endeavors to be happy: But in his laſt Book, where he ſpeaks of this Divine Happineſs, he ſaith, *That he that acts according to his Mind, and is diſpos'd to do the beſt things, is the moſt likely to be beloved of* God: *for, if there be any care above of Human Affairs, as there ſeems to be, it is moſt reaſonable to ſuppoſe that the Gods love what is beſt and neareſt to them; which is our Mind.* But doth he not ſeem to ſpeak very doubtfully in this matter? It is obſerv'd by his Commentator, that his manner of expreſſion is ſuch as he uſes when there is no manner of doubt. But we muſt take *Ariſtotle* as a Philoſopher, and conſider on what grounds he went. He had no Revelation to direct him, and ſo was to judg according to what he thought *moſt reaſonable*; and this he declares he took to be ſo. And in his following words he ſaith, *That thoſe who did moſt eſteem and value their own Minds, the Gods did regard as their friends, and ſuch as did the beſt actions.* That word Ἀντιδοτέον is very emphatical in this caſe; for it implies a *Retribution of a Reward* for doing good. So that here we have the complacency, which God takes in thoſe that are good, and do good; and the reaſonableneſs of expecting a Recompenſe for it. *Ariſtotle* was no Fool, but was eſpecially admired by very great Men, particularly by *Cicero*, and *Quintilian*, and *Pliny*, for *the greatneſs of his Wit and Subtilty:* and ſuch a Perſon would never have been guilty of ſo great impertinency to ſet down ſuch Expreſſions as theſe, if he had not thought them fit to be believ'd; but he would have ſet ſome mark upon them, that they were the Opinions of other Men, and not his own. And in this caſe he had more particular reaſon to have done it. For any one that compares theſe expreſſions with thoſe in *Plato*, 10 *de Rep.* would think that *Ariſtotle* had taken them from thence. For *Plato* there ſaith the ſame thing, *That a good Man is* Θεοφιλής, *one in favor with* God; *and whoſoever is ſo, ſhall receive the beſt things from him. And we cannot ſuppoſe, that he that deſigns to be good, and minds the practice of Virtue, will be neglected above, when he makes it his buſineſs to be as like* God *as he can.* And *Plato*, who was far from being uncertain as to Providence, makes uſe of the ſame kind of expreſſion. *It is not probable that he ſhould be neglected of one ſo like him.* And *Ariſtotle* in the foregoing Chapter ſaith, *The Gods are in a ſtate of perpetual Bliſs, and Mankind are capable of Happineſs, as they come nearer to reſemblance of them.* Can any Expreſſions come nearer than theſe do?

Eth. l. 11. *c.* 10.

Ὁ δὴ νῦν ἐπορσῶν καὶ τὸν θεοφιλέστατον καὶ διακείσῃ ἄριστα, καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν εἶναι. Εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεια, τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἰκὸς ἂν ἄλλοις χαίρειν τε αὐτὰς πρὸ ἀείσω καὶ συσχήσειν τοῦτο ἢ ἂν εἴη ὁ Νοῦς. *Eth. l.* 10. *c.* 9.

Καὶ τοὺς ἀσπαζομένους μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀνταποιεῖν καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς προάγοντας.

Ariſtoteles vir ſummo ingenio, ſcientiæ copia. *Tuſc.* 1. 4. 10. *Acad.* 1. 4. Singulari vir ingenio Ariſtoteles, & pene Divino. *De Div.* 1. 25. *Quint. X.* 1. *Plin. N. H. l.* 8. 16, 18, 34.

Εἰκός γ' ἔφη τοιοῦτον μὴ ἀμελεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου.

Ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή.

We find *Ariſtotle* on other occaſions not very ſhy of expreſſing his diſſent from *Plato*, even in theſe Books of Morals. How warmly doth he diſ-
Ethic. 1. 34. pute againſt *Plato*'s notion of *Ideas*? He ſaith, *there are three kinds of Men pretend to Happineſs; the ſenſual and voluptuous*, which he ſaith, *is the Happineſs of Slaves and Brutes: The buſy and active Men place it in Honor, which is not in their power.* But beſides theſe, *there are thoſe who place it in Contemplation, which is moſt agreeable to the moſt perfect faculty we have.* But then he ſaith, *Some Friends of his had introduced Ideas to this purpoſe; however he was reſolved to prefer truth before them.* Here we ſee he ſticks not at contradicting *Plato*, *as to his Ideas*; but is ſo far from doing it in the preſent caſe, that he takes his very Expreſſions as his own; which he would never have done, if he had not thought them agreeable to Truth and Reaſon. He did not like *Plato*'s *Ideas*, nor his *Poetical Fictions* about a Future State, which made him more reſerved in diſcourſing about it; but he was ſatisfy'd in theſe three things: 1. That the Mind of Man was capable of a real Happineſs diſtinct from the Body. 2. That this Happineſs lies in a ſimilitude to God, as the moſt perfect Being. 3. That it was reaſonable to ſuppoſe God ſhould make the beſt to be moſt happy.

Mag. Mor. 1. 5. In his *Great Morals*, he declares it *not to be Courage but Madneſs not to be afraid of the Gods.* And if there be no Providence, what reaſon can there be for Fear?

In the concluſion of his *Eudemian Morals*, he makes it *the beſt end of a*
Eudem. l. 7. c. 15. *Man to contemplate* God, *and ſaid*; *that it argues a very ill mind to hinder his Worſhip and Service, and the beſt temper of mind to be little affected with ſenſual Inclinations*; *and this*, ſaith he, *is the great end of Virtue and Goodneſs.*

Theſe are not the Expreſſions of a Man that deſpis'd God and Providence; and we are certain theſe were his, as we are, that we have any Books of his. For even *Fr. Patritius* himſelf makes very ſlight Objections againſt them; and the Author of the antient *Paraphraſe* upon his *Ethicks*
Diſcuſſ. Peripatet. To. 1. *l.* 3. *ad Nichomachum* (ſuppos'd to be *Andronicus Rhodius*) is a far better evidence for them, who is ſaid to have *paraphraſed upon* Ariſtotle's *Writings*, and not upon any other Man's. And he puts this matter out of doubt;
Paraphr. Ethic. l. 10. *c.* 10. for he thus *paraphraſes* his words, *If* God *doth take care of Mankind*, καθάπερ πᾶσι δοκεῖ καὶ ἔστι γε, *as it ſeems to all and is true.* And not only *Plutarch* in the Life of *Sylla*, but *Porphyry* in that of *Plotinus*, ſay, *that* Andronicus Rhodius *took great care in digeſting and explaining* Ariſtotle's *Works.*

Let us now compare theſe Sayings with the Objections taken out of him againſt Providence. *Alex. Aphrodiſienſis* is of opinion that *Ariſtotle* meant no more by *Providence*, but *an univerſal care to preſerve the Species of things, and the Order of the World*; *but he doth not deny that ſo far it extends even to ſublunary things.* But if he did allow ſuch an univerſal Providence as to the good of the World; I ask then, Whether God did know and intend this Good and Order that is in the World? If he did, then his great Argument againſt particular Providence is taken off; which was, *That it was below the Divine Perfections to take notice of ſuch mean things.* For if it were not below it at firſt to appoint and order theſe things, then it cannot be below it to mind or regard them. And ſince they cannot deny ſuch an *Univerſal Providence*, they cannot for this reaſon reject a Particular; for it is no more unbecoming God to regard the good of his Creatures, than it was at firſt to make them. But *Ariſtotle* utterly rejects

rejects their Opinion, that attributed the making of things, or the order that appears in them, to blind Neceſſity or Chance; and then God muſt have a Power and Will to make and order theſe things as they are, and with a deſign for the good of the whole. Then it follows, that a Providence that regards the good of the whole, as agreeable to the Divine Nature; and why not then a Particular Providence for the ſame end? If the ſame Power and Wiſdom can manage the whole for that end, with regard to Particular Events, why ſhould that be rejected, and the other allowed?

All that is pleaded from *Ariſtotle* is this, *That the knowledg and care of particular things is troubleſom and uneaſy; that the Eternal Being is happy in it ſelf; and it's better not to ſee and know ſome things, than to ſee and know them.* But I urge from *Ariſtotle* himſelf, that he yields, that the Divine Happineſs doth not lie in *an Unactive ſtate*, or ſuch *a perpetual ſleep, as they fancied of* Endymion. And what can be more agreeable to infinite Goodneſs, than ſuch an Activity as imploys it ſelf in the care of his Creatures? *Metaphyſ. l.* 14. *c.* 6. *Moral. l.* 10. *c.* 8.

But, ſaith *Ariſtotle*, *How can* God *underſtand any thing below himſelf? He is a perfect object, and fit for his own contemplation, and all other things are infinitely below him.* If any made the Divine Happineſs to conſiſt in the knowledg of his Creatures, they were extremely miſtaken; but I do not find that *Socrates* or *Plato*, who were hearty Aſſertors of Providence, ſay any thing like it; All that they ſay, is, That God being infinitely good and wiſe, takes care of the good of the whole, and eſpecially of thoſe that are good; and if he did not, it muſt be either from want of Power or Will, neither of which can be ſuppos'd in the Divine Nature. And if he wants neither of theſe, why is it not done? It cannot be ſaid, *That* Ariſtotle *abſolutely denied* God's *knowledg of all things*; for in one place he ſaith, *It is the Character of a bad man to ſuppoſe any thing hidden from* God; and in another, *That we attribute to* God *the knowledg of all things.* But 'tis poſſible he might be to ſeek as to the manner of God's knowing all things, as who is not? But if he could not comprehend it, it doth not therefore follow, that he denied it. *If* God, ſaith he, *underſtands nothing, then he is like one that ſleeps, which is not conſiſtent with that veneration which we owe to* God. *If he doth underſtand, and the principal object be without himſelf, then he is not the beſt Subſtance himſelf.* But none ever thought, that if there were a God, the principal object of his Underſtanding could be without himſelf. But what repugnancy is there for Infinite Knowledg to comprehend all things? And ſo if there be things without himſelf, he muſt know them, or his Knowledg cannot be infinite. Could *Ariſtotle* imagin that the World and the order of it were of his making and contriving; and yet he know nothing beyond himſelf? Are the ſeveral *ſpecies of things* of his ordering and appointing, and yet he not know them? This is impoſſible. But *Ariſtotle* ſaith, *That his Eſſence, as moſt perfect, is the moſt proper object of Divine Contemplation; and his Underſtanding is nothing but the underſtanding of himſelf:* and ſo, as he expreſſes it, *his Underſtanding is the underſtanding of his Underſtanding.* Wherein, as *Scaliger* ſaith, he did apprehend things *ſupra humanum captum*; and I am apt to think ſo too. But our buſineſs is not to unfold the Myſtery of Divine Knowledg with reſpect to it ſelf, but to conſider whether it be repugnant to it to know other things? *If ſo*, ſaith *Ariſtotle, there muſt be a change and motion, but the Divine Eſſence is always* *Rhet. ad Alex. c.* 18. *De Poet. c.* 15. *Scaliger. Exercit.* 365. *n.* 5.

the ſame. As tho' an Infinite Mind could not comprehend all things, without a change in it ſelf, or ſuch trouble as we find in our gradual perceptions of things, which ariſes from our Weakneſs and Imperfection. The Objection from *the meaneſs of things* is very inconſiderable. For, if they were fit to make up a part of the Order of the World, why are they below Divine Knowledg and Providence? If God thought fit to make them, why not to preſerve them?

Yes, ſay they, *as to the ſpecies he doth, but not as to all the little accidents about them*, The Schoolmen diſtinguiſh in Providence the *Ratio Ordinis* from the *Executio Ordinis*; the firſt they ſay, is wholly immediate, the other is by ſubordinate Cauſes, which we call the Courſe of Nature; which is no more than the common Order which GOD hath appointed in the World; which generally obtains, but yet ſo as that there muſt be a due ſubordination to the firſt Agent; if he ſees cauſe for particular ends to order things otherwiſe. And I cannot ſee any kind of incongruity or repugnancy in ſuch a Suppoſition, becauſe it anſwers the ſame ends, which the original intention and deſign of Univerſal Providence doth. As that in the ordinary courſe of Nature, Fire burns, *i. e.* diſſolves that contexture of Bodies which it meets with; and this it doth by virtue of that order of Cauſes and Effects, which is eſtabliſhed by Univerſal Providence: but ſuppoſe that there be a ſtop put to this method by an extraordinary act for great and wiſe ends becoming the ſupreme Governor of the World, why ſhould not this be as agreeable to the Deſign of Providence, as the firſt appointment of things in the common order was? Why not as well to work miraculous cures at ſome times, as to leave things to the ordinary methods at other times; But we muſt ſtill ſuppoſe the ends to be wiſe, and great, and good; for otherwiſe they do not reach the general deſign of Providence; and we mean no other particular Providence, but ſuch as anſwers the ſame general ends which an Univerſal Providence is deſigned for.

Magn. Moral. l. 2. c. 4. But, ſaith *Ariſtotle, If we ſuppoſe a particular Providence with reſpect to Mankind, then he muſt give to Men here according to their deſerts; which cannot be, ſince bad men often meet with good fortune; and therefore* GOD *being Lord over theſe things would deal unjuſtly as a Judg, which is not becoming him to do.* Here it cannot be deny'd that *Ariſtotle* doth exclude a *Judicial Diſpoſal* of theſe things; for if it were ſuch, his Argument muſt hold; but we diſtinguiſh between that and a *Providential management*, in order to the real good of Mankind. And I need no other than *Ariſtotle*'s own Arguments in this caſe: for if a Man's real happineſs lies in *a ſimilitude of the mind to* GOD, how can that be inconſiſtent with Divine Juſtice to exerciſe good Men here in ſuch a manner, as tends moſt to draw off their Minds from theſe tranſitory and decaying pleaſures? And if theſe things cannot make a Man really happy without virtue, which is the great deſign of his *Morals* to prove; how is it inconſiſtent with his Juſtice to let bad Men meet with good fortune? For theſe things can be no demonſtrations of the favor or diſpleaſure of GOD, which himſelf grants relates moſt to the inward temper of Mens Minds. But the real difficulty in this caſe, is a ſuppoſition that there is no future ſtate. I confeſs that *Plato* clears this matter eaſily and plainly; *A good man*, ſaith he, *if he be under poverty, diſeaſes, or other difficulties here, will find theſe things end in good to him, living or dying; and he makes no queſtion of ſuch a one's happineſs in another ſtate.* But *Ariſtotle* is upon a great reſerve, as to a future ſtate;

Plato de Rep. l. 10.

and altho' he aſſerts the poſſibility of it ſufficiently, from what he ſaith of the Nature of the Mind of Man, as diſtinct from the principle of Life; yet I am afraid *Plato*'s giving too much way to ſuch *Poetical Fictions*, as that of *Herus Pamphilius*, made *Ariſtotle* more cautious as to what he ſaid concerning it, unleſs he could go upon ſurer grounds. He grants, That *the Mind is of a nature diſtinct from the Body, and ſeparable from it*, that *it comes from without*; that *it is capable of pleaſures more Divine* than the Body can enjoy or apprehend: But when he had gone thus far, the mere light of Reaſon would carry him no farther; and therefore he rather forbore to ſay any thing than affirm what he could not prove. As *Socrates* ſaid in the caſe of Prayer, in the ſecond *Alcibiades*, *they muſt ſtay till they were better inform'd.* Which is a mighty advantage in behalf of Divine Revelation. But of that afterwards.

Ariſtot. de. Anim. l. 1. c. 5. L. 3. c. 5. De Part. Anim. l. 1. c. 1. De Gen. Anim. l. 2. c. 3. De Part. Anim. l. 4. c. 10. Eth. l. 10. c. 7, 8, 9.

Thus far I have conſider'd the Perſons of greateſt Reputation in *Greece*, and compar'd their Opinions and the grounds they went upon; and I ſhall proceed no farther there, becauſe the following Sects were deriv'd from theſe, and they fell into quarrels and contentions with one another, which I have no occaſion at preſent to conſider. And therefore I ſhall now give an Account of another ſet of Philoſophers, who ſettled in that part of *Italy*, which lay towards *Sicily*, and was call'd *Magna Græcia*; and this was called the *Pythagorean Sect:* which I ſhall inquire into, with reſpect to the preſent Subject. *Pythagoras* was a Man of wonderful eſteem for his wiſdom, not only in thoſe parts, but at *Rome* too. For *Pliny* and *Plutarch* tell us, *That the Roman Senate erected a Statue to him, as to the wiſeſt Man:* but *Pliny* wonders that *Socrates was not preferr'd before him.* But the *Romans* had a particular veneration for *Pythagoras*; from the Tradition that *Numa* the wiſeſt of their Kings was inſtructed by him. It's true that this is contradicted by *Cicero* and *Livy*, (two great Men) but *Plutarch* thinks, *that they had no certain meaſure of times to direct them to judg by*; as he ſhews from *Clodius his Index.* And there are other odd circumſtances, as to *Numa*, which favor the correſpondence; as his Laws about *Worſhip* and *Sacrifices*, mention'd by *Plutarch*; and eſpecially the *Greek Books* found in his Tomb, diſtinct from thoſe of the *Pontifical Rites*; for which *Pliny* produces unexceptionable Authorities. Even *Livy* himſelf, who thought it a miſtake about *Pythagoras*, yet confeſſes, *the Books contain'd the wiſdom of the* Greeks *at that time.* If *Pythagoras* was contemporary with *Thales* (as we are told he took his advice about going into *Egypt*) what *Wiſdom of the Greeks* was there before *Thales?* But *Varro*'s teſtimony is plain as well as the reſt, *that theſe Books contain'd the Greek Philoſophy.* And what *Greek Philoſophy* could come to *Numa*, but that of *Pythagoras?* And therefore *Ovid* makes no ſcruple of ſaying, *That* Numa *did conſult him.* But if *Pythagoras* was in ſuch eſteem at *Rome*, *how came theſe Books to be ſo ſolemnly burnt by the order of the Senate, after they were diſcover'd? Livy* ſaith, *becauſe they tended to diſſolve their Religion:* which *Lactantius* carries too far, when he ſaith, *That they tended to overthrow all Religion.* A moſt improbable ſtory! That *Numa* ſhould take ſuch care that Poſterity ſhould believe him to have been a notorious Impoſtor. Do Men that deceive the World, write Books on purpoſe to let others ſee they have deceiv'd Mankind? No; they take all poſſible care to prevent any ſuſpicion of that kind. But *Numa* could not think otherwiſe, but theſe Books would in time come to light? And it is a wonder

Plin. N. H. l. 34. c. 6. Plutarch. in Numâ. Tuſc. l. 1. 16. IV. 1. Plut. Num. Plin. N. H. l. 13. c. 13. Liv. l. 40. Ovid. Met. l. 15. Lact. 1. 22.

that

that they were ſo long concealed; and ſo *Pliny* ſaith; for they lay there 535 years: *Plutarch* ſaith, *but about* 400 years, which others ſay is a great miſtake. However, it was a long time before they were diſcover'd; *by a great ſhower*, ſaith *Plutarch*; by *plowing*, ſaith *Pliny* and others.

But ſtill, why were theſe Books burnt? The true account I take to be this. *Numa*'s Religion was very different from what then obtain'd among them. And *Q. Petilius* the *Prætor*, having got a ſight of them, ſaith *Livy*, *from his Kinſman* L. Petilius, in *whoſe Ground they were found*, very officiouſly inform'd the Senate that they were Books of dangerous conſequence to their Religion; and upon his Oath, they order'd the burning of them. Now *Numa*, as *Plutarch* ſaith, had expreſly forbidden any Images in Divine worſhip, which he ſaith continued for 160 years among the *Romans*; and the reaſon he gives was, *that the firſt or ſupreme Being according to* Numa, *was not ſenſible or viſible, but was inviſible, pure, and only to be apprehended by the Mind*; which ſaith he, was very agreeable to the Doctrine of *Pythagoras:* and the Sacrifices he appointed were unbloody, *of meal and wine, and other eaſy things.* But theſe things were ſoon chang'd; for *Plutarch* ſaith that *Tullus Hoſtilius*, his immediate Succeſſor, *chang'd the Devotion which* Numa *had ſet up into great Superſtition*; which daily increaſing, it was no wonder that they ſhould then order *Numa*'s *Books* to be burnt, which upbraided them with their ſuperſtitious folly. But by this we ſee what *Pythagoras* his notion of God and his worſhip was. *Ovid* admires him *for his ſkill in Divinity and Philoſophy*; *for his giving an account of the beginning and nature of things.*

——*Iſque licet cœli regione remotos*
Mente Deos adiit, & quæ natura negabat
Viſibus humanis, oculis ea pectoris hauſit.

So that, if we may truſt a Poet (and ſurely his Authority is as good as that of *Lucretius*) *Pythagoras* aſſerted *the being of* God, *and the beginning of the World.*

———*Magni primordia Mundi,*
Et rerum cauſas, & quid natura docebat;
Quid Deus, unde Nives, quæ fulminis eſſet origo.

Cyrill. contra Jul. l. 1. There is a large deſcription of God extant in St. *Cyril* againſt *Julian*, according to *Pythagoras*; wherein God is ſaid to be *intimately preſent in the World, the beginning of all things, the mind aud ſoul, and motion of the Univerſe.* And ſo *Velleius* in *Cicero*, ſaith that according to *Pythagoras*, God *was a Mind diffus'd thro' the World.* Which is likewiſe expreſs'd by *Virgil* in his known Verſes, *Mens agitat molem*, &c. *Philoaus*, a noted Scholar of *Pythagoras*, (whoſe Books brought the *Pythagorean Learning* into eſteem in *Greece*) gives this deſcription of God, * *That he is the eternal Governor and Ruler over all, being one and the ſame always, and different from all others.* Which we find in *Philo*, and have no reaſon to miſtruſt his Teſtimony; conſidering what the other *Pythagoreans* ſaid concerning the Divine Nature. They made God to be *one Eternal, perfect Being, and that the happineſs of Mankind lay in a*

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. *c.* 27.

* Ἐσὶ γὰ φησὶν, Ἡγεμὼν καὶ Ἀρχων ἁπάντων θεὸς, εἷς ἐσὶν ὢν μόνιμος, ἀκίνητος, αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὅμοιος, ἕτερος τῶν ἄλλων. *Philo de Mundi Opific. p.* 23.

ſimilitude to him; as appears by the *Pythagorean Fragments* in *Stobæus*, and elſewhere, which I need not repeat; but I ſhall only ſet down the paſſages of *Zaleucas* and *Charondas*, who were known *Pythagoreans* as appears by *Porphyry*, *Iamblichus*, *Laertius*, &c. in the excellent Prefaces to their Laws. *Zaleucus* ſaith, *That in the firſt place all perſons ought to own and acknowledge the Gods*; *which*, ſaith he, *is manifeſt by ſeeing the Heaven and the World, and the order that is therein*; *for theſe are not the work of Fortune, or of Mens hands*; *and they ought to be worſhip'd and honour'd as the Author of all good things to us. And to that end they ought to keep their Souls pure from evil*; *for* GOD *is not honour'd by bad men, nor by coſtly ſacrifices, but by virtue, and the choice of good and juſt actions. Charondas* ſaith, *That Men ought to begin their actions with piety. For* GOD *is the cauſe of all: and they muſt abſtain from evil actions, for the ſake of their reſpect to* GOD. *For* GOD *hath no regard to wicked perſons.* Theſe were Men of great and juſt eſteem in their Cities, and their memory is preſerv'd by all that ſpeak of them with great veneration. *Stob. Serm.* 42. p. 279. p. 289.

I might purſue this matter much farther; but if this be not ſufficient to my purpoſe, more will be leſs regarded: for Mankind are better pleas'd with *Choice* than *a Heap*; and I have only pitch'd upon Perſons of great eſteem in the World. Only *Pythagoras* did not go down well with ſome of the *Greeks*, becauſe of his *Myſtical* and *Symbolical ways* of Inſtruction; which the *Greeks* were by no means fond of; as appears by *Xenophon*'s Epiſtle to *Æſchines* (if it be genuine, and I ſee little reaſon to queſtion it) for he upbraids *Plato* with mixing *the Pythagorick Extravagancies* with the plain Doctrine of *Socrates*, which *Xenophon* kept ſtrictly to. But as to *Pythagoras* himſelf, *Cicero* extols him *for his wiſdom* and *Quality*; and he ſaith, *The Pythagoreans for a great while were accounted the only Learned men. Pliny* admires him for *his ſagacity*; *Apuleius* for *the greatneſs of his Wit*; and the People of *Crotone* aud *Metapontum*, *as more than a Man.* His greateſt fault was that he was too wiſe; for he lock'd up his Secrets ſo cloſe, that the greateſt part of Mankind were not much the better for them; only the Cities of *Magna Grecia* were wonderfully reform'd by his means (if the *Pythagoreans* may be believ'd) but at laſt the prevalent Faction of *Cylon* and his brutiſh Party at *Crotone* deſtroy'd many of the Diſciples of *Pythagoras*, and diſperſed the reſt. And *Pythagoras* himſelf ended his days either by violence, or the diſcontent he had to find his good deſigns diſappointed in ſuch a manner. The reputation of his School was for ſome time kept up by *Archytas* and *Philolaus*; and ſome that eſcaped the common danger, as *Lyſis* (who went to *Epaminondas* in *Greece*, and is ſuppos'd to have publiſhed the *Golden Verſes*) and ſeveral others are mention'd by *Porphyry* and *Iamblichus*. But *Porphyry* obſerves, That *they only preſerv'd ſome dark and obſcure notions of the* Pythagorick *Doctrine*, *and made wonderful ſecrets of them*; which he thinks did not contain the true Doctrine of *Pythagoras*; but only *ſome ſparks of it*, which were far from being clear. And the decay of the *Pythagorean Doctrine*, he doth not only impute to the violence of the Faction rais'd againſt the *Pythagorean Society* in thoſe Cities of *Italy* where they flouriſh'd; but to their *Enigmatical* way of expreſſing their minds by *Numbers* and *Figures*; and to the *Dorick Dialect*, which was almoſt ſacred among them: and after their Books were come into *Greece*, he ſaith, Plato *and others took out the beſt*, *and put it into ſmoother Language*, which made the reſt be *Tuſc.* 4. 1; *De Leg.* 2. 9. *Tuſc.* I. 16. *Plin. N. H.* 2. 21. *Apul. Flor. Iambl. vit. Pyth.* c. 6. 10.

ſlighted. And he thinks ſome *invented things on purpoſe in their names to expoſe them the more.* So that it is no eaſy matter to judg now what was the genuine *Pythagorean Doctrine*, except what we find mix'd with *Plato*; who had the beſt opportunities of underſtanding their Doctrine by going among them himſelf, and afterwards getting the Books of *Philolaus* into his hands. And *Porphyry* in the Life of *Plotinus* doth particularly commend him, for *joining the Doctrines of* Pythagoras *and* Plato *together, beyond any that had gone before him.* From whence it appears, that there was no difference between them, as to the firſt Cauſe and the Production of things.

But what ſhall we ſay to *Ocellus Lucanus*, who is mention'd as a Diſciple of *Pythagoras* by *Iamblichus*; and *Architas* in his Epiſtle to *Plato* mentions a Book of his of *the Generation of things*; which hath been often publiſh'd out of MSS. and doth plainly aſſert the *World's Eternity, and Being from it ſelf*; and ſo overthrows the *Pythagorean Doctrine* of God's being the Beginning of all;

In anſwer. That there is ſomething genuine of *Ocellus* extant, I do not queſtion. For *Stobæus* produces a Fragment out of his *Book of Law*, written in the *Dorick Dialect*, according to their cuſtom, and the precept of *Pythagoras*; wherein he doth poſitively aſſert, *That* God *was the cauſe of the World* ὠτᾶς δ' αἴτιος ὁ Θεός· but that is not all; for he ſaith, *The World conſiſts of two parts, of that which governs, and is the principle of motion; and that which is called paſſive, and is governed; the firſt* he ſaith, *is Active and Divine, having Reaſon and Underſtanding; the other is made, unreaſonable, and liable to changes.* How can this be reconciled to the Principles of the other Book? And yet *Vizzanius* who compared it with ſeveral MSS. and publiſhed it, hath printed this Fragment at the end of the other. As to *the different Dialect*, he ſuppoſes *it was firſt written in* Dorick, *but after turn'd into the* Attick: but of this he offers no proof; only he ſaith, *It was done as words are tranſlated out of* Portugueſe *into* Caſtilian; or which anſwers more to the *Doric*, out of *Scotch* into *Engliſh.* No one queſtions but ſuch things have been done, and may be ſo again. But how doth it appear that the whole Book was ſo? For there are ſome Fragments of this very piece in *Stobæus* in the *Dorick Dialect*, which is the concluſion of the firſt Chapter, and ſome parts of the ſecond and third; which I ſuppoſe to have been genuine, and the groundwork of the reſt; which ſome unknown Philoſopher built more upon, and turn'd theſe Fragments into the *Attick Greek*, to make them all of a piece. The *Pythagoreans* did aſſert, that the World was incorruptible, as appears by the Fragments of *Philolaus* and others in *Stobæus*; but that which is aſſerted in this Piece is, That the World was ſelf-originated, which was contrary to their Doctrine, and of *Ocellus Lucanus* himſelf. There can be no diſpute about the Fragment of the Book of Law, where his opinion is plain and clear, *That* God *is the cauſe of all*, and that *the firſt Cauſe is a wiſe and intelligent Being:* let us now compare this with the Doctrine of this Book, wherein he aſſerts, * *That the World is the cauſe of perfection to other things, and therefore is perfect from it ſelf.* *Vizzanius* would have it believ'd that this was *the Peripatetic Doctrine:* If he means that *of Ariſtotle* I have already ſhew'd how falſe it is; ſince he ſo plainly derives the being and perfection of the World *from* God, and not *from it ſelf.* But that which will give the greateſt light into this matter is, that *Nogarola*, who publiſh'd *Ocellus* in *Italy* with Notes, obſerves, that *Critolaus* the

Stob. Eclog. Phyſ. c. 16. p. 32.

Stob. Eclog. Phyſ. c. 24. p. 44.

* Οὕτως ἔν τε τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον γινόμενον τ αὐτο τελείας αὐτὸ ἐξ ἑαυτῦ αὐτοτελές. *Ocell. Lucan. c. 1.*

the *Peripatetick* in *Philo*, us'd the ſame Argument, *That the World muſt be eternal, becauſe it is the cauſe of its own Being, and of other things in it.* Now this *Critolaus* ſucceeded in the *Peripatetick* School at *Athens*, after the Doctrine of it about the beginning of things had been alter'd by *Strato Lampſacenus*, who as *Cicero* tells us, *attributed all to Nature, and nothing to* GOD; *ſuppoſing that Nature had all Cauſes within it ſelf.* And ſo *Plutarch* ſaith, that *Strato* the *Peripatetick ſuppoſed Nature alone to give a Being to all things from it ſelf.* Here we have found the very Principle of this Book, which goes under the name of *Ocellus Lucanus*, which is repugnant to what himſelf had expreſly declar'd; but ſome one of theſe *Atheiſtick Peripateticks* at *Athens* finding that *Ocellus Lucanus* had ſaid ſomething that might be turn'd to their purpoſe, takes what was antient of *Ocellus*, and puts it out of the *Dorick* into the *Attick Dialect*, and makes a ſhort *Syſtem of the Univerſe*, which they thought would better paſs in the World under the name of antient *Pythagorean.* And this ſeems to me the trueſt account of this matter. As for the Arguments themſelves, ſuch as they are, I ſhall conſider them in a more proper place.

Phil. Oper. p. 946.

Acad. Qu. l. 4. c. 38. Cicer. de N. D. l. 1. Plut. adv. Colot.

Thus I have gone thro' the Opinions of the eldeſt Philoſophers of greateſt eſteem about GOD *and Providence, and the production of the World.* But before I proceed farther, it will be neceſſary to make ſome Reflections on the foregoing Diſcourſe, which may be very ſerviceable to my following Deſigns.

1. That thoſe Philoſophers who aſſerted *the Being of* GOD *and Providence*, were Perſons of the greateſt reputation for Wiſdom and Knowledg, and did not hold theſe things merely from Tradition, but from the ſtrongeſt evidence of Reaſon: which appear'd by this, that after the Atheiſtical Hypotheſes of *Anaximander* and *Democritus* were ſtarted, they were not in the leaſt mov'd by them; but ſaw an abſolute neceſſity in point of Reaſon of holding a Firſt Cauſe, which not only gave a beginning to the World, but continued to govern it. Even *Ariſtotle* owning an Univerſal Providence from ſuch Reaſons as will hold much farther.

2. That theſe Philoſophers who follow'd their Natural Reaſon, were very far from looking on *the Univerſe* as made up *only of Bodies*, or that *an Incorporeal Subſtance imply'd a Contradiction.* Theſe were Perſons who underſtood very well what a *Contradiction* meant; and if there had been any ſuch Repugnancy in the notion of *Mind* or *Spirit* as diſtinct from Body, they would have found it out. But *Anaxagoras* aſſerted a *Superior Mind* antecedent to Matter or Body; ſo did *Socrates* and *Plato*, and *Ariſtotle* too, who expreſly aſſerts GOD to be *an Eſſence without bulk and indiviſible, or without any Parts*; but this can never agree to a Body, altho' never ſo *fine and ſubtle.* And *Cicero* tells us, That *they could have no other notion of* GOD, *but as a free Mind, remote from any compoſition, knowing and perceiving, and moving all things.* Even the *Stoicks*, who blunder'd moſt in this matter, yet yielded GOD to be *Numen præſtantiſſimæ mentis*, as *Balbus* in **Tully* calls him; and †*Zeno* in *Laertius* deſcribes GOD *to be an Immortal, Rational and moſt happy Being, uncapable of evil, and taking care of the World.* ‖*Seneca* ſaith, *the World was framed by* GOD, *or by Incorporeal Reaſon.* If at other times they ſeem to contradict this, we are not here concern'd to clear or vindicate them; becauſe my Inquiry is confin'd to thoſe who were elder, and not ſo given to Paradoxes and Innovation in Terms, as the *Stoicks* were.

Metaphyſ. l. 14. c. 7.

Nec verò Deus ipſe qui intelligitur a nobis, alio modo intelligi poteſt, niſi mens ſoluta quædam & libera, ſegregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia ſentiens & movens, ipſaque prædicta motu ſempiterno. *Tuſc. l. 26.*

* *Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.* † *Laert. vit. Zenon.* ‖ *Seneca Conſol. ad Hel. c. 8.*

3. That the true and complete Happineſs of Mankind lay in a ſimilitude to GOD. Herein *Socrates* and *Pythagoras*, and their Scholars agreed, as abundantly appears in the *Pythagorean Fragments*; and that the way to be like GOD, is to be *virtuous, and good, and wiſe*; and that all other things, which Mankind are apt to value ſo much, fall infinitely ſhort of this. And I have ſhew'd that *Ariſtotle* himſelf came to this at laſt, for which I have produc'd unqueſtionable Authorities from his Works.

4. That Religion and Piety are very great and commendable Virtues in Mankind. *Plato* ſaid, *the greateſt*. *Pythagoras* gave very good Rules about Divine Worſhip, that it ſhould be perform'd *ſeriouſly and with great attention of Mind*, and not by *the By, and by Chance*. That *our Minds were moſt affected with Religion and Piety in the due Worſhip of* GOD; *that we ſhould undertake nothing without Prayer*; wherein *Socrates* and *Plato* agree with him. And *Ariſtotle* look'd on it as *Madneſs to deſpiſe God and Religion.*

Plut. in Numa. Cicero de Leg. l. 2.

Aur. Carm. 49.

5. That good Men are to bear the troubles of this World as well as they can, and to look for Happineſs in a Future State. This appear'd by the carriage of *Socrates* at his death, and his Diſcourſes then; and the Courage and Conſtancy of *Pythagoras* and his *Diſciples*, when they were ſo miſerably handled by their inveterate Enemies; ſetting fire in the Houſe where they met, baniſhing ſome, and famiſhing others, and diſperſing the reſt.

6. That there was a common conſent of Mankind, as to the Being of GOD, and Immortality of Souls. Which appears not only by expreſs teſtimonies of Philoſophers, but by their appeals to the ſenſe of former Ages and diſtant Nations about them.

7. That, notwithſtanding that Light of Reaſon, which they had, yet they found it ſo defective in many things, that they thought nothing more deſirable than a clear Revelation about ſuch things, which were of great importance to Mankind, but they found to be out of their reach to recover; as appear'd by the Confeſſion of *Socrates*, and the Silence of *Ariſtotle* about a Future State, when his Reaſon could only go to the poſſibility, and not to the undoubted certainty of it. For I have ſhew'd that *Ariſtotle* hath aſſerted ſo much concerning the Nature and Properties of the Soul, or rather the Mind of Man, that it cannot be deſtroy'd by Death; but yet he was ſo far to ſeek concerning a Future State after Death, by reaſon of the Poetical Fictions about it, that he rather choſe to ſay nothing, than what might be thought fabulous or uncertain.

And now, I hope, I have ſufficiently clear'd the firſt thing which I undertook, which was to ſhew, That it was a moſt unreaſonable prejudice againſt Religion, *that it was only a contrivance of Prieſts and Politicians for their own ends.*

II. I come now to conſider in the next place, what account is given by ſuch Men of that impreſſion of Religion, which hath been upon the Minds of Men in all Ages. And the Cauſe muſt be as general as the Effect: Since then we find this Effect of Religion in all kinds of Men, ſome univerſal and common Reaſon muſt be aſſign'd for it: which is the thing I am now to conſider. And ſince no Perſon hath undertaken this Matter in ſuch a manner, as Mr. *Hobbes* hath done, I ſhall particularly examin what he hath ſaid concerning it. *Seeing there are no ſigns, nor fruit of Religion but in Man only, there is no cauſe to doubt, but that the Seed of Religion is alſo only in Man, and conſiſteth in ſome peculiar Quality, or at leaſt in ſome eminent degree thereof not to be found in other living Creatures.*

Leviathan, ch. 12.

But what is this *Peculiar Quality in Mankind?* For therein the difficulty lies. How come Men of all ſorts to be poſſeſs'd with it? Not merely the unthinking Multitude, but Men of the deepeſt Senſe and greateſt Capacity, and who have taken the moſt pains to inquire into theſe matters.

And firſt, ſaith he, *It is peculiar to the Nature of Man to be inquiſitive into Cauſes of the Events they ſee, ſome more ſome leſs; but all Men ſo much as to be curious in the ſearch of the Cauſes of their own good and evil Fortune. To be inquiſitive into the Cauſes of Events* is very proper for Rational Beings; but we do not mean ſuch as relate merely *to their own good or evil Fortune*, which is no commendable curioſity; but into the nature and reaſon of things, which they ſee in the World; and this we ſay leads Men to a firſt Cauſe, which is GOD. This he mentions in the next words.

Secondly, Upon the ſight of any thing that hath a beginning to think alſo it had a Cauſe, to determin the ſame to begin when it did, rather than ſooner or later.

And was not this a very reaſonable thought? For *what hath a Beginning* muſt certainly *have a Cauſe* which produced it, which determined its Being at that time. And if this be ſuch a *Peculiar Quality in Mankind*, then there is ſomething in Reaſon which carries them to the owning a GOD, which gave a Being to the World, and to the things in it.

Thirdly, Man obſerveth how one Event hath been produced by another, and remembreth in them Antecedence and Conſequence; and if he cannot find out the true Cauſes of things, he ſuppoſes Cauſes of them rather from his own fancy, or Authority of others whom he eſteems.

But how come Mankind not *to find out the true Cauſes of things?* For this is here very ſlily ſuppos'd, without giving the leaſt reaſon for it; and withal the things that Men ſearch for *the Cauſes* of, are ſuppos'd to be *only* ſuch as relate *to their good and evil Fortune* (which are ſaid to be *for the moſt part inviſible*;) but is it not poſſible for Men to inquire into the Cauſes of other things, which we plainly ſee? Do we not ſee our own Bodies, and thoſe of other Animals, as well as the Heavens and Earth? and is it not as proper and reaſonable for Mankind to inquire into the Cauſes of theſe, as well as into their *good and evil Fortune?* What ſtrange ſtuff is this to ſuppoſe all Mankind only to run after *Fortune-tellers*, and never to concern themſelves about the Cauſes of the viſible World? Could any one that in the leaſt pretended to *Philoſophy*, ever think ſo meanly of the reſt of Mankind? But theſe are *the Cauſes* which we ſearch for, and we hope Natural Reaſon will conduct Men in this inquiry to their ſatisfaction; ſo that they need not to have recourſe to *Fancy* or *Authority*.

But he goes on: *The two firſt make Anxiety*, i. e. a Man's *Inquiſitiveneſs into Cauſes* in general, and *thinking that what had a Beginning muſt have a Cauſe.* For *being aſſur'd that there be Cauſes of all things, this fills him with ſolicitude for the time to come; and ſo his Heart is gnaw'd on perpetually by fear of Death, Poverty, or other Calamity; and hath no repoſe or pauſe of his Anxiety but in Sleep.* What? Do Men think of nothing but what Calamities may befal them? And muſt they needs perpetually perplex themſelves with the fear of future Evils? Thoſe who were called *Philoſophers* in former times, thought it poſſible for ſuch who believed GOD and Providence, not to live under ſuch *perpetual anxiety.* But what follows? *This perpetual Fear always accompanying Man-*

kind in the ignorance of Cauſes, as it were in the dark, muſt needs have for object ſomething; and therefore when there is nothing to be ſeen, there is nothing to accuſe, either of their good or evil Fortune, but ſome Power or Agent inviſible. Thence the Poets ſaid, that the Gods were firſt created by human Fear; which being ſpoken of the many Gods of the Gentiles, is very true. But how come we from the *Qualities* of Human Nature to fall upon *the Gods of the Gentiles?* The Queſtion was, What it is in Mankind which inclines them to believe a God? The Anſwer is, *That Fear made the Gods of the Gentiles.* What is that to *all Mankind?* Suppoſe there had been no ſuch Saying among the *Poets*, nor ſuch *Gods among the Gentiles*, the Queſtion ſtill remains, whence comes Mankind to apprehend a *Deity?* Doth it all come from a vain ſuperſtitious Fear, ſuch as Men have in the dark of they know not what; and becauſe they ſee nothing, they imagin ſome *Inviſible Power?* Is this the true ground of the Seed of Religion in Mens Minds? If ſo, then there is no ground in Reaſon to believe a God, but only an ignorant ſuperſtitious Fear.

Not ſo, ſaith Mr. *Hobbes. But the acknowledgment of One God, Eternal, Infinite and Omnipotent, may more eaſily be derived from the deſire Men have to know the Cauſes of Natural Bodies, and their ſeveral Virtues and Operations, than from the fear of what was to befal them in time to come.* What is the meaning of this? *The acknowledgment of One God may be more eaſily derived,* &c. If he had meant ſincerely, he would not have ſaid, *That it may be more eaſily derived,* but that no tolerable account can be given of thoſe things any other way. But we are to obſerve, That he makes *Ignorance* and *Fear* to be *the general Seeds of Religion in Mankind:* ſo that this *Acknowledgment of One* God doth not come from *the Seed of Religion*, but only from Mens being puzzled about a ſeries of Cauſes. *For*, as he goes on, *he that from any Effect he ſees come to paſs, ſhould reaſon to the next and immediate Cauſe thereof, and from thence to the Cauſe of that Cauſe, and plunge himſelf profoundly in the purſuit of Cauſes, ſhall at laſt come to this (even as the Heathen Philoſophers confeſs'd) one firſt Mover; that is, a Firſt and an Eternal Cauſe of all things, which is that which Men mean by the name of* God. This ſeems a plain confeſſion that *Reaſon* muſt carry Men to the owning *a Firſt and an Eternal Cauſe of all things.* And is not Reaſon a *Peculiar Quality in Mankind?* How then comes *the Seeds of Religion* not to be plac'd therein, but *in Ignorance and Fear?* And he after ſaith, *That the Natural Seed of Religion lies in theſe four things; Opinion of Ghoſts, Ignorance of ſecond Cauſes, Devotion towards what Men fear, and taking things caſual for Prognoſticks.* How comes the *Natural Reaſon* of Mankind to be left out? If by that Men may be convinc'd of a *Firſt and Eternal Cauſe of things*, doth not that diſpoſe Men to a fear and reverence towards a Divine Majeſty? And is not that *Religion?* Then the beſt and trueſt Seed of Religion lies in that which moſt diſpoſeth the Mind to fear God. What is the meaning then, that *the Seed of Religion* is plac'd by him in things without Reaſon? If Men by Reaſon are brought to own or *acknowledg One* God *Eternal, Infinite, Omnipotent*; doth not the ſame Reaſon oblige them to pay him that Reverence, and Fear, and Duty, which is owing to him? Therefore by this *Seed of Religion*, he really can mean nothing but an inclination to *Superſtition!* And to this purpoſe he ſpeaks in the concluſion of the foregoing Chapter. *And this Fear of things inviſible, is the Natural Seed of that which every one in himſelf calleth Religion; and in them that fear or worſhip that Power otherwiſe than they do, Superſtition.*

Here is a notable diſtinction found out between *Religion* and *Superſtition*; the former is the good word a Man gives to himſelf, the other the Nick-name he beſtows on thoſe who differ from him. But in general, *Religion* and *Superſtition* are the ſame thing to him; unleſs a difference be found out from the *allowance* of one, and not of the other. So he ſaith in another place: *Fear of Power inviſible feign'd by the Mind, or imagin'd from tales publickly allow'd, is Religion; not allow'd, Superſtition.* So that what is feign'd and allow'd is *Religion*, and what is not allow'd is *Superſtition.* So that the Worſhip of the Heathen Gods, being from *Tales publickly allow'd*, was *Religion*, and not *Superſtition:* and the *Chriſtian Worſhip* under the Perſecution, was *Superſtition* and not *Religion.* No, ſaith Mr. *Hobbes: When the Power imagin'd is ſuch as we imagin, that is true Religion.* How can it be *true Religion*, if Religion be *a fear of a power imagined by the Mind, or from Tales publickly allow'd?* For if this be Religion in general, *true Religion* muſt be a *true Fiction*, a real *Chimæra*, an allow'd piece of Nonſenſe. *But when the Power is ſuch as we imagin it, then*, ſaith he, *it is true Religion.* But if it were *a Power imagined to be ſuch as the Law makes it*, is not that *true Religion?* And if it contradicts what is ſo eſtabliſh'd, can this be according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s *true Religion?* Then it follows, that the diſtinction doth not ariſe from the *Publick Allowance* or *Diſallowance.* For if it be poſſible for the Civil Power to *diſallow* the Worſhip of the true God, (as we know it hath too frequently happen'd) is ſuch Worſhip being diſallow'd *true Religion?* If it be, then it is impoſſible the other ſhould be true, that *Religion* is taken from the *Publick Allowance*, and *Superſtition* from the *Diſallowance.* But they who put in ſome Expreſſions only for a diſguiſe and concealment, know well enough that they contradict themſelves; and they know their Friends will allow them in it, as long as the true meaning may be underſtood by them: and the ſafeſt way of inſtilling Atheiſm is by writing Contradictions, *i. e.* by ſeeming at ſome times to own a God, but by the whole ſeries of the Diſcourſe to overthrow his Being, as a mere fancy of an inviſible Power rais'd by a predominant Fear. But hereby we ſee that *Fear* prevails ſo much on ſuch Men, that they dare not ſpeak conſiſtently; which is very unbecoming *Philoſophers.* As the groſs *Hypocriſy* of *Vaninus* before his diſcovery, and the moſt ſervile *Flatteries* and *Importunities* of *Theophile* in *France*, did ſhew how much the power of Fear may ſway in thoſe who have no Religion, (which may be allow'd in them.) But how comes Fear to be made out to be *the ſeed of Religion in Mankind?* This a true Diſciple to the *Leviathan*, in the Preface to his Book, hath undertaken to make out more fully than Mr. *Hobbes* had done; and therefore ought to be conſider'd in this place. *When Men*, ſaith he, *are under any great diſtreſs, and ſee not the way out of it, their Anxiety and Fear makes them act like Men diſtracted, and aſk any one's help, which at another time they would deſpiſe: ſo we find it as to Religion; when they are in great trouble, they run to their Prayers, and when they are over, their Devotion is ſoon cool'd, as he inſtances in* Alexander, *and might have done in many others.* But what is all this to the proof of the main Point? That Men are too prone to *Superſtition*, eſpecially under Calamities, there is no queſtion. But it is a moſt unreaſonable ſuppoſition, that all *Religion* is nothing elſe but *Superſtition*, which Men take up only when they are at their wits end. But if there be a God and Providence, as we find both the beſt *Philoſophers* aſſerted, and the ſtrongeſt

Leviathan, ch. 6. p. 26.

Leſcaloper. in Cicer. de N. D. I. p. 127.

Tract. Theolog. Polit.

ſtrongeſt Reaſons prove it; then whatever Mens condition be as to this World, there is the ſame ground in Reaſon for a due Reverence and Worſhip to be paid to him. But it is a very bad way of arguing againſt all Religion, becauſe of ſome Mens extravagant Superſtition. *Some Men have run mad with Superſtition.* What follows? Therefore all *Religion* is *Madneſs.* Where lies any colour in the Argument? Some have been mad through an exceſs of Love; therefore all Love is Madneſs. No; but we muſt enquire into the proper objects and degrees of Love, whereof ſome are allowable, and ſome not. So here in the Paſſion of Fear, there is a violent, fooliſh, ungovernable Fear; but may there not be a prudent, wiſe and reaſonable Fear? It is madneſs and folly in great diſtreſſes to run to what cannot help us; but is it ſo to make our addreſſes to a Being infinitely wiſe and powerful, who alone can do it? Here lies the fundamental miſtake of theſe Men, they would have it taken for granted, that there is no GOD nor Providence, and then they cry out upon the fooliſh Fear and Superſtition of Mankind: but they cannot deny that if our foundations be true, Religion is a wiſe and reaſonable thing in Mankind; as it is an owning our Creator by a ſolemn ſubmiſſion to him, and invocation of his help, and dependence upon his Providence. Let any Man in his wits (let his condition as to this World be what it will) deny that it is reaſonable for him to be govern'd by one infinitely wiſer and better than himſelf. If his condition be proſperous, he hath more reaſon to be thankful; if it be troubleſome, he hath more reaſon to be patient, becauſe GOD knows beſt both how to ſupport him under it, and to deliver him out of it. But if there be no GOD nor Providence, he hath nothing but the miſerable comfort of neceſſity. *But, did not the multitude of Gods in the Gentile World come from their ignorant and ſuperſtitious Fear, as Mr.* Hobbes *hath at large ſhew'd?* Truly he needed not to have taken ſo much pains to prove a thing which no body denies. But what then? The Gentiles feign'd a great many Gods from their ſuperſtitious Fear; therefore there is no GOD but what is the effect of Fear. Is this good arguing? *But they fancied Powers inviſible, which were only in their own Imaginations.* Therefore there is *no Inviſible Power* but what depends upon Imagination. Can ſuch Men pretend to Reaſon, who talk at this rate? *But thoſe inviſible Powers they took to be Spirits, and that they were incorporeal, or immaterial, which are words of a contradictory ſignification.* This is news, and ought to have been prov'd in ſome meaſure, ſince the beſt Philoſophers who underſtood contradictions never thought ſo, as I have ſhew'd already. *But thoſe who by their meditation arrive to the acknowledgment of One Infinite, Omnipotent, Eternal* GOD, *choſe rather to confeſs he is incomprehenſible and above their Underſtanding, than to define his Nature by Spirit incorporeal, and then confeſs their definition to be unintelligible.* Do any that believe GOD to be *an Immaterial Subſtance*, confeſs this to be *unintelligible?* I rather believe that they think a *Material God* to be *unintelligible*, as being inconſiſtent with the Divine Perfections. And altho' they acknowledg that what is *Infinite*, is ſo far incomprehenſible; yet they may have clear and diſtinct conceptions of *a Firſt and Eternal Cauſe*, which is endued with Infinite Perfections. And this is not only attributed to him *as a Title of Honor with a pious intention*; but from the true ſenſe of their Minds, as to ſuch Attributes which are proper to GOD.

When

When Mr. *Hobbes* was charg'd with introducing *Atheiſm by denying Immaterial or Incorporeal Subſtances*, he undertook to defend himſelf; not only becauſe we ſay GOD *is incomprehenſible, but becauſe the notion of an Incorporeal Subſtance came from* Plato *and* Ariſtotle, *who miſtook thoſe thin Inhabitants of the Brain they ſee in ſleep for ſo many incorporeal Men; and yet allow them motion, which is proper only to things Corporeal.* Before he ſeem'd only to ſay, That the ignorant ſuperſtitious People entertain'd this notion of *Spirits or inviſible powers being only Creatures of the Brain like the images in ſleep:* but now it ſeems *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* were no wiſer, and that we receive it from them. But I have made it appear that the difference of Mind and Matter was before them; and that not by mere fancy, but by invincible Reaſon: becauſe otherwiſe there could be no ſuch thing as the Motion and Diſpoſition of Matter in ſuch a manner, as we ſee it in the World. And this was the ground which thoſe Philoſophers went upon; who were as little given to be impos'd upon by their dreams, as any before or ſince their time. And it is a ſtrange confidence in any Man to think to bear down the general ſenſe of the moſt Philoſophical part of Mankind, with bare ſaying, that an Immaterial Subſtance implies a contradiction. But he offers to prove it, after an extraordinary manner; *For*, ſaith he, *it is in* Engliſh, *ſomething that without a Body ſtands under — Stands under what? Will you ſay, under Accidents?* Ridiculous! did *Plato* or *Ariſtotle* uſe the word Subſtance? And when it came to be us'd, the word ſignify'd the ſame with *Being*; and ſo the jeſt is quite loſt. Such pitiful things as theſe muſt paſs for Wit and Philoſophy with ſome Men.

Mr. Hobbes *conſider'd, &c. p.* 30. *p.* 32. *p.* 33.

But to proceed with Mr. *Hobbes*; After he hath reckon'd up the many follies which the Gentiles fell into by their ſuperſtitious Fear, he concludes in this manner. *So eaſy are Men to be drawn to believe any thing from ſuch as have got credit with them, and can with gentleneſs and dexterity take hold of their Ignorance and Fear.* Still we meet with nothing but the reſult of *Ignorance* and *Fear* in the *Gentile World.* We do not deny that Religion was exceedingly corrupted among them; but we affirm, that the true foundations of Religion were kept up among Men of Underſtanding; as fully appears by the Diſcourſes of *Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Ariſtotle, Cicero*, &c. Why are their Reaſons never ſo much as mention'd, and nothing thought worth inſiſting upon, but only the groſs ſuperſtitions and follies of the People? This doth not look like fair dealing with Mankind; to repreſent only the meaneſt and moſt deform'd parts, and to conceal what any ways tended to the honor of them, and of Religion. *Cicero* dealt with Mankind in this matter in a much more ingenuous and candid manner. He doth not conceal the follies either of the *People* or of the *Philoſophers* about their Gods; but then he ſets down all the Arguments for GOD and Providence, and urges them with all his force. And in other places he owns the *general conſent of Mankind*, as to the eſteem and worſhip of a Divine Nature: which he is far from imputing to *Mens Ignorance and Fear*; but he ſaith, *it is the voice of Nature it ſelf.* Nay he goes ſo far as to ſay, * *that there is nothing more evident to any one that looks up to the Heavens, than that there is a moſt excellent Mind, by which theſe things are govern'd,* † *And he queſtions,*

Cicero de Nat. Deor.

Cic. de Leg. I. 8. *Tuſc. I.* 13. 15.

* Quid enim poteſt eſſe tam apertum, tamq; perſpicuum, cum cœlum ſuſpeximus, cœleſtiaque contemplati ſumus, quam eſſe aliquod Numen præſtantiſſimæ mentis quo hæc regantur. *De Nat. Deor. l.* 2.

† Quod qui dubitet, haud ſane intelligo, cur non idem Sol ſit an nullus ſit dubitare poſſit. Quid enim eſt hoc illo evidentius? *Ibid.*

ſtions,

ſtions, whether it be more evident that the Sun ſhines. At what another rate doth that excellent Orator ſpeak of *Human Nature*, with reſpect to Religion, than our modern pretenders to Philoſophy? Nay || *Sextus Empiricus* himſelf ſets down the Arguments fairly which prove the Being of GOD: *viz. The Conſent of Mankind; the Order of the World; the abſurdities of Atheiſm, and the weakneſs of the Arguments for it.* Which he doth largely inſiſt upon; and diſtinguiſhes between the *common errors of the people*, and the *Natural Arguments of Mankind*, with the conſent of the wiſeſt and ſharpeſt Men among them; as *Pythagoras*, *Empedocles*, the *Ionic Philoſophers* (from *Anaxagoras*) *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and the *Stoics*. And, ſaith he, *if we enquired after an object of ſight, we would rely moſt on thoſe who ſaw beſt; or after a ſound, on thoſe of the quickeſt hearing: ſo in matters of ſpeculation, the opinion of Philoſophers ought moſt to be regarded.* Which he never anſwers when he ſets down the Arguments on the other ſide; which are chiefly thoſe of *Carneades* againſt the *Stoics*, who laid themſelves open by ſome *Hypotheſes* of their own.

|| *Sextus Empir. ad Mathem. p. 139.*

But Mr. *Hobbes* tells us, *That the firſt Founders and Legiſlators of Common-wealths among the Gentiles took great care to keep the People in obedience and peace; and to that end pretended to Revelation for their Laws: and preſcrib'd Ceremonies, and Supplications, and Sacrifices, &c. by which they were to believe the anger of the Gods might be appeas'd. And thus the Religion of the Gentiles was a part of their Policy.* Who goes about to deny this? or to juſtify the vain pretences to Revelation among ſome of the ancient Legiſlators, beſides *Numa Pompilius*, whom *Diodorus Siculus* takes care to preſerve the memory of; as of *Mnenis*, as he calls him, the firſt Legiſlator in *Egypt*; who pretended to have his Laws from the God *Hermes:* but this ſeems to have been a miſtake for *Menes*, whoſe Counſellor *Hermes* was: his others are, *Minos* of *Creet*, *Lycurgus* at *Sparta*, *Zathamuſtes* (as he calls him) among the *Arimaſpi*, *Zamolxis* among the *Getæ*; and among the reſt he reckons *Moſes*, who had his Laws from the God *Iäo*. No queſtion *Diodorus Siculus* believ'd all alike; but I hope to ſhew the mighty difference between *Moſes* and the reſt in the following Diſcourſes. But here I am only to conſider the force of the Argument. *Theſe Gentile Legiſlators did pretend Revelation when they had it not, only with a deſign to deceive the People.* Doth it hence follow, that there is no ſuch thing as *Religion*; but that it is only a Trick made uſe of by cunning Legiſlators to draw the People the better to Obedience? Now I think the Argument holds the other way. For, if the People were not before well perſuaded of the truth of *Religion* in general, this Argument would have no force at all upon them. For, let us ſuppoſe a People altogether unacquainted with Religion, or uncertain of the truth of it, to be dealt with, by ſome cunning Legiſlator; and he comes and tells them, he had brought them an excellent Body of Laws, which he had by Revelation from GOD; what would this ſignify to a People that were poſſeſs'd with Mr. *Hobbe*'s Notion of *Inviſible Powers* that were only *Fancies, ſuch as appear in a Dream or a Glaſs*; would they be at all perſuaded by ſuch an Argument to obedience? No; but they would rather look on him as an Impoſtor, that went about to deceive them in the groſſeſt manner; which would raiſe an invincible prejudice againſt them. But, ſaith Mr. *Hobbes*, *they had the Original ſeeds of Religion*, viz. *Ignorance and Fear, and upon theſe ſuch Legiſlators did work.* But he can never make it out, that ever there was a People

Diod. Sic. l. 1. p. 59.

poſſeſs'd with ſuch *Ignorance and Fear*, but they had a notion of a Deity among them before ſuch Legiſlators appearing; and all the advantage they had, was from ſuch an antecedent Belief of a God; then indeed it was no hard matter for ſuch Legiſlators to impoſe upon them; but without it, the ſuppoſition is unreaſonable. But Mr. *Hobbes* ſaith, *that Men in the dark are afraid of Inviſible Powers.* As tho' there were no more to be ſaid for the Being of God and Providence, than for ſtories of *Hobgoblings*, and this lies at the bottom of all his Diſcourſe. Wherein he contradicts the common Senſe and Reaſon of Mankind, who have agreed in the Notion and Belief of a Deity, and that as I have ſhew'd from *Socrates* and *Xenophon*, as well as others in *the eldeſt and beſt Ages*, even of the *Gentile World.* But Mr. *Hobbes* ſaith, where he ſpeaks his Mind more freely, *that there is no Argument from Natural Reaſon doth prove that the World had its beginning from* God; and yet he ſaith, *there is no Argument to prove a Deity but from the Creation.* So that all proof of a God in point of Reaſon, muſt be deſtroy'd by him. This he knew was objected againſt him; and the Anſwer he gives is, *That there are no Arguments from Natural Reaſon, except the Creation, that have not made it more doubtful to many than it was before:* and therefore his opinion is, *that this matter is to be left to the Law to determin.* A very philoſophical Anſwer! But why doth not the Argument from the Creation hold, when himſelf had ſaid, *that from the ſeries of Cauſes there muſt be one firſt Mover*, i. e. *a Firſt and an Eternal Cauſe of all things?* But that came in by the by, to avoid *odium* in a Book for all Perſons reading; but in his *Philoſophical Diſcourſes*, he doth not allow this Argument to hold. For what reaſon? *Becauſe*, ſaith he, *it only proves, that a Man's Mind cannot go on* in infinitum, *but he muſt ſtop ſomewhere; and at laſt he grows weary, and knows not whether he ſhould go on farther or not.* And is this all the force of the Argument from the Creation? What becomes now of the Argument from the *Mechanical Contrivance of the Human Body, which*, he ſaid, *was ſo clear a proof of a wiſe Maker, that he muſt be ſaid to be without a Mind, that did not aſſert that it was made by one?* And this is in one of his *Philoſophical Treatiſes*, publiſhed after the other; but in his Vindication of himſelf, he juſtifies the former paſſage; only he ſaith, *except the Creation.* So that he knew not well what to ſay in this matter, but only to keep himſelf out of danger, he was reſolv'd to ſubmit to the Law. But that is not our Point: and why did he not go about to take off the Argument from *the wiſe Contrivance of things*, which ought to go along with the other? But he knew it was far eaſier to darken an Argument, wherein *Eternity* and *Infinity* is concern'd; and ſo from thence would infer that in the ſeries of Cauſes Men's-Mind are only puzzled and not convinced. But why, I pray, muſt a Man's Mind *give over in the ſearch of Cauſes, as not knowing whether he may go on or not?* Can any thing be plainer in common reaſon, than that in the order of Cauſes a Man muſt go on till he arrive at a firſt Cauſe? What ſhould make a Man to ſtop here; for he ſees he muſt go on till he comes at a firſt? No; ſaith Mr. *Hobbes*, *A firſt Cauſe is infinite, and whatever is infinite is above our conception, and ſo we are loſt.* But that is running from the order of Cauſes to the nature of the object, which is a thing of another conſideration.

Phyſ. c. 26. n. 1.

Mr. Hobbes *conſider'd*, p. 34.

But he ſaith yet farther, *That the Argument from motion doth only prove an eternity of motion, and not an eternal firſt Mover*; becauſe as nothing can be mov'd from it ſelf, ſo whatſoever gives motion muſt be firſt mov'd. But all this depends upon the ſuppoſition that there is

nothing in the Univerſe but Body; and if that be granted, his Argument holds: but if there be Mind diſtinct from Body, and can give motion to it, there is not ſo much as the color of reaſon in this Argument. And ſo much in anſwer to the Second Atheiſtical Pretence.

The Third *Atheiſtical Pretence* to be conſider'd, is, *That there is no ſuch common conſent of Mankind, as to God and Providence, as was aſſerted by the Ancients, and is ſtill by the defenders of Religion; for upon the late Diſcoveries whole Nations have been found without any ſenſe of* God *or Religion.* This is a thing very fit to be inquir'd into, with more care than hath been yet us'd about it: for, altho' we do not ground the truth of Religion merely upon ſuch a general conſent; but upon thoſe Arguments which the wiſer part of Mankind hath inſiſted upon; of which I have given ſome account in the foregoing Diſcourſe: yet ſuch an univerſal conſent doth manifeſtly ſhew that there is nothing repugnant to the common ſenſe of Mankind in it; nothing that looks like a Trick or Impoſture, which could never ſo univerſally prevail as this hath done; eſpecially among the more ſenſible and civiliz'd part of Mankind.

But for our better underſtanding this Matter, it will be neceſſary to lay down ſome general Obſervations.

That we have reaſon to diſtinguiſh the more *Brutiſh* and *Savage* People, from the more *Tractable* and *Reaſonable*; becauſe it is poſſible for Mankind by an affected and univerſal neglect of all kind of Inſtruction, to degenerate almoſt to the nature of Brutes. But ſurely ſuch are not fit to be brought in for the inſtances of what naturally belongs to Mankind: which we ought to judge of by a due meaſure, *i. e.* by ſuch as neither want natural capacity, nor are profeſs'd Savages, nor have the improvements of the moſt civilized People. There are two ſorts of brutiſh People in the World, whoſe ſenſe in theſe matters is not much to be regarded. (1.) Such as have very little of common Humanity left among them; ſuch as *Acoſta* deſcribes the *Uros*, who were ſuch *dull and brutiſh People that they did not think themſelves Men*; and ſuch are the *Caffres* or *Hottentots*, at the *Cape of Good-hope*, who by the laſt Account we have of them remain as *Beſtial* and *Sordid* as ever; inſomuch that the Author who was among them, ſaith, *That if there be any medium between Men and Beaſts, they lay in the faireſt claim to that ſpecies.* And ſuch are the *Caiguæ* of *Paraguaria* (of whom afterwards.) (2.) Such as expreſs open contempt and defiance of *Laws* as well as *Religion*, as the *Chichimecæ* in the Northern part of *America*, who are ſaid *to have lived without any Government as well as Religion*; (*unleſs that they offer the firſt wild Beaſt they catch to the Sun*) and ſo *Acoſta* deſcribes ſome other *Savages* among them; viz. *without King, Law,* God, *or Reaſon:* Thoſe of *Braſil* are ſaid to be *without Faith, without Law, without a King*; and the Savages of *Canada* are deſcrib'd after the ſame manner. So that if any Argument can be drawn from ſuch againſt Religion, it will as well hold againſt *Law* and *Civil Government.*

Acoſta *of the Indies, l.* 2. *c.* 6.

Voyage to Surat, *An.* 1689. *p.* 489.

De Laet *Deſcript. Ind. Occid. l.* 5. *c.* 25.

De Orig. Gent. Am. p. 27.

Acoſta *of the Weſt-Indies, l.* 7. *ch.* 2.

Du Val *Obſervations ſur le Voyage de* Pirard, *p.* 132.

De Laet *Ind. Occid. l.* 2. *c.* 12.

2. We muſt not judg by light informations of mere Strangers, and Perſons look'd on as Enemies; which is the caſe of the Inhabitants of the *Southern Iſlands*, which we have only from *Seamen* who landed upon them, and were ſuppos'd to come with an ill deſign; whoſe Accounts muſt be very imperfect and partial. But in *Le Mair*'s Account we only read, *that they could obſerve no Offices of Religion among them:* And *Scouten* to the ſame purpoſe of the Inhabitants of *Horn Iſland* (as they call it)

Deſcript. Navig. Jac. Le Mair, 31. *Mxii. Diarium* Schouten. *p.* 47.

not far from *New Guinea*; *but they ſeem'd*, he ſaith, *to live like the Birds of the Air, without any care, upon the fruits of the Earth.* But no certainty can be grounded upon ſuch Obſervations. Nor can we build any thing upon the *Want of Religion* in places not yet fully diſcover'd; as what is ſaid by ſome of the People of *Yedſo* or *Jeſſo:* For the firſt Account given of it was from the Jeſuit *Fronius*, who liv'd long in *Japan*; and he deſcribes it as a Country of Savages; and he ſaith, *that they have no other Religion but the worſhip of the Heavens.* And ſo *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith, *the ſight of the Heavens was that which brought Men firſt to Divine Worſhip*; and he doth not attribute it to *Ignorance and Fear*, but *to Admiration*; and therefore fix'd *on the Sun and Moon as their chief Gods*; which was the the moſt prevailing Idolatry in the World. But from hence we are not to infer that they believ'd no GOD above them; but they thought he that was above them was above their ſervice: but their viſible Worſhip they thought ought to be paid to theſe viſible Gods, as hath been already obſerv'd of the old *Greeks*; and *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith the ſame of the *Egyptians.* But as to theſe People of *Yedſo* we find the firſt Account of them was, that they were a very *Savage People*, but had ſuch kind of Religion as moſt antient Idolaters had: Since that time there hath been no exact Account given of them; the beſt we have is from the *Dutch.* *Caron*, who was Reſident in *Japan*, ſaith only, *that this People are brutiſh*; *and that the* Japoneſe *could never make a full diſcovery of the Country, which is parted from* Japan *by an Arm of the Sea, where it bounds on vaſt Mountains and Deſerts, ſo that the common Paſſage is by ferrying over.* If this be true, there is a Paſſage by Land beyond that Arm of the Sea, and ſo *Japan* is one *Continent* with it, which extends in probability to the Northern parts of *America:* For in the Account of the *Dutch Embaſſy* to *Japan*, *A. D.* 1641. we are told, That in the Treaty between the *Japoneſe* Agent *Syvoan* and the *Dutch*, he produc'd a *Map* of thoſe Parts agreeable to what *Caron* had ſaid; and they obſerve *that* Jeſſo *was in it of a vaſt extent, and reach'd to* North America, *without any Streight of* Anian. *Martinius* makes no doubt, that Japan *was inhabited from* Eaſt Tartary, *as well as by a Colony from* China; which he proves from their *Cuſtoms* and *Language*; but he thinks *they came over the Water, or at leaſt over the Ice*; *for he ſaith, there are ſevere Winters there.* But he ſaith withal, *that the* Chineſe *do make* Jeſſo *a part of* Tartary, *and that it is join'd with the Province of* Niuthan *and* Yupi. *F. Couplet* agrees with *Martinius*, that *Japan* was peopled from *Tartary*; and he ſaith, they have a Chronology of their Kings for 660 Years before *Chriſt*, and long before that the Northern *Tartars* took poſſeſſion of *Japan.* So that the People of *Yeſſo* and *Japan* are of the ſame Original. In the *Dutch* Account of *Yedſo* printed by *Thevenot*, in the ſecond Part of his Collections (which was taken from a Ship which went upon the Coaſts of that Country and People) we have a more favourable Deſcription both of the *Country* and *People*; only it is ſaid, *that they do not love to take pains, have little Government or Religion*; but they obſerv'd ſome *Superſtitious Practices* among them. And what exact Account could be expected from ſuch, who went not thither to acquaint themſelves either with the Country or their Religion, but to find a paſſage farther that way?

Maff. Epiſt. l. 4. Apr. 28. 1565.

Diod. Sic. l. 1. p. 7.

Ambaſſade Memorable, &c. p. 27.

Martin. *Atlas Extrem. Aſiæ, p. 170.*

Martin. *Atlas, p. 21.*

Couplet *Diſſert. Proœm. ad* Confuc. *Oper. p. 81.*

That it is no certain rule that the People have no Religion, becauſe Strangers cannot find any ſet Times and Places of Worſhip among them. For this was a Principle among many Nations, that the *Supreme* GOD was 3.

to be worship'd only by acts of the Mind; and that external Worship was only for lesser Deities. And *Trigautius* (or rather *Riccius*, who lived a long time in *China*) gives this account of the Religion of that antient and famous Kingdom, *That at first they own'd the Supreme* God, *Lord of Heaven*; *but afterwards they came to worship inferior Deities*; *and this*, he saith, *he took out of their most antient Annals and Books of Wisdom, which*, he saith, *did not, in respect to Religion and Morality, come short of the best Philosophers of* Greece. He affirms, *that the Sect of the Learned*, as he calls them, *did still worship one* God, *because all inferior things are preserved and governed by him*; *but that they gave an inferior Worship to Spirits under him. They are silent about the Beginning of things, as out of their knowledg*; *but there are some of no such reputation, that talk their own vain Dreams, to which little regard is given.* But *Martinius* hath given some account of these Notions among them; *some would have all by chance, others held the eternity of the World.* He saith, *that their antient Books speak of the supreme Governor of Heaven and Earth*; and altho' they have not *a proper name for* God, yet he confesses *they have such as express his Authority and Government of the World.* *Bartoli* saith, they are extremely mistaken who charge this Learned Sect with *Atheism, because they have no Temples, nor publick Ceremonies of Worship for him*; *because they apprehend that the supreme* God *is to be solemnly worship'd only by him that is supreme among them.* And *Magaillans*, who was well acquainted with the Court of *China*, and died there about 20 years since, gives this account of Divine Worship, *that at* Pekim *there is a Temple, called the Temple of Heaven, wherein there is a very large Cupolo supported by* 82 *Pillars, wherein the Emperor himself offers Sacrifice on the day of the Winter Solstice, with great solemnity and humility*; *and another wherein he doth the same at the Summer Solstice: Before which*, he saith, *they observe a strict Fast for three days. He enquired of one of their learned Men, what they meant by this solemn Worship of Heaven*; *whether it was directed to the material Heaven? He answer'd that they took Heaven not only for the visible Heaven, but for the Creator and Governor of all things*; *and that at the four Seasons of the Year their Emperor did offer sacrifice in Temples on purpose, not to the Creatures, but to the spiritual Heaven.* *F. Couplet* saith, *That by the antient Custom of* China, *the Emperor only sacrificed to the King of Heaven, as often as there was great occasion for it. And that if he were in a progress, he did it upon the Hills and Mountains.* And by the last account we have from *China*, we find *the same Custom is kept up at* Pekim *by the present Emperors, since the Conquest of* China. Now it were very unreasonable to infer, that there is no Religion or Worship of the Supreme Being in *China*, because it is not commonly practis'd; since according to their Notion of Ceremonies, wherein they are the nicest People in the World, they think none ought to perform Worship to the Supreme in Heaven, but he who is their Supreme upon Earth.

Trigaut. *de Christian. Exped. ap. Sinas*, c. 10.

Martin. *Hist. Sinic. init.*

Bartoli *Hist. Asiat. part.* 3. *l.* 1. *p.* 73.

Magaillans *Novel. Rel. de la China, ch.* 21.

Couplet *Decl. Proœm ad* Confuc. *p.* 83.

Le Compte *part.* 2. *Lett.* 2.

4. Another thing we are to observe in passing our judgment, whether Nations have any Religion among them, is to have a care of trusting too much to the Sayings of known and profess'd Enemies; but as much as may be we ought to take the Opinion of the most free and disinteress'd Persons, who have convers'd among them on the account of Religion. This I intend chiefly with respect to the *Spaniards* accounts of the *West-Indies*, when their design was to enslave the poor *Indians*; for then they made it their business to blacken them as much as possible, by repre-

senting

ſenting them as a People without any *ſenſe of* God *or Religion, or any Virtues belonging to Human Nature.* But the contrary appears from the firſt, the moſt impartial and the lateſt Accounts we have of them, from ſuch as have been converſant among them, upon the account of Religion.

In the firſt Account we have of the Diſcoveries of the *Weſt-Indies*, we find that when *Columbus* came to the Iſlands of *Hiſpaniola* and *Cuba*, he ſoon found *that they worſhip'd the Sun and Moon, and the Heavens, but could not then diſcover what other Deities they worſhip'd:* which *Peter Martyr Anglerius* underſtands both of *the Natives* and of the *Caribbians*, who were *Savages*, and very troubleſom to them. And he tells a remarkable Story of one of the Natives coming to *Columbus* at *Cuba*, being a Man of 80 years of age, and deſir'd to diſcourſe with him by an Interpreter. The ſubſtance of it was, That he underſtood *that he with his Ship had given a great diſturbance to the Natives, and bad him to conſider, that after death there were two Paſſages for Souls; the one dark and dreadful for thoſe who were troubleſom to Mankind, the other pleaſant and delightful for thoſe who promote the peace and welfare of People; and if he conſider'd that every Man was to receive according to his Actions after death, he would give over being ſo uneaſy to them. Columbus* took the Advice very well, and pretended that they only came to aſſiſt them againſt the *Savages* and *Cannibals, and would hurt none of them*; which the old Man was ſo pleas'd with, that as old as he was, he ſaid he was ready to go with him in ſo good a deſign. Was there any thing that ſavor'd of *Barbariſm* or *Irreligion* in this Diſcourſe, or what would not become a good *Chriſtian* to ſay? Beſides, the ſame Author commends their way of living far beyond what the *Spaniards* brought among them (as appear'd by *Columbus* his own ſuffering for checking their Enormities.) *They enjoy'd the Profits of the Earth in common, without any diviſion or property, having enough for every Family; and none ſuffer'd but ſuch as injur'd others; and without Laws and Judges they did what was right.* This was a great Character from one who was particularly Intruſted in the Affairs and Council of the *Indies*, and had all the Accounts ſent to him, out of which he fram'd his *Decades*. *They thought*, as he ſaith, *that Contentment lay in a little compaſs; and they had more than they knew what to do with.* To the ſame purpoſe *Lerius* gives an account of a Conference he had with a *Braſilian* old Man about Trade. *I pray*, ſaid he, *why do your Countrymen take ſo much pains to come hither for our Wood? Have they not enough for Fuel? Yes*, ſaid *Lerius, but your* Braſil-*wood is of great advantage to them in Trade, by which they grow very rich. Very well*, ſaith he, *and when they are ſo rich, do they not die as other Men do? And whither then go all theſe Riches? To their Children or Relations.* Then ſaid the poor *Braſilian, Your Countrymen are a company of great Fools* (inſigniter Fatui.) *For why ſhould they undergo ſo much toil and danger by Sea and Land, to get that which they muſt part with when they die; and for the ſake of thoſe Children, who might live as contentedly without thoſe Riches? Do not you think that we love our Children as well as you? But we are contented that the ſame Earth which nouriſh'd us, will do as much for them? Theſe barbarous* Braſilians, ſaith *Lerius, will riſe up in judgment againſt too many Chriſtians.* To the ſame purpoſe, he ſaith, one of the Natives of *Peru* diſcours'd the *Spaniards*, who took ſo much pains to get their Gold; and ſaid, *they were the Froth of the Sea, reſtleſs and uneaſy, who might with far leſs trouble get a ſubſiſtence at home.* Theſe things I mention to ſhew, that theſe People were far enough from wanting Senſe and Capacity when

Columbi *Navigat.* c. 5.

Pet. Mart. *Dec. I.* c. 1.

Ler. *Hiſt. Navig. in Braſil.* c. 53.

the *Spaniards* came among them; and ſeem'd to have a much truer notion of the Happineſs of Human Life than they had.

But to ſhew how far they were from being *without Religion* at that time, we have an Account by *Benzo* (who liv'd a great while in the *Weſt-Indies*, upon their firſt Diſcovery) of an *Oracle* among them, which foretold the *Spaniards* a conſiderable time before. For the *Cachiqui* and *Bohitii*, (*i. e.* their *Great Men and Prieſts*) told *Columbus*, *That in the time of the Father of their preſent King, he and another King had a great mind to underſtand what would happen after their time, and to that end reſolv'd to apply themſelves to their Zemes* (the Gods they worſhip'd) *in an extraordinary manner, by faſting five days together in a moſt ſad and mournful condition.* And then they receiv'd that *Oracle*, upon which they made a *moſt doleful Song*, which they repeated at certain times; but now they found things happen'd to them juſt as they were foretold. The ſame *Benzo* informs us, that after *Columbus* diſcover'd the Continent, the Iſlands were ſoon left by the *Spaniards* in hopes of greater gains; and finding they could not manage the Nations as they deſired, they ſent Perſons on purpoſe to make the worſt repreſentation poſſible of them, that they might have *an Edict* to condemn them to *perpetual Slavery*: And therein they charge them with all manner of vices; but as to Religion, they only accuſe them of *Idolatry*. But, if they had found any ſuch thing as *Atheiſm* and *Irreligion* among them, they would have been ſure not to have conceal'd that.

Benzo *Hiſt. Novi Orbis l.* 1. *c.* 8.

Cap. 17.

Joh. de Laet, in his Deſcription of the Iſle of *Cuba*, ſaith, *That the Inhabitants there had no Temple, no Sacrifices, no Religion.* Which I could not but wonder at, the account being ſo different from that of the firſt Diſcoverers, who muſt certainly know beſt what Religion they had among them: but in probability he followed the later *Spaniards*, who give the worſt accounts of them, to juſtify the moſt inhuman Cruelties which were us'd againſt them. For *Benzo* ſaith, *That of two millions of Natives in* Hiſpaniola, *there were left not above* 150 *in his time*; and the like Deſolation was made in *Cuba*, *Jamaica*, *Port-Rico*, and other places; and *de Laet* confeſſes *that they were all long ſince deſtroy'd.* But if we take the Account given of theſe People upon the firſt Diſcovery, we ſhall find it was very different. For *Peter Martyr*, who was imployed by the King of *Spain*, as himſelf tells us, to take the beſt intelligence he could meet with from the *Indies*, ſaith, *That at firſt they could find no other Worſhip among them but that of the Sun, and Moon, and the Heavens; but upon further acquaintance with them, they found out a great deal more, which related to their Religion*; which he ſaid, *he receiv'd from one who was imploy'd by* Columbus *himſelf in inſtructing them. They had little Images, which they call'd* Zemes, which they ſuppos'd to be inhabited by Spirits, which gave Anſwers to them; but which is conſiderable, he ſaith, *That they look'd on them only as a kind of Meſſengers between them and the Only, Eternal, Omnipotent, Inviſible* God. This was extant long before *De Laet* wrote his pompous Deſcription of the *Weſt-Indies*: Was *Peter Martyr* unknown to him? So far from it, that he mentions and commends him for his diligence: How then comes he to differ ſo much from him in his Account of their Religion? And he there mentions the ſame *Oracle* which *Benzo* had done, and adds, *That the Natives underſtood it at firſt of the* Caribbians *or* Cannibals; *but at laſt found it too true of the* Spaniards. In another place he gives an account of *Hiſpaniola* from *Andreas Morales* his own Mouth, who was imploy'd by the Go-

Deſcript. *Ind. Occid. l.* 1. *c.* 10.

Benzo *l.* 1. *c.* 25.

Pet. Mart. *Dec.* 1. *c.* 9.

Decad. 3. *c.* 9.

vernor to ſearch out what he could find concerning the Iſland and the Natives. *And he found that they came from another Iſland, and built a Houſe at the place of their landing, which they after conſecrated and enriched, and reverenced to the time of the* Spaniards *coming: and he makes it to have been in as much eſteem among them, as* Jeruſalem *to the* Chriſtians, Mecca *to the* Mahumetans, *and* Tyrena *in the Grand* Canaries; which he ſaith, *was in ſuch eſteem among the Natives, that Perſons would with ſinging leap off from that Holy Rock, in hopes their Souls ſhould be made happy by it.* But altho' this were a great Argument of *ſuperſtitious Folly* in them, yet it ſhews the falſeneſs of that Saying in the firſt Relation of *Columbus* his Voyage, *That there was no ſuch thing as Religion in the* Canaries: but thoſe who pretend to give a more exact Account, ſay, *That the Natives did believe one* GOD, *who puniſhed the Evil, and rewarded the Good.*

Columbi *Navigat.* c. 2. *Conqueſt de Canaries, par. II.* p. 208.

The next we are to conſider, are the *Savages* which diſturbed the Natives, before the *Spaniards*; who were called the *Caribbians*, or the Inhabitants of the *Caribbe Iſlands.* Theſe were a wild ſort of People, and a great terror to their Neighbours, whom they were wont to eat in triumph, after they had taken them; which was not the general practice of the *Indians*, but only of the moſt *Brutiſh* and *Savage* People among them, as the *Caribbians* and thoſe of *Braſil*; but the other Natives both of the Iſlands and Continent abhorr'd it, as is found by the lateſt Diſcoveries. This appears by *Chriſt. de Acunna*, who was imploy'd *A. D.* 1659. to diſcover the People about the River of *Amazons*; and there he found a conſiderable People call'd *Aguæ* (the *Spaniards* call them *Omaguæ*) and they were repreſented to be *Eaters of the fleſh of their Enemies*; but he ſaith it was very falſe, and only a malicious calumny of the *Portugueſe*; and there he ſaith, *It was a particular Cuſtom of the* Caribbes, *and not us'd by other* Indians. And *Dampier* ſaith, *That in all his Adventures among the* Indians, *both Eaſt and Weſt, he never met with any ſuch People as eat Man's Fleſh, and that he knew ſome of the Cannibal ſtories to be falſe.* But on the other ſide, it cannot be deny'd that there had been ſuch a barbarous Practice, not only among the *Caribbians*, but the Savages of *Braſil* and elſewhere; as appears by the particular Accounts of ſuch as liv'd among them, and ſaw their manner of doing it; as in *Joh. Lerius*, *Pet. Carder*, *Ant. Knivet*; but eſpecially in *Claud. d'Abbeville* his Relation of *Maragnan*, who is moſt particular in it; and he ſaith, that it aroſe from the Hatred and Revenge they expreſs thereby to their greateſt Enemies; and he adds, that their Stomachs cannot bear or digeſt it; but notwithſtanding it had been continu'd among them, becauſe their Enemies did ſo by them; but they confeſs'd it to be cruel and barbarous, but having been long us'd, they could not lay it aſide, without a general conſent. Some ſay, that the *Tapuiæ* eat the Bodies of their Friends; but thoſe who have liv'd among them, ſay nothing about it: which they would not have omitted; and they are moſt to be rely'd upon. The *Caribbe Iſlands* were diſcover'd by *Columbus* in his ſecond Voyage: but the *Caribbians* would have no communication with them, *flying into their Woods.* *De Laet* ſaith only, *that they are a very brutiſh ſort of People, of no ſhame or fidelity.* Not a word of their *Religion*; and it was not to be expected among them, who had very little regard to any thing but the ſatisfying their brutiſh Paſſions of *Cruelty* and *Revenge*, which are the only things they were then remarkable for. Since that time, they have liv'd more quietly, being ſo much over-power'd by the Plantations upon the

Relation de la Riviere des Amazons, c. 52.

Dampier's *Voyage*, p. 485.

Ler. *Hiſt. Navig. in* Braſil, c. 15. Pilgrims, *part.* 4. p. 1188. 1217. *Hiſt. de la Miſſion en l'Iſle de* Maragnan, *ch.* 49. Barlæ. *Hiſt.* Braſil. Piſo *Hiſt.* Braſil.

L. 1. c. 17.

Caribbe

Caribbe Iſlands; by which means they have been brought to ſome kind of Humanity and Converſation. And there have been two underſtanding Perſons converſant among them, who have given the beſt Account we have of them; and thoſe are *Monſ. Rochefort* and *F. Du Tertre*; who both agree, that they have ſome knowledge of One Supreme GOD in Heaven, who is of infinite Goodneſs, and hurts no body; but as *Du Tertre*, who liv'd longer among them, ſaith, they account the ſervice of him a needleſs thing, being ſo far above them; but they are mightily afraid of the *Mabogas* or evil Spirits, which they think deſign to do them miſchief: and to appeaſe them they have their *Boyez*, who are a kind of Sorcerers among them. They both agree, that they believe the immortality of the Soul; and that the principal Soul, which is that in the Heart, goes to Heaven. And *Rochefort* from hence concludes the truth of *Cicero*'s ſaying, *That the knowledge of Divinity is planted in the Hearts of Men.*

Rochefort *Hiſtoire de* Caribb. *l.* 4. *c.* 13.

Du Tertre *Hiſt. Nat. de* Antilles *par.* 7. §. 3.

But *De Laet* repreſents the Northern *Indians* to have been as much without Religion, as the Natives of *Cuba* and *Hiſpaniola*; and from no good grounds, altho' herein he did not rely upon the *Spaniſh* Reports. So he ſaith of the Natives of *New-found Land*, of *New-France*, of the *Souriquoſii*, and other People of *Canada*, and the parts thereabouts, and of *Virginia*, &c. But I ſhall make it appear, that he took up with very ſlight Informations in this matter; which are contradicted by thoſe who liv'd longer among them, and underſtood their Senſe and Language better. 'Tis true, which I ſuppoſe gave occaſion to the miſtake, that the Savages had no ſet and conſtant ways of Devotion; but at certain Seaſons of the year, or in time of War and Calamities they had; or however, to Perſons that diſcourſed with them, they did by no means deny a GOD, but thought it was no great matter whether they ſerv'd him or not in ſuch a manner; ſo that their chief fault lay in a groſs neglect of Religion, and not in any ſetled Principles of Irreligion. So the *Sieur de Champlain* ſaith, He diſcours'd with the Savages of *Canada*, and found they wanted no Capacity; and he aſked one of them, why they did not pray to GOD; he anſwer'd, that every one was left to pray as he thought fit in his own Mind. So, ſaith he, for want of a Law for Divine Worſhip, they liv'd like Brutes: and he imputes a great deal to their Savage way of living upon Hunting; whereas if the Land were cultivated, it might be much eaſier to reduce them to Civility and Religion. Mr. *Winſlow* one of the firſt Planters in *New-England*, had ſome diſcourſe with the *Indian Savages* about Religion, and GOD's being the Author of all our Bleſſings, which they agreed to, and ſaid, *That they own'd* GOD, *and call'd him* Kirtitan: upon which I obſerve, that he ingenuouſly retracts the Accounts he had given before of the Natives; *viz. That they had no Religion or Knowledge of* GOD; for, ſaith he, *we find that they do own one ſupreme Being, who was creator of Heaven and Earth; but they likewiſe own'd many Divine Powers under him.* Therefore *Acoſta*, ſpeaking of the *Indian Savages*, ſaith, *It is no hard matter to perſuade them of a ſupreme* GOD, *be they never ſo barbarous and brutiſh.*

Lact. *Deſc. l.* 2. *c.* 2. 12. 16.

L. 3. *c.* 18.

Les Voyages du Sieur de Champlain, *l.* 3. *ch.* 5.

Purchas *To.* 4. *l.* 10. *ch.* 5.

Acoſta *Hiſt. of the* Indies, *l.* 5. *c.* 2.

But I muſt do that right to *Joh. de Laet*, as to ſhew that after he had receiv'd better Information, he did ſpeak more favourably of the *Religion* of the *Indians:* For in his Book againſt *Grotius*, ten years after the other, he hath an *Obſervation* on purpoſe to clear this matter. Father *Sagard* had publiſh'd an Account of his Voyage to the *Hurons*, a People of *New-France*, or *Canada*, near the Lake call'd *Mare dulce*, where he

Jo. de Laet *de Origin. Gent. American. p.* 187.

Le Grand *Voyage du Pays de* Hurons, *c.* 18.

learnt their Language, and so was better able to judg of their Opinions; and he saith, Their general Sense was, that there was one Creator, who made the World; and that in their Language he was call'd *Ataouacan.* Which is since confirm'd by the Account of the *French Missions* into those parts; especially of *Paulus Juvenæus*, who spent a Winter among them, to converse with them in their own Language. And when he preach'd to them about God, they all asked him, what he meant by it; he told them he meant such a Being who had infinite Power, and made Heaven and Earth: upon which they looked upon one another, and cried out *Ataouacan.* *Sagard* saith, *They believe the Immortality of the Soul*; and the latter Accounts say, *That he was told that the* Souriquosii *did truly believe one* God *that created all things.* Which is very different from *de Laet*'s former Account of them. But *de Laet* goes on, that he understood by *Davis* and *Baffin*, that *the Natives of those parts where they had been, i. e.* (about *Fretum Davis* and *Groen-land*) were *Idolaters, and worship'd the Sun.* *Davis* in the Account of his Voyage saith, *That they were a very tractable People, void of craft or double dealings, and easy to be brought to any Civility or good Order; but they judg'd them to be Idolaters and to worship the Sun.* This is quite another thing from being mere *Savages, and having no Religion among them.* Farther he owns *Hariot*'s Account of the People of *Virginia, that they believ'd many Gods of different degrees, but one supreme* God *who was from eternity.* But he had publish'd to the World in his *Description, that their only Religion was to worship every thing they were afraid of, as Fire, Water, Thunder, Guns, Horses,* &c. *and the Devil, whom they called* Okie. *Hariot*, who conversed among them, saith no such thing; but he saith expresly, *That they own'd that* God *made the World, and that Souls are immortal; and that they shall receive in another World according to their actions in this.* What a different Account is this concerning the same People? And if *Lederer* may be believ'd, who went among the *Indian Natives*, not far from *Virginia*, he saith, Okæe *was the name of the Creatour of all things among them; to him the high Priest alone offers sacrifice; but their ordinary Devotion is perform'd to lesser Deities, to whom they suppose sublunary affairs are committed.* *Denton*, who liv'd among the *Indian Savages* about *New-York*, saith, *That their solemn worship was not above once or twice a year; unless upon extraordinary occasions, as making War,* &c.

Hist. Canada, *l.* 1. *p.* 78.

P. 87.

Hackluit. To. 3. p. 100.

Hariot *of* Virginia, 25, 26.

Lederer's Discovery, p. 4.

Denton *of* New York p. 8.

I shall not need to pursue this matter any farther; since he owns the Religion that was practis'd not only in *Peru* and *Mexico*, but in other parts of the *West-Indies.* Only as to *Chili* he saith, *that we have no certainty, but only that they have solemn Oaths by one they call* Enonamon. But *Marcgravius* in the account he gives of *Chili*, saith at first, *That they know not* God, *nor his worship*, &c. but this must be understood of a clear and distinct knowledge of him; for he saith afterwards, *That they have some knowledge of a supreme Being, by whom all earthly things and human affairs are governed*; *whom they call* Pillan.

G. Marcgravius *de Regione* Chili. *c.* 3.

The only difficulty then remaining as to the *West-Indies*, is as to the People of *Paraquaria* and *Brasil.* For it is affirm'd, *That there are whole Nations there who know nothing of* God, *or Religion.* Which must be more strictly inquir'd into.

As to *Paraquaria*, it is said, that *Nicholas del Techo in his Letters from thence, saith that the Caiguæ*, (a People of that Country) *had no name for* God, *or the Soul of Man*; *and no publick worship, nor Idols.* But

Hiſt. Prov. Paraquar. *Auth.* Nicolao del Techo, *Leodii* 1673. the ſame *Nicholas del Techo* hath publiſh'd a full Relation of all the Proceedings in *Paraquaria* and thereabouts, on the account of Religion, and therein he hath acquainted the World with the ſeveral Nations that inhabit thoſe parts between *Braſil* and *Peru*, &c. which were ſcarce heard of before. The *Diaigritæ*, (who rather belong to *Tucumania*, between *Paraquaria* and *Chili*) he ſaith, *were worſhipers of the Sun, after a particular manner; and they believ'd the immortality of Souls, and that the Souls of their great Men went into the greater Stars, and of ordinary People into the leſſer.* The *Guaicuræi worſhipped the Moon and* Bootes. The *Guarani* were *a very ſuperſtitious People, but they could not tell what* God *they worſhiped; but they were mightily addicted to Sorcery.* The *Calchaquini worſhiped the Sun, and Thunder, and Lightning.* In the Plains between *Rio del Plata* and *Tucumania*, he ſaith, *are a very large People, who have little regard to Religion; but they believe that after death, their Souls return to their Creator.* In *Chili*, he ſaith, *when one* God *the Creator was preach'd to them, one of their* Caſiques *(or great Men) ſtood up and ſaid, that they would not bear that the power of creating ſhould belong to any but their God* Pillan; *and that he plac'd the Souls of their great Men after death about the Sun.* After all theſe he mentions the *Caaiguæ, as the ſmalleſt and moſt inconſiderable and brutiſh People among them:* They were a moſt ſavage ſort of Creatures, that could hardly ſpeak ſo as to be underſtood; he ſaith, *They were much more like to Apes than Men, and liv'd upon Mice, and Ants, and Vipers,* &c. *utrique ſexui,* ſaith he, *tenuiſſimus rationis uſus eſt:* they are harder to be tamed than wild Beaſts; and if they are put in chains, they ſtarve themſelves. And this is all the account he there gives of them, and ſaith not a word of their Religion; and it were very unreaſonable to expect any from them. It is not improbable that others could not find a word for God or the Soul among them; for they were not able to ſpeak ſenſe, at leaſt ſo as to be underſtood by Strangers.

L. 2. c. 18. L. 4. c. 16. L. 5. c. 7. Chap. 23. L. 3. c. 12. L. 2. c. 26. L. 9. c. 24.

Come we now to the People of *Braſil, who are ſaid to be without any notion of* God. But thoſe who have been beſt acquainted among them aſſure us, that they believe the immortality of Souls, and rewards and puniſhments after death. And from hence *Lerius* himſelf argues againſt the Atheiſtical Perſons of his time; and that altho' they will not in words own God, yet he ſaith, they ſhew the inward conviction they have of him; eſpecially when it thunders; which *de Laet* confeſſes they call *Tupâ cunanga*, a noiſe made by the Supreme Excellence: for *Tupâ* he ſaith ſignifies ſo much in their Language. And he adds, *That they are very apprehenſive of evil Spirits; that they do own a God of the Mountains, and of the Highways; and altho' they differ in their idolatry and ſuperſtition, yet* he confeſſes *it generally prevails among them, and the other innumerable People who live on both ſides the vaſt River* de la Plata. *Marcgravius*, a Learned Man, who liv'd in *Braſil*, and underſtood their Language ſo far as to write a Grammar of it, ſaith expreſly, *That they call* God *Tupa* and *Tupana*; and in the ſhort Dictionary of *Emmanuel Moraes*, *Tupana* is rendred *Deus*. But the great Argument to *Lerius* was, *that they had no public exerciſe of Religion*; which was the common caſe of the *Savages* in all parts, who liv'd under no Laws; not that they believ'd no God, but they would not be at the trouble to ſerve him. *Ludolphus* ſaith of the *Gallani*, a ſavage People who had almoſt overrun *Abyſſinia*, that they had no publick worſhip, but if any aſked them about a Supreme God, they would anſwer, *Heaven.* So *Dellon* ſaith of

Hiſt. Navi. in Braſil, c. 16. p. 223, 224.

Laet. *de Orig. Gen.* Americ. p. 193.

Marcgrav. *de* Braſil. *Reg. c.* 9.

Ludolph. *Hiſt. Æthiopiæ, l.* 1.

the Inhabitants of *Madagaſcar*, *that they did not queſtion a Supreme Being that governs all*; *but with a ſtrange obſtinacy denied that there was any neceſſity of praying to him.* *Francis Cauche*, who ſojourned a long time among them, ſaith, *he could obſerve no publick exerciſe of Religion among them*; *but they did not deny a* God *to be the Creator of all, and aſſerted the Immortality of the Soul*; *but Good and Bad went to Heaven.* *Flacurt* liv'd five Years among them, and he agrees in the ſame, as to *no publick exerciſe of Religion*; but he ſaith, *They believe One* God, *of whom they ſpeak with honor and reſpect.* *P. Gillet* in the Account of his Voyage to *Goyane* 1674, ſaith, That the *Nouragues*, and *Acoquas*, and *Galibis*, *all agree in owning One* God *in Heaven, but they give no Worſhip to him.*

Joh. dos Santos ſaith of ſome of the *Caffres* (with whom he convers'd) *That they are the moſt brutiſh and barbarous People in the World*; *but they hold the Immortality of the Soul, and have a confus'd knowledg that there is a Great* God *from a Natural Inſtinct*; *but they pray not to him.* But for thoſe *Caffres* at the *Cape of good Hope*, they may vye with any for *Brutiſhneſs*; but by the laſt Accounts given of them, by thoſe who liv'd among them, and publiſh'd by *F. Tachard*, we find *that they do worſhip one* God, *altho' they have a confus'd knowledg of him*; *but they ſeem to have little regard to another Life, but ſacrifice for Rain and good Seaſons.* By which it appears that the Account given of them in *Thevenot*'s Collections is not true, viz. *That they have no knowledg of* God, altho' it were not much to be wonder'd at, ſince the ſame Author ſaith, *they are the moſt barbarous People in the World.* But that was a haſty Obſervation by Strangers, who could not underſtand one word they ſpake: For Sir *James Lancaſter* ſaid, *That in ſeven weeks time, the ſharpeſt Wit among them could not learn one word of their Language*; *their Speech being uttered only in the Throat*, like the *Caaiguæ* in *Paraquaria.*

And ſo **Pliny* mentions a People of *Africa*, who *made a noiſe without any articulate Pronunciation*; who were ſurely the Anceſtors of thoſe *Hotentots*, concerning whom it is hard to affirm any thing, unleſs they have learnt lately to expreſs themſelves better: As it ſeems they have done by Monſ. *de la Loubere*'s Account of them; for he ſaith, *That they have ſome kind of Worſhip at new and full Moons*; *and he thinks they own a good* God, *to whom they need not to pray*; *but that there is a bad one, to whom they pray not to hurt them.* And in the Journal of Monſ. *de Chaumont*, we read, *That they have no great regard to Religion*; *but when they want Rain, they pray to a certain Being whom they know not, but that lives above*; *and offer Milk, the beſt thing they have*; *and that the* Dutch *Secretary had ſeen them at this Sacrifice with Eyes lifted up to Heaven, and in a profound ſilence.*

* Stridorque non vox; adeo ſermonis commercio carent. *Plin. N. H. l. 5. c. 8.*

Thus I have gone thro' all the Nations I have met with, who have been ſaid to be *without any Notion of* God *or Religion*; there remains only one Objection to be taken off, which relates to a Sect in the *Eaſt-Indies*, which is ſaid to be *Atheiſtical* in their *Principles*, having an *External Doctrine* for the People, and an *Internal*, which they keep from them.

To give the beſt Account I can of this matter; all the late Writers of *China* do agree, that beſides the original Doctrine of the Country, there was brought in long ſince, (they generally ſay 65 *Years after* Chriſt) a new *Sect* from *Indoſthan*, which they call *Xekiao.* The Author is ſuppos'd to be one *Xekia*, or *Xaca* (as the *Japoneſe* call him) who liv'd long before. *Matt. Riccius*, (or *Trigautius*) ſaith, *This Sect was at firſt receiv'd with great applauſe, becauſe it ſet forth the Immortality of the*

Dellon *Relation d'un Voyage*, To. 1. c. 8.
Relation du Voyage de F. Cauche, p. 119.
Hiſtoire de l'Iſle de Madagaſcar, ch. 17.
Journal du Voyage dans la Goyane, p. 81.
*Hiſtoire de l'*Ethiopie *Orientale*, ch. 7.
Purchas To. II. p. 1639.
Voyage de Siam, l. 2. p. 84.
Thevenot, *Roe*, p. 2.
Purchas, To. I. l. 3. ch. 3. §. 1.
Du Royaume de Siam, To. 2. p. 112.
Journal du Voyage de Siam, p. 78.
Trigaut. l. 1. c. 10.

Soul, and the Rewards and Puniſhments of another Life; but not eternal, becauſe it introduc'd the Doctrine of *Tranſmigration of Souls.* In order to the Happineſs after Death, it requir'd *Particular Devotions to Idols,* which by that means ſpread over all *China* and *Japan,* as well as other parts of the *Indies,* and *Abſtinence from Fleſh,* as well as *from Murder, Stealing,* &c. and Auſterities, Celibate, Retirement from the World, and great Liberalities to the *Tapoins* and *Bonzes.* Wherein *Bertoli, Marini,* and the reſt agree. But there was a Secret under all this, viz. *That this was but an external Doctrine for the People, but the internal Doctrine was another thing, that the ſupreme Felicity lay in Eternal Nothing*; or as they rather called it, *an Eternal Quiet, and that Souls are to paſs from Body to Body,* ſaith *Martinius, till they are fit for it. F. Couplet,* who hath given the fulleſt Account of this matter, ſaith, *That when* Xaca *came to die, he ſent for ſome of his choiceſt Diſciples, and told them, that the Doctrine he had hitherto declared to them was only a ſhew, and not the truth; and that all things came out of nothing, and would end in nothing,* as the late Author *Le Compte* expreſſes it; *and that is the Abyſs where all our hopes muſt end.* But *Couplet* ſaith, *That his Diſciples take great care, that this come not among the People; and only thoſe,* he ſaith, *even among the* Bonzes *and others are admitted to it, who are thought capable of ſuch a Secret. The Eternal Doctrine they look on,* as he ſaith, *as the wooden Account which is raiſed to ſupport the other; but they are by all means for keeping that up among the People.* But it is not clear what they underſtand by *Returning to Nothing*; for Monſ. *De la Loubere* ſaith, *They do not underſtand proper Annihilation by it, but in a myſtical ſenſe*; and two things are imply'd by it, 1. *That ſuch Souls as arrive to it, are paſt all Fears of returning to the Body.* 2. *That they live in perfect eaſe and quiet, without any kind of action.* And ſo *Couplet* explains it, *by Acting, Underſtanding, and deſiring nothing*; ſo that this is the higheſt degree of *Quietiſm:* And ſo Monſ. *Gervaiſe,* who was among thoſe of *Siam,* and endeavour'd to underſtand their Doctrine, ſaith, *That Annihilation is to be myſtically underſtood, and not in a phyſical ſenſe.* As appears by what *Couplet* ſaith, *That one of* Xaca's *poſterity ſpent nine years with his Face to the Wall, thinking of nothing, and ſo became perfect.* But from hence he ſadly laments the ſpreading of *Atheiſm* among the *Chineſe,* who were willing to underſtand it in the groſſeſt ſenſe.

Martin. *Atlas,* p. 7.

Couplet. *Proœm. Declar. ad* Confuc. *paragr.* 4.

Le Compte *Memoires Part. II. Let.* 2.

Loubere *du Royaume de* Siam, *To. I. c.* 22.

Hiſt. Nat. & Polit. du Siam, *Part.* 3. *c. p.* 162.

And ſuppoſe it be ſo taken, what imaginable ground can it be for Men of ſenſe, (as the *Chineſe* would be thought above others) to take this for granted, becauſe ſuch an Impoſtor ſaid it; concerning whom ſo many incredible things are ſaid by them, that ſome have queſtion'd whether there ever was ſuch a Perſon or not: and *Loubere* ſeems to think this Story *a Fiction of the* Chineſe; for he can find nothing of him among the *Talapoins* of *Siam,* with whoſe Traditions he was very converſant. But what reaſon or demonſtration did he offer? What ground could they have to believe one who had been an Impoſtor all his days ſhould ſpeak truth at laſt?

But all this ſignifies nothing to the conſent of Mankind: *For this was to be kept up as a Secret,* and only to be communicated to ſuch as were thought capable of it. If they thought this to be the truth, why was it not to be diſcover'd? Was it becauſe the People were ſtill to be kept up in the common perſuaſion about Religion? And was this for the ſake of the *Bonzes,* of whom the wiſe People of *China* had a very mean opinion, as they all agree? Therefore it could not be for their

ſakes. *But the People might grow more unruly, if this were known.* If the *Bonzes* were ſo bad as they make them, they might rather think the People would be better without them; and the beſt ſervice they could do, was to lay open the fraud and impoſture of theſe Men, as thoſe who preach'd *Chriſtianity* in *China* and *Japan* after they underſtood their Languages, did very freely. And yet they did aſſert GOD *and Providence*, and the *Rewards and Puniſhments of another Life*, againſt all the Doctrines of *Xaca*, both as to the *External* and *Internal part*. *Matth. Riccius* having attain'd to good ſkill in the Language of *China*, publiſh'd an account of the *Chriſtian Doctrine* at *Pekim*, *A.D.* 1603. wherein he aſſerted the Being of GOD, not only from Natural Reaſon, but from their own *moſt antient Books*, of which *Couplet* gives a large account, and how the Interpreters of latter times had perverted the Senſe of them. We have in *Kircher* a *Summary of the* Chriſtian *Faith*, as it was publiſh'd in *China*; and therein we find on what grounds they aſſerted the Being of GOD, againſt the *Atheiſtical ſenſe* of *Xaca*'s Doctrine, *That all things came out of nothing*: For, *if nothing were firſt, how came things into Being? therefore to bring them into Being, there muſt be a Creator before them; and this Creator is he whom we call* GOD. This was plain and true Reaſoning, and impoſſible to be anſwer'd by the ſubtileſt of thoſe *Atheiſtical* Wits of *China*. For nothing can produce *Nothing*. So that if *Xaca*'s interior Doctrine were true, *That all things came out of Nothing*, it muſt neceſſary follow, that there muſt be *Nothing* before *any thing*; and what poſſible imagination can any Man of ſenſe have, how any thing ſhould by it ſelf come out of Nothing? There is no repugnancy at all in conceiving that an Infinite Power ſhould give a Being to that which had it not before; for altho' the difference between *not being and being* be ſo great, yet where we ſuppoſe a Power Infinite in the Cauſe, that may command the terms of that diſtance, by giving a Being to that which had it not before. To ſay that *Nothing can be produced out of nothing*, implies that nothing can of it ſelf reſult out of nothing, where there is no ſuperior Cauſe; but to ſay that by no Cauſe whatſoever any thing can be put into Being which had it not before, is to take away all poſſibility of an Infinite Power, without any reaſon, when the very Being of things is an impregnable reaſon for it. For ſince we are certain things are, we muſt be certain that they came into Being; and that muſt be either out of nothing by themſelves, which is impoſſible; or it muſt be from ſuch a Power which can give Being where it was not, which muſt be infinite.

Couplet. *Declar. Proœm.* *Kircher.* China *illuſtrata, Par.* 2. c. 10.

Thus far I have conſidered the General Prejudices againſt Religion, and the *Atheiſtical* Pretences of this Age, and have ſhew'd how very little they ſignify to any Perſons that will take the pains to examin them.

DISCOURSE

Discourse II.

The Modern Atheiſtical Hypotheſes *examin'd, and the Unreaſonableneſs of them ſhew'd.*

I Now come to conſider the *Atheiſtical Hypotheſes* of this Age, which I ſhall rank under theſe two Heads:

1. Such as have a *Tendency* towards *Atheiſm.*
2. Such as are *plainly Atheiſtical.*

As to the former, I ſhall inſiſt upon theſe two:

(1.) Such as weaken the known and generally receiv'd Proofs of God and Providence.

(2.) Such as attribute too much to the *Mechanical Powers* of *Matter* and *Motion.*

I begin with thoſe who have gone about to weaken the known and generally received Arguments for God and Providence; which I have at large ſhew'd, were thoſe taken from the manifeſt effects of Wiſdom and Deſign in the parts of Animals, and in the frame of the World. I am far from intending to lay the *charge* of *Atheiſm* on any who have weakned ſome Arguments to prove a God, when they have induſtriouſly ſet themſelves to do it from any other, altho' not ſo firm, nor ſo generally receiv'd. For I conſider the fondneſs Men have for their own Inventions, and how apt therefore they are to ſlight other Arguments in compariſon with them. And this I take to have been the caſe of a Modern Philoſopher of great and deſerved Reputation: For he deſigning to do ſomething beyond other Men, thought he did nothing unleſs he produced Arguments which he thought had not been purſued by others. To this end he ſet aſide the Argument from *Final Cauſes*, for two Reaſons. 1. *Becauſe in Phyſical Inquiries we ought to make uſe of none but the ſtrongeſt Reaſons.* 2. *Becauſe all* God's *ends are unſearchable by us, being kept cloſe in the Abyſs of his infinite Wiſdom.* But when he was ſmartly urged by his learned Adverſary, That altho' upon another occaſion he might ſet aſide Final Cauſes, yet he ought not when the Honor of God, as the Maker of the Soul, is concerned; for by theſe means the Argument from the light of Nature, as to the Wiſdom, Providence, Power, and Exiſtence of God would be caſt off; which he looks on as the chief Argument (which is taken from the parts of the viſible World, the Heavens, Earth, Plants, Animals, and eſpecially Mankind;) He had no other anſwer to make, but *that what was brought for a Final Cauſe, ought to be referred to the Efficient*; i. e. *that from thoſe things we ought to know and honor* God, *as the Maker, but not to gueſs for what end he made them.* Which is a ſtrange anſwer to be made by one of ſo much ſagacity. For, as *Gaſſendus* well urges, how can we honor God for the excellent uſe of theſe things, and not know for what end they were made? Wherein lies the difference between *the Uſe* and *the End* in this caſe? For he that adores God for the Uſe, muſt do it for the End he deſigned thoſe things for.

Des Cartes *Medit.* 4. *Princip. Phil. Part.* 1. *p.* 22.

Reſp. ad 5. *Object.*

But, ſaith *Des Cartes*, *In Moral Conſiderations, wherein it is a pious thing to make uſe of Conjectures, we may conſider* GOD's *End; but not in Phyſical Speculations, wherein we muſt only make uſe of the ſtrongeſt Reaſons.*

To which *Gaſſendus* very well anſwers, That if he takes away the Final Cauſe, he weakens the Argument for the Efficient: for that leads us to him. And it is not the bare ſight of the viſible World which makes us own GOD to be the Maker of it; becauſe it is poſſible for Men to think that theſe things were ſo from Eternity, or came by Chance: but when we obſerve the Wiſdom of GOD in the deſign and contrivance, then we come upon good grounds to own the Efficient Cauſe, and to adore him for the Workmanſhip of his hands. As, ſaith he, if a Man ſees a Paſſage for Water, between Stones on each ſide with an Arch over, that doth not preſently convince him that it is a *Bridge*; becauſe pieces of Rocks might happen ſo, as to afford ſuch a Paſſage: but when he comes to conſider the Order in which they are framed and hold together, and the conveniency of Mankind for paſſing over, he cannot then but acknowledg there was a ſkilful Artificer who managed it, and that it could not be done by Chance.

To the other Argument, *That* GOD's *ends are unſearchable*, he anſwers, That it is not to be denied that GOD may have ends above our reach; but on the other ſide, there are ends which lie open to our view; as ſaith he, particularly in the Body of Man, as the frame of the Mouth for reſpiration and nouriſhment, and all other Paſſages ſo exactly fitted for thoſe ends; and ſo the Bones, Muſcles, Nerves, and other parts of the Body: but there are three eſpecially which ſtrike him with admiration. 1. The Umbilical Veſſels, the fitneſs of them for diſtribution of Nouriſhment to the *Embryo*, and the alteration after the Child is born. 2. The Valves of the Heart, and the ſeveral Veſſels for receiving and diſtributing the Blood. 3. The Perforation of the Tendons which ſerve to draw the Fingers into the Hollow of the Hand. Theſe were cloſe and preſſing Inſtances, of which *Gaſſendus* profeſſeth, *that neither himſelf nor any of his acquaintance, who had made it their buſineſs to ſearch into the Cauſes of things, were able to give any other Account of them, but from the Wiſdom and Power of* GOD. And he challenges *Des Cartes* to ſhew him, *what Mechanical Cauſe could produce ſuch Valves about the Heart; out of what matter, and in what manner they were made; how they came to have ſuch a Temper, Conſiſtence, Flexibility, Bigneſs, Figure, Situation*, &c. But I do not find that he ever undertook to give any anſwer to it; but by a Letter to *Merſennus*, it ſeems he was of opinion, *that he could give an account of the formation of the ſeveral parts of Animals in a Mechanical way, ſuppoſing* GOD *to have eſtabliſhed thoſe Laws of Mechaniſm, which he ſuppoſes in the ſame manner as he had explained the grains of Salt, and figures of Snow in his Meteors.* But however he might pleaſe himſelf in his Opinion, he hath given the World no manner of ſatisfaction about it; inſomuch that his poſthumous piece to that purpoſe is charged with great and fundamental Miſtakes. However his Diſciples run on upon the ſame ground, that *Final Cauſes are to be conſidered only in Morals*; and they muſt overthrow the Argument to prove a Deity, from the Wiſdom and Contrivance in the works of Creation, which, according to them are only occaſion of our Meditation and Praiſe. But how can Men of ſenſe ſatisfy themſelves with this Anſwer? For can we give thanks to GOD for the uſe of our Senſes, without knowing that GOD gave

Epiſt. Part. 2. ep. 98.

Regis Metaphyſ. l. 2. Part. 1. Nittich. in Meditat. Metaph. 4. p. 97.

gave us Eyes to ſee with, with ſuch admirable contrivance for that purpoſe? and ſo for all the variety of Organs for our Hearing, unleſs we are ſatisfied that GOD did really give them for thoſe ends? Otherwiſe all that we have to do, is to thank GOD for putting Matter into Motion, and for eſtabliſhing thoſe Laws of Mechaniſm from whence theſe Organs reſulted. With what Devotion can we praiſe GOD for the Benefits we have from the Influences of Heaven and the Fruits of the Earth, if theſe things were not intended for our good; but it fell out by the Laws of Mechaniſm, that we have theſe advantages by them? So that all Natural Religion, according to this *Hypotheſis*, comes to no more than an acknowledgment of GOD to be the Efficient Cauſe of the World, altho' we have no reaſon from his Works to conclude him to be ſo. *Yes*, ſay they, *from them as the effects of a Firſt Cauſe, which put Matter into motion, we may*; *but not from the ends which* GOD *intended by them, which are above our capacity.* But this falls ſhort of *Ariſtotle*'s *Divinity*; for he aſſerted, that not only the firſt Motion was from GOD, but the Order of the Univerſe; and that GOD did deſign the mutual Benefits which one part of it hath from others: but according to theſe Laws of Mechaniſm, GOD only put the Matter into motion with ſuch Laws, and then every thing came into the order it is in, without any deſign of Providence. Which takes away all *Life* and *Spirit and Religion*, which depends upon GOD's managing the affairs of the World; and without that Men may own a *Firſt Mover*, and yet live as *without God in the World.* What reaſon can we imagin, why we ought to give GOD thanks for *fruitful Seaſons*, or to pray to him in time of Drought and Scarcity, if he hath left all theſe things to the natural courſe, which he hath eſtabliſhed in the World? But it is not denied by *Des Cartes*, *That* GOD *may reveal to us his own Ends, and then we are to believe them, and to ſerve him accordingly*; *but that without ſuch Revelation, we cannot find them out.* Now this I ſay is contrary to the general ſenſe of Mankind, where there hath been the moſt confuſed Notion of a GOD. For I have already obſerved, that even the *Caffres* of *Soldania* (or at the *Cape of Good Hope*) do pray ſolemnly to GOD in their diſtreſſes for want of Rain; and the *Savages* of the Northern parts of *America* do the ſame at ſome Seaſons of the Year above others; ſo that if the conſent of Mankind ſignify any thing as to the Being of GOD, it will do as much as to his Providential care of the World. And if ſuch a confuſed Idea did carry along with it the Notion of his Providence, much more the clear and diſtinct *Idea* of him. For *Des Cartes* proves the Being of GOD from the *Idea* of him in our Minds. Now what is there in that *Idea*, which doth not equally imply *Providence*, as well as his *Exiſtence?* For, why ſhould not a *Being abſolutely perfect* as well regard the *Well-being* as the *Being* of his Creatures? *By the name of* GOD in this *Idea*, he ſaith he underſtands *a certain Subſtance, infinite, independent, moſt intelligent and moſt powerful*; *by which himſelf and all other things were created.* But this is not all; for he acknowledges ſoon after, and in other places, *that becauſe there is no neceſſary connexion between the ſeveral moments of Exiſtence in a contingent Being, we moſt evidently know our dependence on this ſuperior Being for our conſervation*; which he therefore owns to be *a continued Creation.* From hence I infer, that *Des Cartes* his own Idea of GOD doth imply a particular Providence. For, if we depend upon him for every moment of our Subſiſtence, and Conſervation differ only by an act of our Mind from Creation, as he affirms; then there is as immediate

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Ren. Des Cartes, *Ep. Part.* 2. *Ep.* 103.

Ep. 104. *Epist. P. II. Ep.* 37.

Post Resp. ad duas Object. p. 85.

The force of his Argument, as himself hath put it in the Mathematical way, Prop. 2. lies here.

The objective reality in our Ideas must have some Cause in which it is either formally, or eminently: but we have such an Idea within us, which is not within us either of those ways; and therefore there must be some other Cause of it, which can be none but GOD; *and therefore he is.* Now here the difficulty returns, *viz.* to shew what necessary Connexion there is between the *Objective Reality* in the *Idea*, and the real Existence of the thing out of the *Idea.* For that he saith, by *Axiom* 5. *That this is the true Principle of Knowledg; for*, saith he, *we do not know that there is such a thing as the visible Heaven, barely because we see it; for that goes no farther than our sense: but our knowledge is an act of the Mind from the Idea, which arises from hence that the Objective Reality of the Idea in our Minds doth come from the thing it self as the true Cause; and the more of Objective Reality there is, by* Axiom 6. *in Substance than Accident, and*

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in an Infinite Subſtance than a Finite, ſo much more doth it prove the Exiſtence of the thing repreſented by the Idea.

But the caſe ſtill ſeems different between an Idea raiſed in our Minds from an object of Senſe; and that which the Mind raiſes within it ſelf about an infinite Subſtance. For, altho' it be impoſſible for the Mind to make an Objective Reality, which is infinite, by its own power; yet it doth not appear, but that it may frame an Idea within it ſelf to which it ſets no bounds, and ſo is infinite to it. And here lies the main ground of the Miſtake: If our Idea were infinitely perfect as GOD himſelf is, no doubt it were wholly out of our power to make it; but then it would follow, that Idea with its Objective Reality muſt be GOD: if it be not GOD, it muſt be finite; and if it be finite, it is within the power of our Minds to frame it. For, altho' our conceptions of GOD be not *merely Negative*, yet whatſoever conceptions we have, they are not adequate; and if not, they are imperfect; and ſo come within the reach of our capacities.

Cenſur. Philoſoph. Carteſ. c. 4. §. 3. *Réponſe à la Cenſure de Monſ.* Huet, *p.* 192. *P.* 198.

When the Learned Monſ. *Huet* urged this Argument againſt *Des Cartes*, *That the Idea in us muſt be finite, becauſe it wants ſomething to make it perfect, being not adequate:* Monſ. *Regis*, who undertook to defend *Des Cartes*, anſwers, *That if the Idea be taken formally as it is in us, ſo it is finite; but if we take it with its objective Reality, ſo it is infinite, and above our power: And as to its not being adequate, he ſaith, it doth not follow that it is finite objectively, but only formally*; becauſe *it repreſents an infinite object, and it is ſufficient to make it infinite becauſe it repreſents as much as we can apprehend.* I grant, that if it reaches as far as our capacity will go, it may be ſaid to be infinite in regard of its object, altho' it be finite as to our manner of apprehending it; but ſtill the main difficulty returns, *viz.* how a finite Idea in us can prove the Exiſtence of an infinite Object. For the Queſtion is not barely about our manner of conception of an infinite Being, which muſt be according to our capacities; but whether ſuch a finite Idea, as we are capable of, can prove an infinite Being: for our Idea can repreſent to us an object to which we can ſet no bounds; but how doth it hence appear that it muſt be an infinite object really exiſting, and that ſuch an Idea muſt proceed from an infinite Cauſe? Altho' theſe things be not ſo clear as were to be wiſh'd, yet we muſt not diſſemble the force of this Argument ſo far as it goes, *viz.* That we cannot form an Idea of Nothing; and that we have no Ideas in our Minds, but what have a proper Cauſe for them; either from without us by *Senſe*, or from within by the acts of our own Minds. As if a Man hath an *Idea* of a rare piece of workmanſhip, either he hath ſeen it, or elſe hath been told it, or was able to invent it. But here can be no evidence from Senſe, and no Man can find within himſelf a power to frame ſuch an object as GOD; therefore either he muſt have it from others, or elſe GOD himſelf hath imprinted it in our Minds. Now if the *Idea* of GOD had been alike in all, *viz.* of a Being infinitely wiſe, powerful and good, there might have been great reaſon to have believ'd it to have been planted in our Minds; but the general Idea of GOD among Mankind was too dark and confus'd to form any Argument from it; and it related chiefly to his power, and ſome kind of goodneſs; but not ſo as to exclude any other Beings from being honored as Gods. So that the force of it cannot be taken from the conſent of Mankind in this Idea; but if it be only ſaid, *That this is a true and juſt Idea of him*; and that there are other Arguments to prove it from his Works; ſo far

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it may and ought to be allow'd. But the *Metaphyſical Subtilty* of this Argument, as it was managed by *Des Cartes*, was ſo great, that not merely Perſons of common Capacities could not comprehend it; but he complains himſelf, *That the Mathematicians would not be convinced of the demonſtrative force of it.* Upon which he makes a ſharp Reflection, *That the Mathematicks did rather hinder than farther Men in Metaphyſical Speculations.* Des Cartes *Epiſt. To. 2. Ep.* 33.

But my buſineſs is not to lay open the weakneſs of theſe Arguments, but only to ſhew, that there is no cauſe to lay aſide thoſe which have been always uſed, and approved by the moſt ſincere and intelligent Perſons in all Ages. And this I ſhall make appear from his ſecond Argument in his *Meditations*, but the firſt in his *Principles*, where he briefly lays it down after this manner. That among the ſeveral Ideas of our Minds, we find one of a Being infinitely perfect in Wiſdom and Power, which hath not a contingent, but a neceſſary exiſtence; which being contained in the Idea, it follows that ſuch a Being actually exiſts. *Des Cartes* in his 5th Meditation confeſſes, That at firſt appearance this looks like a piece of *Sophiſtry*; but he ſaith, that upon conſideration, neceſſary Exiſtence doth as much belong to an infinite perfect Being, as three Angles do to a Triangle. But he objects againſt his own Argument, that our thoughts put no neceſſity upon things; as if I conceive a Mountain, I muſt likewiſe conceive a Valley, but it doth not follow that there is a Mountain exiſting: But, ſaith he, the difference is, that in this caſe there is no neceſſity of a Mountain's exiſting, but only that a Mountain and Valley cannot be ſeparated; but in the other, it is not our Thought makes neceſſary exiſtence to belong to GOD, but the nature of the thing makes that Thought neceſſary. For, ſaith he, I can frame no other Idea that hath neceſſary exiſtence beſides, nor can I make more than one GOD who hath it; which ſhews that it is no arbitrary or fictitious Idea. But *Gaſſendus* and others ſay, That all this *is a Paralogiſm*; becauſe it ſuppoſes that which it ſhould prove, *viz.* that GOD exiſts, which was the thing in queſtion; and withal they ſay, It is a piece of *Sophiſtry* to argue from the Idea in the Mind to the exiſtence of the thing out of the Mind. And this is the main thing which Monſ. *Huet* inſiſts upon; for he ſaith, *This Argument proves no more, than that a moſt perfect Being muſt neceſſarily exiſt in that way in which it doth exiſt; if it relates to the Idea, then it neceſſarily exiſts only in the Mind; if it relates to the thing, then it really exiſts out of the Mind; but the Argument doth not hold from one to the other.* To this Monſ. *Regis* anſwers, That thoſe things which are ſaid only to exiſt in the Mind, have their foundation out of the Mind; as a Syren, from the Ideas of a Fiſh and a Woman joyn'd together: and ſo other *Chimeras* are form'd from joyning things in the Mind, which nature hath not joyn'd; for a Man cannot have an Idea of nothing. But in the Idea of a perfect Being he cannot diſtinguiſh that which is in the Mind, and that which is out of the Mind. And that here is no taking that for granted which ought to be proved; but it is only arguing from the nature of the thing; and not firſt ſuppoſing it to be, and thence proving that it is. For it is as much of the nature of a perfect Being to have neceſſary exiſtence, as of the nature of a Triangle to have three Angles.

Princip. Part. I. n. 14.

Cenſur. Philoſoph. Cartef. c. 4. *n.* 8.

Réponſe à la Cenſ. ch. 4. *p.* 233, *&c.*

And thus the matter ſtands as to this Argument, ſo that whatſoever force there is in it, we plainly ſee that Perſons of great Sagacity and Judgment, ſuſpect that there is ſomething in it of the nature of a *Paralogiſm.*

logiſm. And therefore there can be no reaſon why we ſhould quit the former Arguments, which were plain and obvious to all capacities, for ſuch a *Metaphiſical Demonſtration*, which thoſe who are moſt verſed in *Demonſtrations* will not allow. Let the followers of *Des Cartes* magnify and defend this Argument as well as they can; but let them not deſpiſe and reject all others, which have had the approbation of all Ages, and the wiſeſt Perſons in them; and that upon ſuch frivolous pretences, *that we cannot comprehend all the ends of Divine Wiſdom.*

Boyle *of Final Cauſes, p.* 36.

But *Des Cartes* in an Epiſtle mentioned by Mr. *Boyle*, ſaith, *That it is a childiſh and abſurd thing to affirm in* Metaphyſicks, *that* God *like a proud Man, had no other end in building the World but to be praiſed by Men; or in making the Sun, which is ſo much bigger than the Earth, but only to give light to Mankind, who take up ſo ſmall a part of it.* Which is an Expreſſion not at all becoming the reverence due to the great Creator of the World, from any one that doth acknowledg him truly to be ſo. For the objection, if it be any, lies againſt his making the World at all: ſince it may as well be ſaid, to be *like a proud Prince, only to ſhew the greatneſs of his Power and Wiſdom.* But what is it which ſuch Men would have? Can they imagin the World ſhould be made without *any ends* at all? Is that becoming the wiſdom of the Maker? Or would they not have theſe ends to be known? To what purpoſe are great and noble ends deſign'd, if they are not to be underſtood? And by whom can they be underſtood, but by rational and intelligent Beings? It is a great preſumption in Mankind to pretend to know all the ends which the wiſe Creator had in the vaſt Fabric of the Univerſe; for ſome of the great parts of it are almoſt wholly unknown to us; I mean as to the fix'd Stars, every one of which of the firſt magnitude, is ſaid to be above a hundred times in bigneſs beyond the Globe of the Earth; and yet how ſmall do they appear to us? And in thoſe other Celeſtial Bodies, which we can hardly diſcern without the help of Glaſſes of a late invention: and we are told by ſkilful *Aſtronomers*, that there are many Stars not viſible, even with the help of Teleſcopes; and that they rather leſſen than add to the greatneſs of the fix'd Stars. But if they had given us a fuller view of them, we cannot imagin, that God's great ends could depend upon ſuch way of diſcovery: If all his deſign had been to be admir'd by Mankind for the greatneſs of his work, it would have been plac'd more within our reach; and the Earth we live upon would have born ſome bigger proportion to the Celeſtial Bodies, which is concluded to be but a Point in compariſon of the Starry Heaven; and the very Orb of the Sun is thought to be no more in reſpect of the whole Firmament. So that the main parts of the Univerſe cannot be ſaid to be made for our view. We grant therefore that the infinitely wiſe and powerful Creator hath great and glorious ends, which are above our reach; but how doth it follow from hence, that he hath no ends which we can judg of? For even in thoſe things which we diſcern at ſo great a diſtance, we ſee enough to admire the infinite Majeſty of him that made them; and conſequently to adore, and fear him: And whatever other ends he may have which we cannot ſee into; yet this is the beſt and moſt proper end for us with reſpect to him. Other ends might ſatisfy our curioſity more, but this tends moſt to promote our true happineſs. As I have ſhew'd in the precedent Diſcourſe that the wiſeſt Philoſophers, *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and the *Pythagoreans* all agreed upon Principles of Natural Reaſon, that the true happineſs of Mankind

lay in being made like to God, not in an affectation of greatneſs and power, but in goodneſs and true wiſdom; which lay in the knowledg of God, and a temper of Mind ſutable to our appprehenſions of him. Now if thoſe ends be attainable by ſuch Diſcoveries, which God hath made of himſelf in the works of Creation, it is to little purpoſe for any to pretend that we cannot know the particular ends which he had in making ſuch a number of vaſt Bodies of Light in the Heavens, nor why they are placed in ſuch a manner, and at ſo great a diſtance from us; nor whether the ſpace between be wholly void, or filled up with an Ethereal Matter, nor of what uſe thoſe ſeveral Bodies of the Stars are with reſpect to themſelves, or the reſt of the Univerſe. Suppoſing that we are to ſeek as to theſe, and many other things relating to the viſible Frame of the World, muſt we therefore ceaſe to admire and praiſe the great God, the Maker of all, leaſt we ſhould ſeem to flatter him for his Greatneſs and Power? There is doubtleſs a juſt veneration due to an infinite Majeſty, in what way ſoever he ſhews himſelf; but it is too mean a thing to imagin that theſe things were done by him only to be admir'd and prais'd by his own Creatures: But if ſuch an Admiration tends to beget in them a greater and deeper ſence of his Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs; and that be the beſt and moſt effectual means to bring Mankind to a conſtant fear and love of him, and thereby to fit them for a future happineſs; can any Man of ſenſe think this to be an end unbecoming the Creator of the World?

But theſe are ſaid *to be good Moral ends, but not proper for Phyſical Speculations.* I anſwer, That thoſe are truly the moſt *Philoſophical Contemplations*, which lead us to the beſt and moſt noble ends of our Beings; for this was of old look'd on as the trueſt end of *Philoſophy*, and the firſt occaſion of it. For, it is agreed on all hands, that it had its name from *Pythagoras:* And it is very well obſerv'd by S. *Auguſtin, that the Doctrine of the Soul's immortality gave the firſt occaſion to the Greeks to apply themſelves to Philoſophy; and from hence* Pythagoras *began it:* Who was inſtructed therein by his Maſters *Thales* and *Pherecydes*; and after long Travels into ſeveral Countries for his own ſatisfaction, he at laſt fix'd at *Crotone* in *Italy*, and there took upon him to inſtruct others in the way to *Immortality:* but finding great reaſon to miſtruſt many who came to be his Scholars, he ſet up a very ſevere Diſcipline in his School (which prov'd his ruin at laſt) and would admit none but ſuch as he had ſufficiently tried. But when he was aſk'd by one of the Great Men of thoſe parts, *What it was he profeſs'd*, he ſaid nothing but *Philoſophy*, or a *Love of Wiſdom*; which he made to conſiſt in two things, *A ſearch after Truth, and a purſuit of Virtue.* But by *Truth* he did not underſtand the *Phyſical Cauſes* of things, but *Abſtracted and Metaphyſical Speculations*; for his Notion was, that there was no certainty to be had from mere ſenſible things, which rather perplexed and confounded Mens Minds, which were apt to judg by the impreſſions of Senſe; (and his opinion was that the Senſe only tranſmitted the Objects, but *it was the Mind which ſaw and heard*, &c.) therefore to prevent falſe judgments, he thought it neceſſary to draw off their Minds from ſenſible Objects; to this end he bethought himſelf of the way of reaſoning by *Figures* and *Numbers* as is before obſerv'd, which were ſo ſoon and ſo groſly miſunderſtood. *He had learnt*, ſaith *Porphyry, from the Eaſtern Magi, that* God *was Light and Truth*; and therefore he look'd on a ſearch after Truth as one way of aſſimilation to God. But the main thing was in

Aug. *ad* Voluſ. *Ep.* 3.

in the practice of Virtue; of which there is a short Abstract in the *Golden Verses*, and *Hierocles* declares in the beginning, *The design of them all was to bring Mankind to a likeness to the Divine Nature.* And in this, saith *Eudorus* in *Stobæus*, *Socrates* and *Plato agreed with Pythagoras, That this was the chief end of Philosophy*; but *Plato* added Καλὰ τὸ δυνατὸν, *as far as Mankind could attain to it.* And so *Alcinous* expresses the sense of *Plato:* but he tells us, *That* Plato *sometimes set it forth by being Wise, and Just, and Holy; sometimes by following* God; *because according to the ancient Saying* God *is the beginning and end of all things. This,* saith *Hierocles, is the end of the Pythagorean Philosophy, to give wings to our Souls, that when death comes, we may leave a mortal Body behind us, and fly to the immortal Mansions above, and partake of a Divine Nature, as far as we are capable of it.* And *Simplicius* in the beginning of his Commentaries on *Aristotle* saith, *The end of Philosophy is to attain to our most perfect Happiness; and if a Man arriv'd to the top of Philosophy, he might be a God, and not a Man.* These things I mention to shew, that *Philosophy* as it was understood by the Ancients was far from excluding *Final Causes*, or *Moral Considerations* of things; since its great end was to bring Men to a likeness to God.

Stob. Eclog. c. 3.

Alcin. c. 27.

Simplic. in Categor.

This being then the true original end of *Philosophy*, to improve Mens Minds in order to their Happiness, how came the consideration of the great ends of God in the World, to be thought unbecoming Philosophical Speculations? The reason was, that the immortality of the Soul hath been excluded too. For, altho' according to the Doctrin of *Des Cartes* its distinction from the Body be asserted and proved, yet its immortality is pass'd over; under this pretence, *that* God *may fix its duration by his Will*; and therefore unless we know the Will of God in it, we can determin nothing in *Philosophy* about it. But the Ancient *Philosophers* made the immortality of the Soul the foundation of all their Inquiries, and therefore took in all such considerations as tended to improve, and refine, and purify the Minds of Men. For which end *Moral Considerations* are most proper. And therefore it cannot but seem strange to any thinking Man, to observe these to be so industriously set aside, on pretence *that we cannot find out the ends that* God *had in framing the World, and the several parts of it:* and yet at the same time they pretend to have found all the Mechanical Powers of Matter, which is much more difficult to comprehend. But of that afterwards: we now consider Final Causes. And have we not reason to conclude from the present Frame of the World with respect to mankind, that the Maker of it intended to dispose things for their advantage? Let Men consider the Faculties of their Minds together with the Materials about them, and the Organs God hath given them to make use of them; and can they think otherwise, but that God hath abundantly made up to them, what other Creatures seem to exceed them in? Their Understanding, and Contrivance, and artificial Inventions go far beyond the natural strength and sagacity of Brutes, as to the comfortable way of subsistence. They can make the Brutes to be very serviceable to them, as to Diet, Clothing, Journeying, Habitations, *&c.* They can find out ways to communicate their Thoughts to each other at a great distance, and entertain commerce in the remotest parts, by the help of their own Inventions as to Navigation. So that if one Country be not sufficiently furnished, they can bring home the products of others. And so, all the benefit of Trading (which in these later Ages is grown to so mighty

a reputation above what it had in elder Ages) is owing to the happy Invention of the uſe of the *Magnet*. But ſet aſide theſe modern Improvements, and conſider Mankind as mere Natives of their ſeveral Countries, take all together, and the Inhabitants of the Earth have no cauſe to complain of Providence; which makes up what is wanting in one thing by ſuch advantages another way, that moſt Nations are fond of their own Countries, and would not change them. The ancient Geographers indeed mention People *who curſed the riſing and ſetting Sun, becauſe his heat was intolerable to them*; and the *Philoſophers* thought they had great reaſon to conclude the *Torrid Zone* uninhabitable. But the experience of theſe latter times have found it quite otherwiſe, and that the places there were fully peopled, and their condition tolerable enough, and in ſome reſpects pleaſant to them: as to the fruitfulneſs of Land, and numbers of Rivers and plenty of commodities. And as to Heat, that is very much qualify'd, by the conſtant breezes in the Day-time, and coolneſs of the Nights; and the particular ſituation of ſome places, at a very little diſtance have Winter and Summer; which ſhews that the Seaſons do not merely depend upon the Sun, but upon the motion of the Air; for where that is ſtopt by the height of Mountains, there is Winter on one ſide, and Summer on the other; as *Iſ. Voſſius* obſerves on the coaſt of *Malabar*; and about the *Mountains* of *Arabia*, *Congo* and *Bengala*, and other places: And *Ludolphus* confirms it concerning the Mountains of *Malabar*; inſomuch, that he ſaith, *the King there may keep a perpetual Summer, only by croſſing the Mountains.* Others have given a more particular account of it, and tell us, That the *Cherſoneſe* between the Rivers of *Indus* and *Ganges*, is divided in the middle by a ridge of *High Hills*, which they call the *Gate*; on the one ſide is *Malabar*, and on the other *Coromandel*: and that it is Winter on one ſide from *April* to *September*, and Summer on the other; and that not above 20 Leagues diſtance in croſſing the Mountains. And the ſame is ſaid to be at Cape *Razalgate* in *Arabia*, and in *Jamaica*; which is imputed to the Mountains ſtopping the current of Vapours wherein the particles of them are driven together, and fall down into drops of Rain; and ſo the Seaſons depend upon the *Monſons* or fix'd Winds in thoſe parts; the North-eaſt blowing on one ſide from *November* to *April*, and the Southerly on the other from *April* to *November*. Sir *H. Middleton* ſpeaks of *ſo great cold on the Mountains of* Arabia, *that he could not have believ'd it, unleſs he had felt it himſelf*; for he deſpis'd their information at *Mecca*, who knew the Country far better. But he thought he went according to *Reaſon*, as the Ancients did; but *Experience* hath plainly diſcover'd their miſtakes. For Heat and Cold are found not to depend merely upon the nearneſs or diſtance of the Sun; for other things we find may not only qualify that heat, but produce cold where it was leaſt expected. *Acoſta* tells us that the old Philoſophers went upon Principles of Common Reaſon, when they ſuppoſed *the Torrid Zone was uninhabitable*, but notwithſtanding he found it ſo far from being ſo, that *he thought it pleaſant and agreeable, and ſaw it full of People:* and he ſaith, *that the Air is cleareſt when the Sun is fartheſt off, and fulleſt of Clouds and Rain when the Sun is neareſt.* As he ſhews at large from the experience himſelf had in thoſe parts. Some places of the *Torrid Zone* he obſerves to be *Temperate*, as in *Quitto*, and *the Plains of Peru*; ſome very cold, as at *Potoſi*; ſome very hot, as in ſome parts of *Æthiopia*, *Braſil* and the *Moluccas*. The temperateneſs of it he imputes to the

Herod. l. 1. *Mela l.* 1. *c.* 8. *Plin. l.* 5. *c.* 8.

Iſ. Voſſ. de Nilo, c. 12. *Ludolph. Comment. ad Hiſt. Æthiop. p.* 101. *Philoſoph. Tranſactions, n.* 175.

Purchas Pil. To. I. *p.* 255.

Acoſta *of the* Indies, *l.* 2. *c.* 23. *c.* 9. *c.* 10.

Rains, to the ſhortneſs of the Days, the nearneſs to the Ocean, the height of Lands and Mountains, but eſpecially to the Winds. For he
C. 13. ſaith, *The Providence of* GOD *hath ſo order'd it, that the freſh and cool Winds do qualify the exceſſive heat of the Sun.* But he obſerves, *that be-*
L. 3. c. 8. *ſides the Breezes from the Sea by day, there are Land-winds by night, which ſerve very much to temper the heat of the Air.*

It look'd like an Objection againſt Providence, when Men concluded that by the nearneſs of the Sun within the Tropics, ſo great a part of the Earth as the *Torrid Zone* ſhould be ſcorch'd by the Sun, as not to be capable of habitation by Mankind: but when the contrary is now found moſt certainly true, and ſuch reaſons are given for it, which Mankind could not have thought of, have we not ground to infer that Providence had certainly ſuch an end as the good of Mankind, to order things ſo, as by ſeveral means to make thoſe habitations not only tolerable, but in many places delightful? By this we ſee how vain thoſe old Arguments againſt Providence were, which were grounded on this ſuppoſition, that ſo great a part of the Earth was uſeleſs to Mankind by the intolerable heat of the Sun. Yet how confidently doth *Lucretius* argue upon this ſuppoſition, as tho' he could demonſtrate againſt Providence from Heaven and Earth?

Hoc tamen ex ipſis cœli rationibus auſim
Confirmare, aliiſque ex rebus reddere multis,
Nequaquam nobis divinitus eſſe paratam
Naturam rerum, tanta ſtat prædita culpa.
Principio quantum cœli tegit impetus ingens,
Inde avidam partem montes, ſylvæque ferarum
Poſſedere, tenent rupes, vaſtæque paludes,
Et mare, quod late terrarum diſtinet oras.
Inde duas porro prope parteis fervidus ardor,
Aſſiduuſque geli caſus mortalibus aufert. Lucret. l. 5.

So much room taken up by the Heavens, ſo much by Mountains, Woods, Rocks, Marſhes and Seas; and two parts of the Earth uſeleſs for Mankind by intolerable Heat and Cold; that he could never imagin this Earth was fram'd with deſign for the good of Mankind. And yet at the ſame time there were *Philoſophers*, who thought the conveniencies for Mankind were ſo great in this World, that from thence they infer'd that there was a Providence, which had a particular regard to the advantages which they enjoy; and this without any Revelation from GOD of thoſe ends which he deſign'd. The *Stoics* knew, as well as *Epicurus*, the compaſs of the Heavens, the greatneſs of the Mountains, Woods, Rocks and Seas; and they believ'd as much that ſome parts of the Earth were not to be inhabited; and yet they concluded, that there was a deſign of Providence in all with reſpect to Mankind. For they took notice, not merely of the ſpace which the Heavens took up, but of the great Beauty, and order, and uſefulneſs of the *Celeſtial Bodies*; and particularly the convenient diſtance of the Sun to make the Earth fruitful and pleaſant; and to diſtinguiſh Days and Nights for Works and Reſt; and that the Mountains were large ſtore-houſes for Metals and Rivers, which could not otherwiſe be ſupply'd; and that the Seas afforded plenty of Fiſh, and large conveniencies for Commerce; and the Woods were furniſh'd with Timber to make Veſſels out of, to paſs over thoſe Seas, and ſo

preſerve a correſpondence among Mankind at the greateſt diſtance for their mutual advantage; and if there were uncultivated parts of the Earth, that only ſhew'd that God did not give theſe things to make Mankind lazy and idle, but to exerciſe thoſe abilities both of Body and Mind, which he had given them.

But as to the two parts of the Earth being wholly unſerviceable to Mankind, by reaſon of exceſſive Heat or Cold, that is found by experience of later Ages to have been a great miſtake. But *Ariſtotle* is poſitive in it, *That the places near the Sun have no Waters nor Paſtures; and that the remote Northern parts are not to be inhabited for the Cold.* But both theſe Aſſertions are found to be falſe; however his Authority was follow'd. Inſomuch, that *Pliny* ſaith, *Of five Zones two are uſeleſs by extremity of Cold; and that there is nothing but a perpetual Miſt, and a ſhining Froſt; and that within the Tropicks all is burnt up by the heat of the Sun, which is ſo intenſe, that,* he ſaith, *there is no paſſage from one Temperate Zone to the other.* This is a ſtrange Account to us now, and given by a Man who had read all Authors then extant about theſe matters; and it is the ſtranger, becauſe in the Chapter before he ſaith, *That* Hanno *paſſed from* Cadiz *to the end of* Arabia, (which is much doubted) *and that* Eudoxus *came to* Cadiz *from the* Arabian *Gulph; and that another went from* Spain *to* Æthiopia *on the account of Trade; and that ſome* Indians *trading abroad were caſt by ſtorms on the Northern Coaſts, who were preſented to the Proconſul of* Gaul. How could theſe things be, and yet they ſuch ſtrangers to the *Torrid Zone*, thro' which they muſt paſs? But he ſeem'd to take it for granted, *That thoſe Regions were unpaſſable, and uninhabitable*, altho' himſelf mentions ſeveral Nations which liv'd within *the Torrid Zone*; as the *Negroes* on both ſides the River *Niger*, the *Garamantes*, *Troglodytæ* (whom *Ludolphus* makes to be ſame with the *Hotentots*) and ſeveral others. Now if all theſe Countries were burnt up, how come ſo many People to be then known to live here; and ſo they were from the time of *Herodotus*, who mentions them? But how different are the beſt Accounts we now have of theſe Places from what the Antients imagin'd? The Country of the *Negroes*, thro' which the *Niger* runs (which is ſuppos'd to be of the ſame *Nature* (if not *Original*) with the *Nile*, and overflows the Country of the *Negroes*, in the ſame manner and at the ſame time that the *Nile* doth *Egypt*) is, according to a late Author, *a populous and fertile Country*, who ſaith, *that the Natives endure the Heat with eaſe, and are healthful and vigorous.* Another, who ſpent ſome time in that Country, ſaith, *That the Heat is more ſupportable by the cool Wind which blows; and that for 6 Months it is as pleaſant as* France. *Andrew Battel*, who liv'd about 18 Years in *Angola* and thereabouts, ſpeaks enough of the *Populouſneſs* of thoſe parts; and *Lopez* who was at *Congo*, commends the *Temperature of the Air* there. *Ludolphus*, in his Account of *Ethiopia*, which he had chiefly from a Native, ſaith, *that it is as temperate as* Portugal. The ſame we have already produc'd from *Acoſta* of *Peru*. Many more ſuch Inſtances might be produc'd, but theſe are ſufficient to ſhew what a wonderful Miſtake the Antients were under as to the *Torrid Zone*, and how very weak *Lucretius* his Argument againſt Providence from thence is. But the Argument for it is much ſtronger from theſe Diſcoveries, becauſe, according to the ordinary effects of the Heat of the Sun, they reaſon'd truly; but there is a concurrence of ſeveral other things which temper the Air, which they could not underſtand. It is true, there are ſome things that abate the

Ariſt. *Meteor. l. 2. c. 5.*

Plin. *l. 2. c. 68.*

L. 5. c. 8.

Herodot. l. 4. c. 183. Plin. l. 5. 8. Solin. c 43.

Voyage to Surat, *p. 61. p. 71.*

Relation de la Nigritie, *1689 p. 85.*

Purchas *II. l. 7. c. 3. Id. c. 4.*

Ludolph. Comment. l. 1. c. 5. n. 36.

Heat which ariſes from the Sun's nearneſs; as the equality of Nights to Days, and the abundance of Rains which fall at that time, of which the moſt probable account is, that altho' in our parts the diſtance of the Sun cauſes Cold and Rain, and the nearneſs Heat and Drought; yet it is quite otherwiſe there, for the Sun raiſes up the Vapors more there by rarifying the Air, and that to a great height; which joining together, and falling down with greater force, doth thereby produce a Wind as well as Water, both which cool and refreſh the Air; and where the Vapors do not produce Rain, yet they make a Dew, as in ſome parts of *Peru*, which falling on the ground makes it fruitful. But theſe things are not ſufficient; for were all the Country in the *Torrid Zone* a flat, with thoſe advantages, it would not be habitable; and therefore the height of the Mountains was neceſſary for this purpoſe. Which ſhews, that theſe are ſo far from being *Botches* or *Ruins*, that they are great inſtances of Divine Providence, if they can be made out to be ſerviceable to this purpoſe. *Scaliger* ſaith, that thoſe do *piè delirare, who impute the Mountains to the fractures made in the Earth by the Flood; and that it is impoſſible that the Earth which fell in, ſhould ever make a ſurface equal with the height of the Mountains:* but he aſſerts them to be a work of Providence in the original frame of the World, and chiefly intended to be a receptacle for Water: and he obſerves that the higheſt Mountains are under the Torrid Zone, where they ſerve likewiſe for tempering the Air. For, *Acoſta* gives that reaſon of the temper of the Air in the *Weſt Indies*, that *it is a high Country, having many Mountains, which afford a great refreſhment to the neighbour Countries:* and he obſerves, *that the Sea-coaſt in* Peru *and* New Spain *is very hot, being low and flat; but it is otherwiſe in the higher parts.* *Piſo*, a learned Phyſician, who liv'd in *Braſil*, and hath given a *Natural Hiſtory* of that Country, imputes the *Healthfulneſs* of the *Maritime Coaſts* there, which he thinks compares with *Europe*, to two things: 1. *The conſtant breeze from the Sea lying on the Eaſt of it, which* he ſaith, *very much defends them from the exceſſive Heat of the Sun.* 2. *A Ridg of Mountains between that and* Peru, *which keep off the noiſom Vapors of the Mooriſh Grounds on the other ſide of them. In the Night*, he ſaith, *the Cold is ſo great* (even in the *Torrid Zone*) *that they are forc'd to keep Fires to prevent the ill effects of it.* *Nichol. de Techo*, who was in *Tucumania*, ſaith, *That the part of it which is within the Torrid Zone is very cold, by reaſon of the Mountains there; which*, he ſaith, *evidently confutes the Antients opinion concerning it.* *Andrew Battel* mentions *the high Mountains* about *Angola, over which he march'd, and found the Air very cold.* *Ludolphus* ſaith, *The Providence of* God *is much to be admir'd in the Mountains of* Ethiopia; *for the height of their Mountains makes that Country habitable, and their Air more temperate, and affords them Rivers, which the flat in the Torrid Zone do want,* unleſs they be ſuch as come out of the mountainous part. And, which ſeems very ſtrange, he affirms from *Tellez, That the Heats in ſome parts of* Ethiopia *are more tolerable than in* Portugal, *which lies ſo many degrees more to the North.*

Scaliger. Exerc. 43.

Exerc. 42.

Acoſta *Hiſt. of the Indies, l.* 2. *c.* 12.

Piſon. Hiſt. Nat. & Medic. Braſiliæ, l. 1. *c.* 1.

Hiſt. Paraquar. l. 1. *c.* 19.

Purchas *To.* II. *l.* 7. *c.* 3. §. 3.

Ludolph. Hiſt. Æthiop. l. 1. *c.* 6.

C. 5.

The force of what I have ſaid comes to this. It was ſuppos'd to be an Argument againſt Providence, that ſo great a part of the Earth was uſeleſs to Mankind: Which is ſo far from being true, that undoubted Experience hath convinc'd the World, that they have been fully inhabited; and that to the comfortable ſubſiſtence of Mankind, there hath been concurrence of ſeveral things, which could not be the reſult of

Chance, or of the Mechanical Laws of the motion of Matter: and therefore we ought to conclude theſe things to be ordered by Divine Providence, for the uſe and benefit of Mankind.

There is yet one thing to be obſerv'd before I end this part of my Diſcourſe, which is to ſhew the pernicious uſe that hath been made of *Des Cartes* his laying aſide the conſideration of *Final Cauſes*. For there was lately a Perſon too well known in the World, (and whom I intend to conſider at large afterwards) who at firſt profeſs'd himſelf a ſtrict Follower of *Des Cartes* his *Notions* in his *Metaphyſical Meditations*. But he made uſe of the Argument from the *Idea* to prove *the World to be* GOD: And *Des Cartes* cannot be excus'd from giving too great advantage to *Spinoza*, by ſuppoſing *the Idea of extended Matter to be infinite and neceſſary*; which overthrows the force of his own Argument from the *Idea*, for if it agrees to Matter, it cannot prove the Being of a Subſtance diſtinct from Matter, and gave occaſion to the other to think, that nothing but *Infinite Matter* was imply'd in this *Idea*: and to carry on his deſign the better, he kept cloſe to *Des Cartes* in excluding the *conſideration of Final Cauſes*. For in his *Mathematical Ethicks* (as he calls them) he hath an *Appendix* to his firſt Part, where he doth purpoſely ſet himſelf to overthrow all *Final Cauſes, as meer Fictions of Mens Brains*. But the comfort is, that they are no late *Fictions*, but the wiſeſt Men in all Ages, as I have already ſhew'd, did aſſert them: And it is not a mere *Mathematical Appearance* will fright Men now out of the Principles of Reaſon. But let us examin what the grounds are on which *Final Cauſes* are thus peremptorily condemned. He ſaith, *That they ariſe from the common prejudice of Mankind, who have ſo much fondneſs for themſelves as to think that all things are done for their ſakes: that* GOD *made all things for Man, and Mankind to ſerve him.* But this is not a juſt and fair repreſentation of the matter. We do not ſay, that GOD had no other end in the frame of the Univerſe, but merely for the ſake of the Inhabitants of the Earth; for we do not pretend to give an account of the great ends which the Almighty had in thoſe vaſt and numerous Bodies of the fix'd Stars, which are ſo very remote from us; but that which we ſay, is, that GOD hath plac'd Mankind in ſuch a ſtation here upon Earth, that they cannot but look about them; and when they do ſo, they cannot but admire to find ſo great and ſo wiſe a Being order all things ſo, as to ſee not only the Wiſdom but the Goodneſs of their Maker. And how doth this appear to be *a mere Fiction of Mens Brains?* Are there not ſuch juſt cauſes for our admiration? Are there not ſuch conveniences for human Life? Do not all Men ſee the wonderful contrivance and uſefulneſs of the parts of their Bodies? And are there not great diſcoveries of the like Wiſdom in Plants and Animals, and the Earth and Sea? Are all theſe mere Phantaſms and Fictions of Mens Brains? Why are not the miſtakes about theſe things diſcover'd in a Mathematical manner? This might have ſignify'd ſomething: But to go about to confute Mankind by telling them, *That Final Cauſes are mere Fictions of their Brains,* is far from being a Geometrical way of Demonſtration. Let us examin, however, the method he takes to make it out. (1.) In the firſt place, he undertakes to ſhew how Mankind came to think ſo much of *Final Cauſes*; and then, (2.) How repugnant they are to the nature of things: (3.) How Men came to take up the Notions of Good and Evil, and of Rewards and Puniſhments, from this Opinion about *Final Cauſes*. All which I ſhall briefly conſider. As to the firſt, he ſuppoſes *that all Men are born ignorant*

Des Cartes *Prin. Part. II. n. 21.*

B. D. Spinoſ. Opera Poſth. p. 36.

rant of Cauſes, and look after their own advantage, which they are conſcious to themſelves of. And what follows? *Firſt, that they ſuppoſe themſelves free, becauſe they know their own Deſires.* And why ſhould they not, as well as know that they think? For they have the like inward Perception as to both. *But they are ignorant of the Cauſes which determine their Deſires.* How doth it appear, that there are ſuch *Cauſes*, which they are thus ignorant of? If any Man undertakes to aſſign Cauſes which Mankind are not at all ſenſible of, he ought not to take it for granted, that there are ſuch Cauſes, but to prove it in ſuch a manner, as to overballance the evidence of their inward Perceptions. For Mankind are conſcious to themſelves of no ſuch Cauſes; if therefore any one will prove, that however they are not free, certainly that Evidence ought to be clearer than the Argument from our own Perception to the contrary. I think I move my Eye freely to this or that Object, and am fully ſatiſfy'd from that inward Perception I have of the voluntary motion of the Muſcles belonging to the Eye. Now if any one goes about to tell me that I am deceiv'd herein, and that there were other Cauſes, which determin'd the motion of my Eye; is it not reaſon I ſhould have Evidence greater than what I have from my own Senſation? But here we have no Cauſes at all aſſign'd; therefore we muſt go on. *Secondly*, ſaith he, *Mankind do all things for ſome End*, viz. *for their own Profit*; *and therefore deſire only to know Final Cauſes, and if they find theſe they are ſatiſfy'd.* Is not this well ſaid by a Man that pretends to *Demonſtration*, and that in a *Geometrical manner?* Could no other *Ends* be thought of but *Profit?* I begin to be of *Des Cartes* his mind, *That Geometry ſpoils Mens Reaſonings in other matters.* For, how was it poſſible for a Man of common ſenſe to argue in ſuch a manner; *Men aim at their own Profit, therefore they deſire only to know Final Cauſes?* What *Profit* was it which this Author aim'd at in making this Work of his. He had without doubt ſome end in it; for I hardly think he could take ſo much pains for no end at all. Was it a *Good* or a *Bad end?* (For Mankind are ſtill apt to be inquiſitive into *Final Cauſes.*) *A Good End*, no doubt his Friends will ſay. What was this *Good End?* was it *mere Profit?* No certainly, they will ſay, his Mind was above it; *for he devoted himſelf wholly* (as they tell us in the Preface to his Works) *to Philoſophy*; and *retired on purpoſe for the proſecution of his Studies.* It is then more than poſſible for a Man to aim at ſome other end, than mere *Profit.* And what was the End he propos'd in Philoſophy? Still we enquire after *the End*, altho' *Profit* be ſet aſide; and we cannot have a better account of it than from himſelf. He tells us, *His Mind was ſet upon finding out the true Good of Mankind.* This was a noble End indeed, and fit for a Perſon that deſign'd to improve his Underſtanding. But was this *true Good* nothing but *Profit?* So far from it, that he ſaith, *He was ſoon ſatisfy'd, that what things Mankind generally purſued, were a hindrance to the End he aim'd at: and therefore he ſaw it neceſſary to give over the purſuit of Riches, Honors and ſenſual Pleaſures; and to fix upon an eternal and infinite Good, which alone can give ſatisfaction to the Mind, and therefore ought to be purſued with all our might.* This, one would think, were ſpoken like a true Chriſtian Philoſopher; but his way is, to uſe our Expreſſions, and to couch his own meaning under very plauſible Terms: but he ſpeaks his Mind more afterwards, when he ſaith, *This chief Good of Man is to underſtand the union between the Mind and Nature.* What that is, will appear more afterwards; but here he ſaith, *That this is the End to which*

De Intell. Emend. p. 357.

P. 361.

our Studies and Endeavors are to be directed. Which is ſufficient to my preſent purpoſe. For here it is confeſs'd, that they are only vulgar Minds that aim at *mere Profit* as their End; but that there is a higher, and more certain, and agreeable End for the Minds of Men to ſearch after; and that their Happineſs lies in the attaining of that End. Which being allow'd, if we ſuppoſe a wiſe and intelligent Being to have created Mankind, there is no incongruity at all in Man's making that infinite and eternal Good to be his chief End, nor in purſuing after it with all his Endeavors; nor can there be any in ſuppoſing that this GOD ſhould order things in this World with that deſign, that they ſhould be ſerviceable to him here as to his preſent ſubſiſtence, in order to his main End. For he allows his *Philoſopher* to do many things with that deſign to ſerve his End, viz. *To ſpeak as other Men do, whatever he thinks: To uſe ſenſual Pleaſures, as they ſerve for Health: To get as much Wealth as will make his Condition eaſy.* Thus far then we find that Mankind may propoſe Ends to themſelves; and that there are things which have a tendency to them; and that it is very becoming to them to uſe thoſe Means in order to their Ends. Why then may not the wiſe Creator of the World appoint proper Ends and Means to Mankind, as to their conveniencies and future Happineſs? What repugnancy is there in this, more than in the former caſe? All that he can ſay is, *That Mankind finding ſomething very uſeful to them, as Eyes for ſeeing, Teeth for eating, Herbs and Animals for nouriſhment, the Sun to give Light, the Sea to breed Fiſh,* &c. *and becauſe they are ſo uſeful to them, conclude that there was a Being above them, which prepar'd all theſe things for them.* And what abſurdity is there in ſo doing? What *Geometrical Demonſtration* is there, that theſe things all came together ſo of themſelves without any intelligent Agent? All that he ſaith is, *That they conſidering them as Means, could not believe that they made themſelves; but becauſe they were wont to provide things for their own uſe, they ſuppoſed or believed ſome free Agent which ordered all theſe things for them. And from hence they judging all by themſelves, concluded that* GOD *ordered all theſe things for their uſe; to oblige Mankind to him, that they might honor and ſerve him; and ſo under a pretence of doing honor to* GOD, *they fell into Superſtition, and were ſo bent upon Final Cauſes, till at laſt they made* GOD *no wiſer than themſelves.* Is not all this *Demonſtration?* They muſt think very meanly indeed of the Underſtandings of Men, that can think they will be ſatisfy'd with ſuch Accounts as theſe. We find he grants *Eyes fitted for Sight, Teeth for Eating,* &c. And why, I pray, may we not in reaſon conclude, that they were deſign'd for that uſe? He finds ſome things to cavil at, about *Unſeaſonable Weather, Earthquakes, Diſeaſes,* &c. (which are conſiſtent with the general Ends of Providence) but he hath nothing to ſay as to his former Inſtances, why we ſhould not believe *we had Eyes to ſee with, or Ears to hear with, or Teeth to eat with:* But if theſe things were given for thoſe uſes and no other, doth not this prove particular Ends of Providence with reſpect to Mankind? What, *if Men do provide Means for their Ends?* Is it an Argument of *Folly*, or *Wiſdom* ſo to do? If it be *Wiſdom* to act for an End, and *Folly* to act for none, why may we not ſuppoſe an infinitely wiſe Being to act for Ends agreeable to himſelf? Not for mean, fooliſh, ſordid Ends, but ſuch as become the great Creator and wiſe Governor, and bountiful Benefactor to Mankind. And what is there unbecoming our *Idea* of GOD in theſe relations? Is it then unfit for a wiſe Creator, and Governor, and Benefactor, to beſtow on Man-

Ethic. P. I. p. 34.

kind ſuch things as tend to the uſe and good of his Creatures, or to take care of their welfare, ſo as to furniſh us with ſuch Organs of our Senſes, ſuch Faculties of our Minds, as may make uſe of the many conveniences which we have about us for our comfortable ſubſiſtence, and our cheerful ſervice of ſo Great, and ſo Good, and ſo Liberal a Benefactor? Can this be call'd *Superſtition*, to ſerve and adore him? Is this *making* GOD *like to our ſelves*, when we acknowledg the infinite diſtance between him and us, and ſerve him with devout Reverence and godly Fear? Far be it from us to think ſo meanly of him, as to attribute the leaſt degree of our Paſſions and Weakneſſes to him. We know he could not be GOD, if he were not infinitely above our Thoughts as well as our Services: but if he pleaſe to be ſo kind to us, to give us ſo many reaſons to love and ſerve him, is it fit for his Creatures to deſpiſe his Service, on pretence that he is above it? *Superſtition* is a fooliſh thing, becauſe it comes from mean apprehenſions of GOD; but *true Religion* is a wiſe and agreeable thing, becauſe it flows from a due ſenſe of a Divine Majeſty, and a tender regard to his Honor. And whatever Men pretend as to *Philoſophy* and *Demonſtration*, there are none that really want Senſe and Underſtanding ſo much, as thoſe who deſpiſe *Religion*, under the name of *Superſtition*. We cannot deny that there is too much of it in the World: but as GOD remains the ſame notwithſtanding the Follies of Mankind, ſo *Religion* is as juſt and reaſonable a thing as ever, altho' *Superſtition* hath brought ſo much diſhonor upon it.

The next thing is to ſhew, *That Final Cauſes are repugnant to the Nature of things*. This is to the purpoſe indeed, if he can make it out. As to his Argument *from the neceſſity of all things*, that muſt be referr'd to its due time; becauſe it is not prov'd but ſuppos'd: But here we are to conſider how *Final Cauſes* do ſo lamentably pervert the Order of Nature. *They make*, ſaith he, *the Cauſe to be the Effect, and the Effect to be the Cauſe; and that which was firſt in Nature to be the laſt; and make the moſt perfect Being to be the moſt imperfect.* Theſe are ſad Conſequences, if they hold: The two former he paſſes over, as he had reaſon, and fixes on the laſt, *That they overthrow the Divine Perfection*; and he needs no more, if he can make this out. But how? *If* GOD *works for an End, then he muſt want that which he works for.* Is this the *Demonſtrating Ethicks in a Geometrical way?* A Father out of kindneſs to his Son deſigns to advance him in the World, and furniſhes him with all neceſſary means to that end: Doth this argue weakneſs and indigency, or only kindneſs and good-will to his Son? If there may be a deſign of doing good to others, with regard to their welfare, and many means us'd to that end, what want doth this argue? But rather it flows from *abundant Goodneſs*; and the more perfect any Being is, the greater is the beneficence and readineſs to do good to others: and one would think Men did not want Geometry to know this. *But*, ſaith he, GOD *did not do this for their ſakes, but his own; his own Glory is the end of all.* But if the *Glory of* GOD be moſt advanced by the good of his Creatures, how can theſe two be ſeparated from each other? Men may make a diſtinction by Metaphyſical Speculation: but if his Glory be advanced by their good, there can be no real diſtinction between them; for both are carried on by the ſame thing.

After theſe faint Attempts, our *Geometrician* falls to *Ignorance of Cauſes*, (of which I have ſaid ſo much already) and from thence, he ſaith *comes Mens admiration of the Fabrick of Man's Body, becauſe they know not*

the Cauſes of it. And did our Philoſopher know the *Mechanical Cauſes* of all the parts of it? What pity it is we had not ſeen them, inſtead of theſe looſe and idle Diſcourſes; for I can call them no other, when there is ſo much bluſtering talk about *Geometry*, and ſo very little appearance of true Reaſon. But, ſaith he very ſenſibly, *The World looks upon a Man as a very dangerous Heretick, and impious Perſon, if he gives an account of Natural Cauſes, and takes away their ignorance.* I ſee no ſuch great danger from his *Knowledg*, whatever there be from his *Impiety*; for he hath ſhew'd much more cauſe for us to wonder at one, than at the other. But the *Impiety* of his *Syſtem* muſt be conſider'd in its proper place.

The laſt thing he ſaith, as to Cauſes, is, *That Mankind being perſuaded that all things were made for them, they ſet an eſteem upon ſuch things as they found moſt uſeful, and meaſur'd the value of things by their agreeableneſs to themſelves. From hence came the difference of Good and Evil, Orderly and Confus'd, Hot and Cold, Beautiful and Deform'd; and becauſe they imagin'd themſelves free, thence came Praiſe and Diſhonor, Fault and Merit. And what tended to Health or the Worſhip of* GOD, *they called Good, and the contrary Evil; what ſuted to their Imagination, they called Order, what did not, Confuſion. What was agreeable to their Senſes they called Beautiful, Sweet, Pleaſant, and the contrary to what was not, and attributed their Modes of Senſation to the things themſelves: and Men judg of things by their different Imaginations; and from thence come ſuch great differences among Mankind about Good and Evil, Order and Confuſion; all which come from Mens following Imagination, and not Reaſon.* This is the ſubſtance of what he ſaith; which in ſhort takes away all the real difference between Good and Evil, and makes *Good* to be a mere effect of Mens Imaginations, from reſpect to their own Conveniency, or what they call *the Honour of God*; and *Evil* what is repugnant to them. But how comes this to follow from *Final Cauſes?* Yes, ſaith he, *ſince all things are made for them, therefore Good and Evil are to be taken with reſpect to them.* This is a very weak foundation to build this Doctrin upon. For things are not therefore ſaid to be *Morally Good*, becauſe they are uſeful to Mankind; but that implies only a *Natural Fitneſs* for ſuch purpoſes, which is quite another thing from Moral Goodneſs; and it is ſtrange our Philoſophers ſhould not diſcern the difference. For, is there no meaſure of Good and Evil among Mankind with reſpect to one another? If the Good and Evil of things did depend upon Final Cauſes, with reſpect to Mankind in general, then there could be no ſuch thing in regard to each other; for theſe Final Cauſes do not reach to one individual more than another, for they reſpect the whole kind. But we ſay upon good grounds, that there are things which are good and evil between Man and Man. *Yes*, it may be ſaid, *with reſpect to Society, and the common good of the whole.* If it be ſo, then it follows that it doth not depend upon mere Imagination, but that there is a true and juſt meaſure in things; for if Human Society cannot be preſerv'd without Juſtice, and keeping Faith and Obedience to Government, Conjugal Fidelity, *&c.* then there is a real tendency in theſe things to that end, and a repugnancy in the contrary; and if ſo, then their being good or evil doth not depend upon Mens Fancies or Humors, any more than the taking away Fuel doth for leſſening a Fire, or the adding it doth to the increaſe of it. For Mens indulging their own Paſſions againſt Reaſon and a common Intereſt, doth as much tend to a Civil Combuſtion, as the other

ther to a Natural; and Mens due government of themſelves and actions doth as naturally tend to Peace and Tranquillity, as withdrawing Fuel or caſting Water doth to quench the violence of Fire. From whence it appears, that there are real ends as to Mankind, which are the meaſures of Good and Evil, with reſpect to Society. But beſides this, Mankind cannot be ſuppos'd to ſubſiſt without the Relations of Parents and Children: and can any Man in his right Senſes imagin that the Duties of theſe to each other depend only upon Fancy? Is there no natural regard due from Children to Parents, no natural affection and tenderneſs in Parents to Children? Is all this only the product of Imagination? So as to the difference of Sexes; Chaſtity, Modeſty, and a decent regard to each other are things founded in Nature, and do not ariſe from Cuſtom or Fancy. But in all theſe things, altho' there be a juſt regulation of them by Laws, yet the foundation of them is laid in the nature and reſpects of things to one another. As to our own Bodies, Health is not the only meaſure of Good and Evil; for it is ſo uncertain, that thoſe Exceſſes do little prejudice to ſome, which are miſchievous to others: but there is a juſt proportion of things to be obſerv'd with reſpect to their uſe; and ſo *Intemperance* may be conſiſtent with a healthful Body. As to the condition of others, who by reaſon of Poverty or Sickneſs ſtand in need of our help, it is a thing in it ſelf good to afford them our aſſiſtance; and ſo Liberality, Charity, and doing good, are ſo far from being good only from Imagination, that no Man can imagin them to be otherwiſe than good. But beſides all theſe, there are Duties which are owing to that infinite Being, from whom we derive all that we enjoy or hope for; and can it be any other than good for us to fear, and ſerve, and love, and honor him? He confeſſes Mankind allow *that to be good which reſpects the honor of* GOD; but he means *that it is becauſe we ſuppoſe that he made all things for Men.* But altho' his Goodneſs and Providence be very great reaſons for our ſerving him; yet if he had been leſs bountiful to Mankind, they had been bound to ſerve him as their Creator. And it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe that he ſhould diſcharge his Creatures from ſo neceſſary a duty, and to make the contrary not to be a Fault. For, it would imply ingratitude and contempt of the beſt Being in the World not to be evil; and that he who is infinitely good, ſhould require what is in it ſelf evil. From all which it appears, that the nature of Good and Evil doth not depend upon the arbitrary Fancies and Opinions of Men; but upon the Nature of things, the Reaſon of Mankind, and the Reſpects they ſtand in to one another.

And it is a great confirmation of this, that our Philoſopher himſelf makes it the ſame caſe as *to Good and Evil*, as it is with reſpect to *Order* and *Confuſion*, and *Beauty* and *Deformity*, and *Harmony* and *Diſcord*. For altho' there may be a *Variety* of *Fancies*, as to ſome *Degrees* of theſe things, and that may pleaſe ſome which doth not others; yet in the main they all agree in a real difference between them: and none can have ſo little judgment, as to think that there is nothing but Fancy which puts a difference between a well digeſted Diſcourſe, and a confus'd heap of Thoughts; or between an exact Beauty, and the Picture of Deformity; or the moſt raviſhing Muſick, and the noiſe of a pair of Tongs. So that the Extremes muſt be allow'd to be really different from one another, what difference ſoever there be in Perſons Fancies, as to what lies between; and yet as to them, when the Idea of the thing it ſelf is agreed upon, then the nearer any approach to it, the more it hath of the reality,

and the farther off, it doth ſo much more depend upon Fancy.

But, ſaith he, *in our Objects of Senſe we imagin the Qualities to be real things without us, whereas they are only the different impreſſions made upon our Senſes, and ſo convey'd to our Imaginations.* And is this an Argument that there is no real difference between *Bitter and Sweet, Savory and Unſavory*, or *that all Sounds are alike?* Or that becauſe ſome have fancied the Muſick of the Spheres, therefore there is no ſuch thing as Harmony? But ſuch kind of arguing deſerves no farther conſideration.

I now come to the ſecond *Hypotheſis*, which tends towards *Atheiſm*, and that is of thoſe who *attribute too much to the Mechanical Powers of matter and motion.* It cannot be denied by any ingenuous Man, that in our Age a great improvement hath been made in *Natural* and *Experimental Philoſophy*. But there is a great difference to be made between thoſe who have proceeded in the way of *Experiments*, which do great ſervice as they go, and ſuch as have form'd *Mechanical Theories* of the Syſtem of the Univerſe; and have undertaken to give an Account how the World was fram'd, and what the immediate Cauſes are of thoſe things which appear in the World. I do not go about to diſpute, whether many things are not better reſolv'd by the *New* than by the *Old Philoſophy*; I am not concern'd in the Doctrines of *Antiperiſtaſis*, *Fuga vacui*, *Occult Qualities*, *Intentional Species*, and ſuch like: And I confeſs, that the *Particular Hiſtories* and *Experiments* relating to things of Nature, as to the *Bodies* of *Animals*, the *Vegetation* of *Plants*, and *Particular Qualities*, tend much more to the true knowledg of Nature, than the mere nice and dry general Speculations about *Forms* and *Qualities*: which have been handled in ſuch a manner, that they have been like ſome of *Ariſtotle*'s *Books, ſet forth, but not to be underſtood.* If therefore ſeveral *Qualities* of Bodies be explain'd *mechanically*, *i. e.* by virtue of the known Affections of Matter, *viz. Size, Figure, Motion*, &c. and that new ones can be produc'd by changing the *Texture* or *Motion*, or ſome other *Mechanical Affection* of Matter; it is far from my deſign to oppoſe them, or any ſuch Diſcourſes, which tend only to give us more light into the *Occult Nature* (tho' not *Qualities*) *of things.* For to ſay, that Things proceed from *Occult Qualities*, is in other words to ſay, that they come from we know not what; and none can take that for a good Anſwer from one that pretends to give the reaſon of a thing.

But to proceed more diſtinctly, I make no difficulty of allowing theſe following Principles, as to the *Nature* and *Qualities* of Natural Bodies; which are moſt inſiſted upon by a late Excellent Philoſopher, and a truly *Chriſtian Virtuoſo* among us. (1.) That there is One Univerſal Matter of Bodies, that is, a Subſtance extended, diviſible, and impenetrable. (2.) That there is a diverſity of Motion in ſeveral parts of Matter; ſo it be not ſaid to be in Matter from it ſelf as eſſential to it; for then it muſt always move, and there could be no Reſt, and ſo no Compoſition. (3.) That by virtue of this Motion, Matter is divided into greater and leſſer parts, which have their Determination, Size and Figure. (4.) That beſides theſe, their Situation is to be conſider'd; that is, their Poſture and order, with reſpect to one another: and when the ſeveral parts join together to make up one Body, that is called the *Texture* of them. (5.) That there is a different *Texture* both in our *Organs* of Senſe, and in the *Objects* which make impreſſions upon them, with a different Mo-

Mr. Boyle *of the Origin of Forms and Qualities.*

tion, Figure and Size; from whence ariſe our different Senſations, and our Apprehenſions of different ſenſible Qualities in things. (6.) That by a Coalition of the ſmaller Particles of Matter into one Body, there are different Subſtances in the World of diſtinct Denominations; but by a change of Texture or Motion, or other Properties of Matter, that compound Body may be put into a different ſtate, which may be called its Alteration or Corruption; and if the change be ſo made as to offend our Senſes, it is then called *Putrefaction.* (7.) That there may be an incomprehenſible variety in the Coalition and Texture of the minute Particles of Matter, which may be ſo different from each other, as to be thought to be endued with diſtinct Qualities. As the 24 Letters make up an inconceivable number of words by the different placing of them.

But when I have allow'd theſe, I can by no means agree, 1. That there are no other Qualities in Bodies, but what relate to our Senſes. It's true we could not be ſenſible of Heat and Cold, but from the impreſſions made on our Senſes: but ſuppoſing we were not ſenſible of the different agitation of Particles without us; it doth not at all follow, that there is not a real Alteration in the objects themſelves, as that the Fire doth not burn, if we do not feel the heat of it; and why that diſpoſition in Matter, which is apt to produce ſuch a ſenſe in us, may not be called an inherent Quality, is not ſo eaſy to apprehend. But if there be ſuch a real difference in Bodies, as that one will make ſuch an impreſſion on our Senſes, and another will not, we cannot in reaſon ſay that there is no Quality in things, but that it wholly depends on our Apprehenſion. It is granted, *That Snow hath a greater diſpoſition to reflect light outwards, than a Coal or Soot, when the Sun ſhines upon all three.* Now why this diſpoſition ſhould be called a diſtinct Quality from what is in the other two, ſeems to me a Diſpute of no conſequence. So, if an Eccho be nothing but the cavity of a place, whereby it is diſpos'd to reflect the ſound back to the place from whence it came, altho' it muſt not be called the Quality of the place which makes the Eccho; yet it cannot be denied to be the peculiar Figure and Diſpoſition of the parts which make it. So that, if Men will allow ſuch inherent Diſpoſitions in things to produce what we call *Qualities* in us, the difference will not be found worth the diſputing. And I have wonder'd Perſons of Judgment and ſkill in theſe matters lay ſo much weight upon it, as tho' the Quality muſt be ſaid to be only in us, when it is confeſs'd to ariſe from a different Diſpoſition in the parts without us.

2. That there are no other Qualities in Bodies, but ſuch as an account may be given of by the foregoing Principles: For I do not find it poſſible for any Perſon by virtue of theſe Principles to give an account either of the make or compoſition of the Bodies of Animals, or of the diſpoſition and relation of the inward Parts, or of the inſtruments of Nature for preſervation of the Individual or Species; or of the Diſeaſes they are ſubject to, or of the proper methods of cure. And the more any Perſon ſearches into all the Mechanical attempts of this kind, the more unſatisfy'd he will find himſelf about them; and will ſee reaſon to conclude, as a Learned Phyſician hath done, *That we may know enough for our general direction what to do, but that the ſecret Cauſes are ſo hidden from us, as we have reaſon to admire the Supreme Artificer in what we know, and to adore him in what we do not.*

Sydenham *de Hydrope* p. 160.

Theſe things being premis'd, I come to the main point, which is, Whether Matter being put into motion, can in a Mechanical manner produce that frame of the Univerſe which we ſee, and the ſeveral things which are in the Heavens, and in this Globe of Earth and Sea.

To make this Matter as clear as we can, we muſt firſt conſider the *General Principles*; and then proceed to the Account given of the ſeveral *Phænomena*, as they are commonly called.

I begin with the *General Principles*, which are theſe;

That the Matter of the Univerſe is one and the ſame extended Subſtance; and that all the properties we clearly perceive in it, are, that it is diviſible and capable of motion in its parts. I. *Princip. l.* II. *n.* 23.

That this matter is without bounds, and that the Idea of Extenſion is the ſame with that of Corporeal Subſtance. II. *N.* 21.

That it is capable of diviſion into ſo many parts, as we cannot comprehend the utmoſt bounds of its diviſibility. III. *N.* 34.

That God alone is the firſt and univerſal Cauſe of the motion of matter, which continues the ſame in the whole, altho' it vary in the ſeveral parts. IV. *N.* 36.

That there are certain Laws of motion, whereof theſe are the chief: V.

1. That every part continues in the ſtate it was in, unleſs mov'd by an External Cauſe. *N.* 37.

2. That all motion of it ſelf is in a right Line, but by other Bodies it becomes oblique, and all matter being in motion it becomes circular. *N.* 39.

3. That when two Bodies meet, the weaker loſes not its motion, but changes its tendency, and the ſtronger loſes ſo much as it gives to the weaker. *N.* 40.

That the parts of matter were at firſt divided into many parcels of an equal and indifferent ſize, and had among them all that motion which is now in the World. VI. *Princip. Part.* 3. *n.* 46.

That theſe Particles of matter could not at firſt be ſpherical, becauſe then there muſt be a void ſpace between them, but by force of motion and natural attrition they became ſo. VII. *N.* 48.

That thoſe leſſer Particles which came off from the Angles of the bigger, fill up all the empty ſpaces between them, and have a quicker motion. VIII. *N.* 49, &c.

That beſides theſe, there are ſome Particles which are large and ſlower than the reſt, being full of Angles, and ſo more apt to ſtick to one another, which by reaſon of their paſſage thro' the triangular ſpaces between the globular Particles become wreathed. IX. *N.* 88.

And theſe are the three Elements out of which he ſuppoſes all Bodies to be made; and accordingly the Ingenious Author hath framed *a Syſtem of the Univerſe* with great Art and appearance of Reaſon; but at ſometimes he is content to let it paſs as a bare *Hypotheſis*, *agreeing with the Phænomena of the World*; but withal he ſaith, *That he makes uſe of no Principles but ſuch as are moſt evident, and deduces nothing from them but by Mathematical Conſequences.* And in an *Epiſtle* to *Merſennus*, to whom he opened his Mind more freely, he ſaith, *That he ſhould think he knew nothing in Phyſicks, if he could only tell how things might be, if he could not demonſtrate that they could be no otherwiſe.* But to another Perſon he calls it his *Romance of the World*; *which* he confeſſes *he was very well pleas'd with.* *Part.* III. *n.* 44. *N.* 43, 44. *Ep. To.* II. *Ep.* 37. *Ep.* 103.

But ſo have not others been, who have taken great pains both in *Philoſophy* and *Mathematicks*; and altho' they cannot deny this *Hypotheſis* to be very conſiſtent and well put together, yet they will by no means allow it to be a true and ſatisfactory account of the *Nature* and *Formation* of the World. But it is not my buſineſs to lay together the Objections of others againſt the *Carteſian Hypotheſis*, but to ſhew the tendency of it to *Atheiſm* in theſe two Points.

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As to the former; His firſt Principle is, *That Matter is one and the ſame thro' the Univerſe*; *and is every where known by its eſſential property, which is Extenſion:* and therein he places *the Eſſence of a Corporeal Subſtance*; (as will preſently appear.) If then the very Eſſence of Matter be independent upon GOD's Power, ſo that he can neither create nor annihilate it, what becomes of the Creation of the World according to this *Hypotheſis?*

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P. Petiti *Diſſert. de Principiis Cart. p. 28.*
Huet. *Cenſ. Philoſoph. Carteſ. c. 8. n. 4.*
Part. II. n. 9.

Part. 3. n. 46.

Part. II. n. 64.

if

if *Space* can neither be *created* nor *annihilated*, neither can *Matter*. And it ſeem'd ſtrange to me, that a Perſon ſo ſagacious, ſhould not lay theſe things better together; but his *Mathematical Notions* ran ſo much in his Mind, that his endeavor to accommodate them to the nature of things, was that which led him into ſuch inextricable difficulties. It is well obſerv'd by Monſ. *Du Hamel*, that the great miſtakes in *Natural Philoſophy* have riſen from Mens applying their *former Notions to it*; *thus*, ſaith he, *the common Philoſophers confounded Natural things with Meta-phyſical ſpeculations: on the other ſide*, Des Cartes *being a great Mathematician, endeavor'd to reduce Nature to Geometry, and ſo conſider'd nothing in Body but Extenſion. Extenſion*, ſaith he, *which conſtitutes Space, is the ſame which conſtitutes Bodies; but we conſider it more particularly in Bodies, and more generally in Space, which is not chang'd, as the other is.* But is there then nothing to make a *Body*, but mere *Extenſion?* I mean not *a Mathematical*, but *a real Phyſical Body*. No, ſaith he, *in the Idea of a Body, we may caſt off other Qualities, as Hardneſs, Color, Gravity, Heat and Cold, and yet a Body remains; to which then nothing belongs but Extenſion, which is common to Body and Space.* This is not ſo deep reaſoning, as might have been expected from ſo great a Maſter of it. For altho' the particular Qualities may be caſt off, yet the Capacity of them can no more than *Extenſion*; as is plain in *Figure* and *Size*, as well as *Hardneſs*, &c. any one particular *Figure* and *Size* may be abſtracted from Body, but it is impoſſible to conceive a Body, but it muſt be capable of one or other. Beſides, all this proves no more but that *Extenſion* is the *Inſeparable Property of Body*. And what then? Muſt the whole Eſſence of a Body conſiſt in one inſeparable Property? *But this is all the Idea we have of Body.* Then I ſay, our Ideas of things are ſhort and imperfect, and there is no forming Worlds upon ſuch Ideas. And this was the fundamental miſtake of *Des Cartes*. He lays this down as his ground of certainty; *or that we cannot take falſhood for truth, if we only give aſſent to ſuch things as we clearly and diſtinctly perceive.* Then he goes on, *that the things which fall under our perception, are either things and their Properties, or eternal Truths. Of things, the moſt general are Subſtance, Duration, Order, Number and ſuch like, which extend to all kinds of things.* And he ſaith, *they may all be comprehended under thoſe two: Of Intellectual or Thinking Subſtances; or of Material, i. e. of Bodily and Extended Subſtances.* Thus far all is clear and diſtinct. Then, as to the Notion of *Subſtance*, he ſaith, *By that we can underſtand nothing but a thing which ſo exiſts, as to need nothing elſe to ſupport it. There is but one Subſtance in the World which needs no ſupport, and that is* GOD. *All created Subſtances needs his ſupport, and the Notion of them is, that they are things which only ſtand in need of* GOD's *concourſe to ſupport them.* Hitherto we find nothing to ſtick at. *But how come we to have an Idea of created Subſtances? Not from the bare Exiſtence, for that doth not affect us: but it muſt be from ſome Properties, Attributes or Qualities; becauſe Nothing can be attributed to Nothing. From whence we conclude from any Real Attribute, that there muſt be a thing or Subſtance to which it belongs.* All this appears very well ſtill; only we muſt take notice, that all Properties do aſſure us of a *Real Subſtance* under them: Which is very true, relating to *Phyſical Bodies*. But it is poſſible he may from hence aim at proving, *That there muſt be a Corporeal Subſtance in Imaginary Space, becauſe there is an Extenſion there, and nothing cannot be attributed to nothing; therefore there muſt*

De Conſenſu vet. & nov. Philoſoph. l. I. c. 9. n. 8.

Part. 2. n. 10.

N. 11.

Princip. P. I. n. 43.

N. 48.

N. 51.

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Part. 3. *n.* 46.

Part. II. n. 64.

if *Space* can neither be *created* nor *annihilated*, neither can *Matter*. And it ſeem'd ſtrange to me, that a Perſon ſo ſagacious, ſhould not lay theſe things better together; but his *Mathematical Notions* ran ſo much in his Mind, that his endeavor to accommodate them to the nature of things, was that which led him into ſuch inextricable difficulties. It is well obſerv'd by Monſ. *Du Hamel*, that the great miſtakes in *Natural Philoſophy* have riſen from Mens applying their *former Notions to it*; *thus*, ſaith he, *the common Philoſophers confounded Natural things with Metaphyſical ſpeculations: on the other ſide*, Des Cartes *being a great Mathematician, endeavor'd to reduce Nature to Geometry, and ſo conſider'd nothing in Body but Extenſion. Extenſion*, ſaith he, *which conſtitutes Space, is the ſame which conſtitutes Bodies*; *but we conſider it more particularly in Bodies, and more generally in Space, which is not chang'd, as the other is.* But is there then nothing to make a *Body*, but mere *Extenſion?* I mean not *a Mathematical*, but *a real Phyſical Body*. No, ſaith he, *in the Idea of a Body, we may caſt off other Qualities, as Hardneſs, Color, Gravity, Heat and Cold, and yet a Body remains*; *to which then nothing belongs but Extenſion, which is common to Body and Space.* This is not ſo deep reaſoning, as might have been expected from ſo great a Maſter of it. For altho' the particular Qualities may be caſt off, yet the Capacity of them can no more than *Extenſion*; as is plain in *Figure* and *Size*, as well as *Hardneſs*, &c. any one particular *Figure* and *Size* may be abſtracted from Body, but it is impoſſible to conceive a Body, but it muſt be capable of one or other. Beſides, all this proves no more but that *Extenſion* is the *Inſeparable Property of Body*. And what then? Muſt the whole Eſſence of a Body conſiſt in one inſeparable Property? *But this is all the Idea we have of Body.* Then I ſay, our Ideas of things are ſhort and imperfect, and there is no forming Worlds upon ſuch Ideas. And this was the fundamental miſtake of *Des Cartes*. He lays this down as his ground of certainty; *or that we cannot take falſhood for truth, if we only give aſſent to ſuch things as we clearly and diſtinctly perceive.* Then he goes on, *that the things which fall under our perception, are either things and their Properties, or eternal Truths. Of things, the moſt general are Subſtance, Duration, Order, Number and ſuch like, which extend to all kinds of things.* And he ſaith, *they may all be comprehended under thoſe two: Of Intellectual or Thinking Subſtances*; *or of Material, i. e. of Bodily and Extended Subſtances.* Thus far all is clear and diſtinct. Then, as to the Notion of *Subſtance*, he ſaith, *By that we can underſtand nothing but a thing which ſo exiſts, as to need nothing elſe to ſupport it. There is but one Subſtance in the World which needs no ſupport, and that is* GOD. *All created Subſtances needs his ſupport, and the Notion of them is, that they are things which only ſtand in need of* GOD's *concourſe to ſupport them.* Hitherto we find nothing to ſtick at. *But how come we to have an Idea of created Subſtances? Not from the bare Exiſtence, for that doth not affect us: but it muſt be from ſome Properties, Attributes or Qualities*; *becauſe Nothing can be attributed to Nothing. From whence we conclude from any Real Attribute, that there muſt be a thing or Subſtance to which it belongs.* All this appears very well ſtill; only we muſt take notice, that all Properties do aſſure us of a *Real Subſtance* under them: Which is very true, relating to *Phyſical Bodies.* But it is poſſible he may from hence aim at proving, *That there muſt be a Corporeal Subſtance in Imaginary Space, becauſe there is an Extenſion there, and nothing cannot be attributed to nothing*; *therefore there muſt*

De Conſenſu vet. & nov. Philoſoph. l. I. c. 9. n. 8.

Part. 2. n. 10.

N. 11.

Princip. P. I. n. 43.

N. 48.

N. 51.

N. 52.

be a Real Body there. But I think it may be truly anſwer'd, That the Extenſion is no more real than the Space is, and implies no more but a Capacity of having Bodies which it had not; that is, that God might create Bodies beyond this World; and if he did ſo, then there would be a real Extenſion; but as we conceive it, the Imaginary Space is no more but a Poſſibility for Bodies exiſting out of the compaſs of this Univerſe. And therefore I deny this to be any real Extenſion; and that it can be no *Real Subſtance*, becauſe *Des Cartes* himſelf, but juſt before, owned *that a created Subſtance was that which ſtood in need of* God *to ſupport it.* Now is it poſſible to imagin that *Space* needs *a Divine Concourſe?* Therefore he muſt diſtinguiſh it from *Subſtance:* or elſe he muſt affirm it to be an uncreated Subſtance; which overthrows his diſtinction here between *Created and Uncreated Subſtances.* As to his Maxim, that *nothing can have no properties*, it certainly relates to *Subſtance*, and not to a *mere Space*; which by the common ſenſe of Mankind muſt be diſtinguiſh'd from *Bodily Subſtance*; and there can be no greater prejudice to Philoſophy, than to go againſt that. Now let us

N. 53. proceed. *From every Attribute a Subſtance is known; but there is one chief Property which conſtitutes the Eſſence and Nature, to which the reſt are referr'd. So*, ſaith he, *Extenſion makes the Nature of a Corporeal Subſtance, and Cogitation of a Thinking Subſtance. For every thing which we attribute to Body, ſuppoſes Extenſion, which is only the Mode of the thing extended; as all things attributed to our Minds, are different Modes*

N. 54. *of thinking. And thus we come to two clear and diſtinct Notions or Ideas; one of a Thinking Subſtance, and the other of a Corporeal; if we diſtinguiſh between the Attributes of thinking and Extenſion.* After this he

N. 63. ſaith, *That Cogitation and Extenſion may be conſider'd, as conſtituting the Natures of a Thinking and Corporeal Subſtance; and ſo their clear Ideas are, a Subſtance which thinks, and a Subſtance which is extended: but then theſe Properties*, he ſaith, *may be conſider'd likewiſe only as Modes*

N. 64. *belonging to thoſe Subſtances; and ſo they make a diſtinct Idea of themſelves, not without the Subſtances, but as Modes belonging to them.*

Thus I have carefully laid down his own Notions about theſe matters. And now ariſes the main difficulty; *viz.* how upon theſe grounds *the Idea of Space, and of Corporeal Subſtance ſhould be the ſame?* All

Part. 2. *N.* 9. that I can can find is, that Extenſion is really *Corporeal Nature, altho' it be call'd an Accident.* But did not himſelf diſtinguiſh it as *a Mode of Matter*, and as *a Subſtance extended?* And was not this look'd on *as ſuch a Property of Matter, as Thinking is of a Mind?* But can any Man ſay, that *Thinking* by it ſelf is *an Intellectual Subſtance*; how then can *Extenſion* by it ſelf be *a Corporeal Subſtance?* And yet, if it be not, as I can ſee no reaſon from his own grounds why it ſhould be; then his Suppoſition of the *Infiniteneſs of Matter*, of *the Plenarty of the World*, and *the circular motion of his Particles of Matter*, on which his whole *Hypotheſis* depends, comes to nothing. And what a ſtrange foundation is *Des Cartes* his World built upon? I could hardly believe that ſo thinking a Man ſhould not diſcern the Weakneſs of his own Grounds. But inſtead of that, it is plain that he laid great weight upon it: For when a learned Man of our own, and then a great admirer of him, ob-

Epiſt. Des Cartes *To. I. Ep.* 87. *Ep.* 88. jected to him, *that he extended the notion of Corporeal matter too far; but he thought it of no great conſequence to the main of his Principles*; *Des Cartes* takes him up ſmartly for it, for he ſaith, *he look'd on it, as one of the chief and moſt certain Principles of his Philoſophy.* And in the

Fragment of his laſt Anſwer, which he liv'd not to finiſh, he perſiſted in his Opinion, *That the empty Space was a real Body, becauſe nothing can have no properties.* But there is a difference between *Real Properties* and *Imaginary*; if there be any Bodies in that Space, there will be *Extenſion, Diſtance*, &c. but it is a very unconceivable thing that one of his judgment ſhould ſo much contend to the laſt, *That there was a difference of parts in ſuch a ſpace, where there was nothing but ſpace. i. e.* That there muſt be ſomething, where there is nothing. And therefore *Bernier* obſerves, *That thoſe who confound Space and Body, run themſelves into ſtrange abſurdities by a Corporeal Subſtance to fill all poſſible ſpace, or rather to be ſpace it ſelf; and that* GOD *cannot annihilate the leaſt part of it.* And he concludes it to be *neither Subſtance nor Accident, but a mere Capacity.* And it was not an improbable Conjecture of that Learned Perſon who wrote to *Des Cartes* upon this Argument, that this Doctrine of his, as he explain'd it, laid the foundation of *Spinoza*'s opinion of the *Infinite extent* and *power of matter*; but I cannot think that *Des Cartes* himſelf intended it ſo, however the other underſtood it. And it is great pity one of ſo clear a Capacity in other things, ſhould ſo ſtifly adhere to ſo unreaſonable an Opinion. And yet we find his Diſciples go on to defend him in this Matter. For when Monſ. *Huet* had objected, *That* Des Cartes *had made Extenſion, which was an Accident, to be a Subſtance*; Monſ. *Regis* anſwers, *That he confounded Extenſion which was of the eſſence of Body, with the Extenſion which belonged to Quantity; whereof the one is conſidered in it ſelf, and the other with reſpect to Magnitude.* But let it be conſider'd how he pleaſes, it is ſtill but a Mode belonging to a Subſtance, and not the Subſtance it ſelf. However, he refers us to his Book of *Phyſics* for the clearing of this Matter. And there we find indeed, that he diſtinguiſhes three ſorts of Bodies, *Phyſical, Mechanical,* and *Mathematical. A Phyſical Body is one compos'd of many inſenſible parts in its due order and figure, from whence reſult the Phyſical properties. A Mechanical Body is one compos'd of groſs and ſenſible parts, which by their figure and ſituation are proper for particular motions. A Mathematical Body is a Body conſider'd with its proper extenſion under a regular figure, as a Cube or a Cylinder.* But this doth not ſhew that *Des Cartes* did not confound a *Mathematical* and *Phyſical Body:* For it is an eaſy thing to find out diſtinctions to avoid a difficulty; but then they ought to be agreeable to the general ſenſe of thoſe Terms. But here a *Mathematical Body* is confin'd to *Regular Figures*; whereas the general notion of it is ſuch a Body as *Des Cartes* himſelf means, when he calls it, *Geometrical Quantity, ſuch as is the object of Mathematical Demonſtrations: i. e.* of any kind of Figures abſtract from Phyſical Bodies; and *this,* he ſaith, *is that matter he treated of.* And to ſuch a *Body* Extenſion alone belongs, and to none elſe, either *Phyſical* or *Mechanical.*

Ep. 93.

Bernier *Abregé de Gaſſend. To. I. p. 25.*

H. Mori *Oper. Phil. To. 2. p. 242.*

Cenſur. Carteſ. *l.* 5. *n.* 1. Regis *Réponſe à la Cenſure, ch. V. Art. I. p.* 255.

La Phyſiq. Regis *To. I. p.* 273.

Here then lies the difficulty as to *Des Cartes* his Principles: he conſiders Matter *Geometrically*, i. e. *Abſtractedly*, with reſpect to bare *Extenſion*, and yet ſuppoſes the effects of *Phyſical Bodies*; ſuch as *Diviſion of parts of matter one from another*, and *a motion of thoſe parts* in order to the compoſition of things. But *Mathematical Extenſion* is capable of no Diviſion but in the Mind; for no Man imagins the Earth really divided by the *Parallels* and *Meridians*, &c. and the Diviſion of the parts of an empty ſpace is nothing but a Mathematical Diviſion, which implies

nothing

nothing really in that ſpace, but a mere act of the Mind in conceiving the diſtance between the ſeveral parts of it.

Prin. Part. II. n. 16. But *Des Cartes* proves it impoſſible *there ſhould be a vacuum in Nature, becauſe the extenſion of Space and Body are all one.* But may not God *annihilate* that Air which is between the ſides of a Veſſel, and would there not be a *Vacuum* between? No; he ſaith, *It is impoſſible to conceive ſuch a Cavity without Extenſion, or ſuch an Extenſion without Matter; and if the middle ſubſtance were annihilated, the ſides muſt come together, becauſe there would be nothing between.* By which we ſee, that this Notion of the Identity of *Extenſion* and *Corporeal Subſtance* had ſunk ſo deep into his Mind, that he makes *Annihilation* of the Subſtance of Matter impoſſible to Divine Power: for there can be no ſuch Vacuity, but there muſt remain *Extenſion*, and conſequently *a Corporeal Subſtance.* This hath been objected to the followers of *Des Cartes*, and lately by *Du Hamel*, in his Cenſure of *Regis* his *Carteſian Philoſophy*; and it is worth the while to ſee what anſwer he makes to it. He ſaith, *That his objection about the Annihilation of the Air between the Heaven and Earth, can be of no force to prove a Vacuum; becauſe if there be no ſpace, they muſt touch one another; and if they do not, there muſt be ſpace, and conſequently a Corporeal Subſtance.* But ſaith *Du Hamel*, may not God by the ſame power by which he preſerves the Bodies between Heaven and Earth, deſtroy them, and then there muſt be a Vacuum? He anſwers plainly, *That an Annihilation of the ſubſtance of matter is impoſſible, even to the power of* God; *becauſe his Will is immutable. He grants that* God *may deſtroy the Air, and all other Bodies as to their Form, or preſent Modification; but he cannot deſtroy their Matter,* i. e. *their Extenſion, which is a true ſubſtance, and ſubſtances are indefectible.* Where we plainly ſee that the *Carteſians* aſſert the neceſſary Exiſtence of Matter, and that it is not in the power of God to deſtroy it; and whatever they may talk of the Will of God, they deny any power to exerciſe it with reſpect to Matter.

Réponſe aux Reflex. de M. Du Hamel, *Part.* 2. *ch.* 4.

But *Du Hamel* proceeds. How can thoſe Bodies touch one another, when God can create another Body between? No, ſaith *Regis*, *That ſtill ſuppoſes a ſpace between; and if there be a ſpace, there muſt be a body, and ſo a vacuum is a repugnancy in it ſelf.* But this Space, ſaith *Du Hamel*, is nothing but imaginary, a fiction of the Mind, and there is no arguing from thence to the Nature of things. *Regis* replies, *that their Ideas depend on the objective realities of things; and that the Idea of ſpace or extenſion is one of their primitive Ideas; and that it repreſents ſubſtance, and all ſubſtance is incorruptible.* Still we ſee the neceſſary exiſtence of Matter is look'd on by them as a fundamental Principle, and depending on primitive Ideas.

Abregé To. I. p. 13. Monſ. *Bernier* puts the caſe of Air being annihilated between two walls; and he deſires to know of the *Carteſians*, whether theſe two walls will come together or not? They ſay, *They muſt, if there be nothing between.* True, ſaith he, there is nothing Corporeal, or that touches our Senſes, no Subſtance or Accidents; but there is a true diſtance remaining. Suppoſe a Chamber 20 foot long, 15 foot broad, and 10 foot high; and theſe dimenſions to be meaſured, and one wall 20 foot diſtant from the other: it cannot be ſaid that it is the Air that makes the diſtance between them; how then comes this diſtance to be quite loſt, if the Air be deſtroy'd? They have no anſwer, he ſaith, but to ſay, It is

is an impoſſible Suppoſition; and they will rather deny God's Omnipotency in annihilating the Air, than let go their Opinion. Monſ. *Regis* in his *Phyſicks* takes notice of *Bernier*'s Doubts, and in anſwer to them he reſolves it at laſt into this, *That it is impoſſible there ſhould be an Annihilation, ſo as to make a Vacuum; becauſe Subſtances cannot ceaſe: not from the Nature of things, but from the immutable Will of* God. And after all poſſible Objections, here they ſtick, and ſeem reſolv'd to maintain, that *Extenſion* and *Matter* are the ſame. Reg. *Phyſ.* *Part.* I. *ch.* 3. *n.* 3.

Even Monſ. *Rohault* himſelf, altho' in ſome things he ſaw it neceſſary to leave *Des Cartes*, yet in this he perſiſts, *That the Eſſence of Matter conſiſts in Extenſion, and that Space and Matter are the ſame; and therefore a Vacuum is impoſſible.* And to the Objection about the Walls of a Chamber ſtanding, when the Air is annihilated, he avoids anſwering *as to God's Omnipotency*; but, he ſaith, *according to our Underſtanding the Walls muſt come together.* And to that about the Wall's diſtance not depending on the Air, he anſwers, *That the Being of the Walls does not depend upon the Air within, but the ſtate or diſpoſition of them doth upon the Extenſion between them.* Which he ſuppoſes impoſſible to be taken away, and that the Subſtance of Matter hath a neceſſary Exiſtence. Rohault, *Tr. Phyſ.* *l.* 1. *c.* 7. *n.* 9. *c.* 8. 1,2,3.

The ſubſtance of this Argument comes to this. *Des Cartes* makes *all the matter of the World to be one and the ſame:* but he aſſerts *the Eſſence of Matter to be Extenſion*; and that Extenſion can neither be created nor annihilated: and therefore it is impoſſible upon his Principles, to make out the dependence of Matter upon an infinite Creator. If it be ſaid, that *Des Cartes* expreſly ſaith, *That it ſeemed manifeſt to him that there is no other General Cauſe which created Matter with Motion and Reſt but God*; and that in the *Fragment* of his laſt Anſwer to Dr. *H. M.* he ſaith, *That if Matter were left to it ſelf, it would not move; but that it was firſt moved by* God: I anſwer, That according to his *Principles* the Subſtance of Matter muſt be before, becauſe there muſt be *Space*; and *Space and Matter are the ſame.* And I can ſee no poſſible way of clearing him, but by ſaying, that he held two ſorts of *Matter*; one part is *Phyſical Matter*, which God gave motion to at firſt when he created it, and out of which the World was fram'd; and the other *Mathematical*, which conſiſts in mere *Extenſion:* but how to reconcile theſe two to his aſſerting *One and the ſame matter in the World*, is a thing above my Underſtanding. *Prin.* P. II. *n.* 36. *Epiſt.* To. I. *ep.* 93.

The next thing to be conſider'd, is *Des Cartes* his undertaking to give an account of the *Phænomena* of the *Univerſe* from the *Mechanical Laws of Motion*, without a particular Providence. We are told by ſome, who have been very converſant with the Atheiſtical Perſons of our Age, That *they deſpiſe the Epicurean Hypotheſis of the World's being made by a fortuitous concourſe of Atoms, as a ridiculous thing; and think* Moſes *his Account more probable than that*; (which is a great Favor indeed.) So that it is to little purpoſe now to ſpend time in ſhewing how *precarious* and *unſatisfactory* the *Principles* of *Epicurus* were, who ſuppos'd Motion in Matter, without the leaſt ground for it; but *Des Cartes* was a Man of too great ſenſe and judgment to commit ſuch Blunders as *Epicurus* was guilty of (whom one of his ſharpeſt Adverſaries allows to have been *of a great and ſearching Wit, well ſkilled in Geometry, to which he endeavor'd to reduce Natural Philoſophy, (altho' he fail'd in his Attempt;) That he had a faculty of expreſſing his Mind clearly in few words above any* II.

Fr. Cuperi *Arcan. Atheiſm, l.* 2. *c.* 3.

Huet. *Cenſ.* *Phil. Cart.* *c.* 8. *n.* 4.

either antient or modern Writer.) Therefore it will be neceſſary to conſider what *Des Cartes* yields, that we may not miſtake or miſrepreſent his deſign.

1. He grants, that God did at firſt create Matter, which was capable of Reſt or Motion.

2. That Matter left to it ſelf would be without any motion; and therefore the firſt Motion was from God.

3. That God by his ordinary Providence doth preſerve as much Motion in the World, as was given at firſt.

4. That we have no reaſon to ſuppoſe any other alteration in the ordinary courſe of things, according to the Laws of Motion, than what we are certain of by Experience or Revelation.

And now the main point is, Whether Matter being thus put into motion, can produce the *Phænomena* of the World, without any farther interpoſition of Providence, than only to preſerve the motion of matter? For which we muſt conſider, That he doth not give a ſatisfactory account, 1. of the *Nature* and *Laws of Motion*; nor 2. of the *Phænomena of the Univerſe.*

(I.) As to the former, I ſhall inquire into his *Notion* of *Motion*, and then of the *Laws* of it.

Princ. Part. II. n. 25.

(1.) He aſſerts, That Motion, according to his Principles, is barely *Mode of Matter*, without any inward Principle of Motion. For *Motion*, he ſaith, is the change of the ſituation of Bodies, with reſpect to one another, or *a removing a Body from the vicinity of ſome Bodies to the neighbourhood of others*; and he places it in ſuch *a Tranſlation* on purpoſe, that it may be underſtood to be only *a Mode of the Matter moved, as Figure is of a thing figured.* But it is not ſo eaſy to underſtand that *Motion*, which imports an Action, ſhould be only *a Mode of the Matter moved*, as it is that Figure belongs only to the thing figured. For it is not poſſible for the Figure to be any where elſe, but in that Body which hath it; but it is poſſible to apprehend Motion to come either from an external Agent, or an internal Principle; and ſo it is not a mere mode of the thing moved. But when the whole weight is laid upon the Nature of *Motion* in this caſe, ſome greater evidence ought to have been given how Motion being once given to Matter, as a Mode of it, muſt always continue, when the reſiſtence of Bodies doth certainly weaken it ſo as to need a new force to repair it. For either all motion of matter muſt be by a violent impulſe, without regard to the different force or magnitude of things (which is to overthrow the due Laws of Motion;) or elſe there muſt be a proportion in the force of the mover to the reſiſtence of the Body moved: and if there be a regard to that proportion (or elſe the ſmalleſt Body might move the greateſt) then there muſt be a reſiſtence in that Body which is moved: But every reſiſtence gives a check to the motion of that Body which moved it, and every check leſſens the impulſe; and ſo from a gradual reſiſtence there muſt come a gradual decay, till at laſt all motion muſt ceaſe; as it is in all Machines, whoſe motion depends upon external force. *Des Cartes* indeed ſaith, *That whatever Motion is loſt by one Body is communicated to the next, and ſo the firſt motion is ſtill preſerved.* But it is hardly poſſible to make it appear, that Motion is not ſo much weakned by reſiſtence, but that it can preſerve it ſelf in a degree of motion proportionable to that which is not communicated to another. For the frequency of impulſe leſſens the power of reflection; and it appears in Light, and Sounds, and other things, that

whatever is reflected grows weaker. So that resistence must gradually weaken motion. And in the *Motion of Projected Bodies*, *Des Cartes* himself grants, *That the Motion continues till it be hinder'd by the resistence it meets with*; and he saith, *It is manifest that the Motion is retarded by the Air, and other ambient Fluids, and so it cannot continue long.* But is that an Argument *that Bodies do continue motion till they be hinder'd, and that Motion is only a Mode of the Body mov'd?* Whatever *Mode* it is, it comes from the force of the immediate Agent, and not from the motion at first given to Matter; and here we see the resistence it meets with, soon gives a stop to it. Therefore it seems unconceivable that all the Motion in the World, considering the continual resistence of Bodies, should be the same mode of Matter, which was at first given to it. And as to his definition of *Motion*, some have undertaken to demonstrate it to be false, by shewing how one Body may come nearer to another, without changing the situation of the parts next adjoining to it; and that there is no such reciprocal motion as he asserts, altho' there be a reciprocal change of situation, which is unavoiable. But Monsr. *Rohault* saith, *That Motion is to be taken with respect to the next, and not to any remote Bodies.* However Monsr. *Regis* thought fit to quit that definition of *Des Cartes* for another, which *Du Hamel* saith is not at all better; but he thought it necessary to take in *the efficient Cause of Motion*, which makes it not to be a mere mode of the matter moved. And but for the Authority of *Mathematicians* and *Philosophers*, it would be thought ridiculous for a thing not to be said *to be moved, because it doth not change the situation as to the next Bodies about it*; as that the Kernel of a Nut is not moved, because it is thrown with the Shell upon it; or that the Wine is not moved in a Ship at Sea, because it keeps within the Vessel. So, if the Earth be carry'd about with the force of the *Vortex* wherein it is, 'tis as certainly moved as a Pendulum is with the motion of the Ship, altho' it hath a proper motion of its own.

Part. II. n. 38.

H. Mori Enchirid. Metaphys. Part. I. c. 7.

Rohault. *Tr. Physic. c. 10. n. 1.*

Regis *Réponse aux Reflections Critique de M.* Du Hamel, *ch. 7.*

But *Des Cartes* undertakes to give an account of the Proportion of the increase and lessening of motion, upon the meeting of two hard Bodies, and he lays down *seven Rules* to determin it; but it falls out very unhappily, that *six of them* are deny'd *to be true, and that the first doth not answer the end it was brought for.* This was a bold charge on so great a Mathematician; but all that *Regis* saith in answer to it is, *That he did not undertake to defend all* Des Cartes *his Rules of motion, because they did not appear to him exact enough.* But if the Particular Rules of motion be no better fix'd nor understood, how come they to be so certain, that the same quantity of motion is still preserv'd in the World? For that *Des Cartes* hath recourse *to the immutable Will of* God *which hath determin'd it.* No doubt if God hath determin'd it, so it must be. But from whence comes *Des Cartes* to know this to be the *immutable Will of* God? What antecedent Reason is there to satisfy any Man's Mind, that God *by his immutable Will* must keep up the same proportion of motion in the World? Why may not God alter or suspend the Laws of motion, as to the parts of matter, in what way or manner he thinks good? What repugnancy is there to the *Divine Nature* in so doing? So that these Arguments *à priori* (as they call them) have no kind of Evidence as to such matters, which may be or not be, as God pleases. Besides, what necessity was there that *Motion* must be only a *Mode of Matter?* And that Mode to be preserv'd by such *Laws of Motion*, which are so very uncertain? A very Skilful and Ingenious Philosopher of our own

Des Cartes *Prin. Part. II. n. 45, &c.*

Réponse, &c. Part. 2. ch. 12.

Prin. Part. II. n. 36.

Mr. Boyle of the high Veneration of Man's Intellect towards God, p. 41, 42.

ſaith, *That this Rule, which he ſaith is the moſt uſeful of all* Des Cartes's, *is very metaphyſical, and not very cogent to him: And he doth not ſee how it can be demonſtrated; and he queſtions whether it be agreeable to Experience.* And he was a Perſon very favorable to *Des Cartes*, as far as he could, as appears on all occaſions in his Writings; but here we ſee he gives up his Fundamental Rule. *Du Hamel* ſaith, *The Argument from* God's *Immutability is no force, becauſe it holds not as to Extrinſecal Actions.* *Regis*, to defend this, runs into that Abſurdity to make God a neceſſary Agent, becauſe God's Will and his Eſſence are the ſame; which overthrows all Religion in the Conſequence of it.

Réponſe aux Reflections, part. 2. c. 13.

Prin. Part. II. n. 36.

But *Des Cartes* himſelf excepts *ſuch Mutations as are made in Matter, by evident Experience, or Divine Revelation.* What is the meaning of this? Can that be *an Immutable Will of* God, which is contradicted by *Evident Experience*, and *Divine Revelation?* Or were theſe words only put in to avoid Cenſure? As the World was ſaid to be *Indefinite*, leſt he ſhould be charg'd with making the World *Infinite*; and the Definition of *Motion* was altered, to avoid *Galileo*'s fate: But there is no diſſembling in this matter; if it be contradicted by *Evident Experience*, it can be no fix'd and *Immutable Rule*; if it can be alter'd in caſe of Miracles, the Argument from God's Immutability ſignifies nothing. For if it be no repugnancy to the Divine Nature to alter, or ſuſpend the Laws of Motion, as he ſees cauſe; then we can have no aſſurance as to God's Will any farther than himſelf hath declar'd it; and conſequently they muſt prove that God hath manifeſted this to be his Will. But ſaith *Rohault*, *It is unbecoming Philoſophers on all occaſions to run to Miracles and Divine Power.* Who puts them upon it? We may certainly allow an ordinary courſe of Providence, as to Cauſes and Effects, without aſſerting theſe Notions of *Des Cartes*; but this is a pleaſant way of taking it for granted, that none but his Principles are fit for *Philoſophers*.

Rohault. part. I. c. 10. n. 13.

(II.) Come we now to examin his *Catholick Laws of Motion:* and of all things, thoſe ought to be very clear and certain, becauſe ſo much depends upon them; and yet I am afraid we ſhall hardly find one of them to be ſo.

II. The firſt of them is, *That every thing remains in the ſame ſtate it was in, unleſs it be changed by External Cauſes.* From whence he concludes, *That which is moved always continues to be moved; and that nothing tends to Reſt, which is contrary to the Laws of Nature, becauſe Reſt is contrary to Motion: and nothing tends to its contrary, for that would be to tend to its own deſtruction.* The main thing intended by this, is to aſſert the continuance of Motion in the parts of the Univerſe, upon their being once put into it; ſo that Reſt is a ſtate of violence to a Body once moved, becauſe Reſt and Motion are contrary to each other. But this is a very weak Foundation to build ſo much upon: For, we are not to conſider Reſt and Motion Abſtractly, but Phyſically, together with the Bodies in which they are: And I think it will be very hard to perſuade any Body endued with Senſe and Motion, that after weariſome Motion, he doth aim at his own deſtruction by ſeeking for Reſt. This is a ſort of Reaſoning would not be expected from *Philoſophers*; that becauſe Motion and Reſt are contrary Motions, therefore no Body in motion can tend to Reſt. *But every thing continues in the ſtate it was in, till it be put out of it; therefore every thing in motion muſt continue to move.* This is not clearly expreſs'd. For if it be meant, that every thing from it ſelf continues in its original ſtate, then it is not true. For Matter, he confeſſes,

Princip. Part. II. n. 37.

would

would reſt, if God did not give motion to it; and ſo it muſt continue to reſt, and there could be no Motion at all: If it be meant, that every thing continues in the ſtate God put it into, unleſs he appointed ſeveral Cauſes to alter it, then it is true; but it doth not ſerve his purpoſe. For if God hath appointed both Motion and Reſt for ſome Bodies, it can never be ſaid that ſuch tend to their own deſtruction, when they tend to that Reſt which God and Nature appointed for them. If God hath appointed them for continual Motion, as the great Bodies of the Univerſe, then they muſt continue in it, not by virtue of any inherent Law of Motion, but by the immutable Will of God. *Des Cartes* ſaw it neceſſary for God to put Matter into motion, but he would have the framing of the Laws of this motion himſelf; whereas he had acted more reſpectfully towards his Maker, and more like a Philoſopher, *i.e.* more conſonantly to his own Principles to have left God that made the World and gave motion to Matter, to have ſetled thoſe Laws of Motion, which were agreeable to his Infinite Wiſdom. For theſe Notions are unbecoming *Philoſophers*, to make *Motion* a mere *Mode of Matter*; and this *Mode* to be ſupported by *Divine Concourſe*; but ſo, that *Motion* and *Reſt* being contraries, whatever is in *Motion* muſt continue in it; becauſe *Motion* and *Reſt* being contraries, nothing can tend to its own deſtruction.

Beſides, I know not how to reconcile this with another Law of Nature, as he calls it, *That all Bodies in a circular motion endeavor what in them lies to recede from the center of their motion.* Is not a Body put into a *Circular Motion* in a ſtate belonging to it? How comes it then not to continue in that ſtate, but to endeavor all it can to get out of it? And yet all the *Phænomena* of *Light* depends upon this Law: *That the round particles of the ſecond Element endeavor to recede from their centers; not from any cogitation,* (no doubt of it) *but becauſe they are ſo plac'd and incited to that Motion.* Is that poſſible, and yet *all Bodies continue in the ſtate they are in,* when they endeavor what they can to get out of it? Are not theſe more contrary than *Motion* and *Reſt?* I do not meddle with *External Hindrances*, but the *Natural Endeavors* of Bodies. But it may be ſaid, *That* Des Cartes *intends his Rule only of Primary and Simple Motions, and not of Circular, which are violent and unnatural.* So indeed his words ſeem to run at firſt, that this Rule relates to *ſimple and undivided Bodies*; but then I ſay, it is of no uſe, as to the preſent *Phænomena*; and he ſpeaks of *the Laws of ſuch Motion as we may obſerve in Bodies:* which words ſignify nothing, unleſs his Law reaches to the Bodies now in being; and I ſee no reaſon for him to ſuppoſe Circular Motion to be any more repugnant to the Nature of Matter, than any other. *Regis* to avoid this, ſaith, *That Circular Motion is not Unnatural, but Accidental; and the ſtate of the Body is to be taken from what it would be, if External Cauſes were removed*; i. e. *in a right Line.* But he doth not attend to the Conſequences of this; for then the Circular Motion of the Heavens muſt be *Accidental*, and not under the care of Providence, or the immutable Will of God. For God's *Will*, he ſaith, is, *that every Body be preſerved in its own ſtate*; *now*, ſaith he, *the ſtate of a Body in motion is in a right line, and the endeavor of Nature is to keep to that.* Then ſay I, whatever Motion is againſt the ſtate wherein Nature deſigns it, muſt be not only *Accidental* but *Violent*, becauſe it is againſt the courſe of Nature. And if it be violent, it cannot be ſuppos'd to be under God's immutable Will; but if it be not *Violent*, then a Body in circular

Part. 2. *n.* 39. *Part.* 3. *n.* 55.

N. 56.

Réponſe, &c. part. 2. *ch.* 10.

circular motion muſt endeavor to preſerve it ſelf in that ſtate, and not to recede from it, as *Des Cartes* ſuppoſes.

Monſ. *Du Hamel* objects againſt this Law, that Permanent Beings do indeed endeavor to preſerve themſelves in the ſtate they are in; but it doth not hold in Beings that are ſucceſſive; becauſe the former are in their full ſtate at firſt, but it is otherwiſe in ſucceſſive. But ſaith *Regis*, *This doth not hinder them from not doing any thing to their deſtruction.* So that it is a plain caſe, no Body in *motion* can tend to *Reſt*, *becauſe Motion and Reſt are contrary*; and this is a Fundamental Law of Nature for this weighty Reaſon.

Réponſe aux Reflex. part. 2. c. 9.

The ſecond Law is, *That all Motion, according to Nature, is in a right Line, and that oblique and circular Motion ariſes from the motion and interpoſition of other Bodies; and whatever Body is moved circularly, hath a perpetual tendency to recede from the center of the circle it deſcribes.*

Now if this Rule had that evidence which is neceſſary to make it a fundamental Law of Motion, it muſt be proved either from the Nature of Matter and Motion, or from the immutable Will of God: The latter is not pretended to be proved, but only *from the immutability and ſimplicity of the operation whereby* God *doth preſerve Motion in Matter; which only regards that very moment, without regard to what was before.* But how from hence it follows that *Motion*, which extends to more moments, ſhould be determined one way rather than another, I cannot apprehend. For if the Motion be in a right line, it muſt be in more moments than one, as well as in a circle; and if it prove any thing, it is *that* God *preſerves Motion* only in a point: but *Des Cartes* owns *That it cannot be conceived in an inſtant, altho' in a right line.* How then comes *Motion* in a *Right Line* to come from God's *Immutability*, and not *in a Circle? Becauſe it is determined in every inſtant towards a right line.* This ought to have been made more evident, than from the inſtance of the *Sling:* For the falling down of the Stone to the Earth, is certainly from another cauſe, *viz.* from the Principle of *Gravitation*, and not from the Inclination of matter to move in a right line. Neither can it be ſaid to come from the *Nature* of *Matter*, or *Motion:* For a Circular Motion, hath as much the Nature and Definition of *Motion*, according to *Des Cartes*, as the other: and *Matter* is of it ſelf indifferent, which way it moves; and ſome have thought *Circular Motion* more perfect, becauſe they obſerv'd the motion of the Heavens to be ſo. But if it ariſes from the impediments of other Bodies, they muſt ſhew, that Matter was firſt put into motion in a ſtreight line; and if God put all the parts of Matter at firſt into motion in a right line, how came the impediments to make it circular? For God preſerves motion as he gave it; he firſt gave it in *right lines*, and *his Will is immutable*, therefore it muſt always ſo continue; and ſo *Circular Motion* will be impoſſible.

But let us ſuppoſe *Circular Motion*, how comes it to be ſo evident as to be made a Law of Nature, *That a Body in that motion always endeavors to recede from the Center?* How is this conſiſtent with the Principle of *Gravitation and Attraction*, which depends upon Mathematical Demonſtrations? Can it be in the Nature of Bodies to tend to the center, and to recede from it at the ſame time? And it is a very improbable thing, that *Gravity* ſhould be nothing elſe, but ſome Particles being not ſo quick in their motion from the center as others are, theſe being left in the lurch, and preſs'd by the motion of the other, do ſink under them; and

and ſo come nearer to the center, which is all that *Des Cartes* means by *Gravity*. But of this afterwards.

The laſt Fundamental Law of Motion is, *That when a Body meets another, if it hath not a greater power to proceed in a right line than the other hath to hinder it, then it turns aſide, but loſeth not its motion; if it hath a greater force than the other, then it communicates its motion to the other, and loſeth it ſelf as much as it gives.* The reaſon given of this is, *Becauſe it is the immutable Will of* God, *that the ſame quantity of motion ſhall be always preſerved:* Of which I have ſpoken already. And as to the whole matter of theſe Laws of Motion, Mr. *Boyle* ſaith, *That they have been received by Learned Men, rather upon the Authority of ſo famous a* Mathematician, *than upon any convictive evidence which accompanies the Rules themſelves.* N. 40. *Mr.* Boyle *of Veneration, &c.* p. 41.

The next thing we are to do is, to ſee whether from theſe *Laws of Motion*, he gives a ſatisfactory Account of the making of the Univerſe.

And here we muſt conſider the *Elements* out of which he ſuppoſeth it made, and the account of the things made out of them.

As to the *Elements*, this, in ſhort, is his account of them, *The Particles of matter into which it was firſt divided, could not at firſt be round, becauſe then there muſt be a vacuum between them; but they muſt by ſucceſſion of time become round, becauſe they had various circular motions* (altho' the *Natural Motion* be in *a Right Line*, and *God's immutable Will be that every thing ſhould be preſerved in its Natural ſtate.*) *But that force which put them into theſe Notions, was great enough to wear off their Angles, and ſo they become round. Which being join'd together muſt leave ſome intervals, which were filled up by the filings off from the Angles; which were very ſmall and of a figure fit to fill up all interſtices, and were carried about with a very quick motion. So that here we have two Elements, one of the round Particles, and another of the ſubtile Æthereal matter, which came by the attrition of the firſt Particles. But beſides theſe, there are others more groſs and unapt for motion by their figure; and which make the third Element, and out of theſe, all the Bodies of the viſible World are compos'd; the Sun and fixed Stars out of the firſt; the Heavens out of the ſecond; and the Earth, with Comets and Planets out of the laſt.* *Princip. Part.* 3. n. 48. N. 49. N. 52.

The main thing which makes this *Hypotheſis* unſatisfactory to me is, that it is as precarious and groundleſs as the *Epicurean*, and they differ only as to the beginning of Motion, which the *Epicureans* ſuppoſe to belong to Matter, and *Des Cartes* ſaith, it comes from an infinite Agent diſtinct from it; becauſe he ſuppoſes that it would not move of it ſelf, unleſs it were put into motion. Which being ſet aſide, there is no more of the Wiſdom or Providence of God to be found in His making of the World than the others, nor any more evidence as to the Production of his Elements. For he firſt ſuppoſes, that there can be no *Vacuum* in Nature, which he proves only from his Mathematical Notion of Body conſiſting only in Extenſion; and from hence he undertakes to give an account, not of God's creating the matter of the World at once, nor of his Production of things within ſix days; but how in proceſs of time Particles of matter being divided would come to make up his ſeveral Elements. And for this, he makes uſe of ſeveral Suppoſitions without any ground of reaſon why it muſt be ſo and no otherwiſe, which was the thing which he undertook to *Merſennus* to do. For what reaſon doth he give that Matter muſt be divided at firſt, in order to the production of the Elements? When there can be no *Diviſion*, but there muſt be Intervals

tervals between the Parts; and if all Matter be *One and the ſame*, and the Space of the Intervals be neceſſarily fill'd up with *Extended Matter*, what diviſion of Parts could there be? And how can that Extenſion be divided into ſolid Bodies? *Des Cartes* grants, *That by reaſon we cannot find out how big the parts of Matter were at firſt, how quick their motion, nor what kind of Circles they deſcribed.* Then it is impoſſible to find out by Reaſon how the World was made. For, *if God*, as he confeſſes, *might uſe innumerable ways of doing it, and we cannot tell which he pitched upon*; what a vain thing is it in any Man to undertake to give an Account how the World came to be form'd? And therefore *Rohault* with great Judgment, pretends not to give an Account how Matter was form'd by God at the firſt Creation; but only to ſhew a poſſibility how it might be fram'd, ſo as to ſolve the Appearances of the World. But neither he nor *Des Cartes* can reconcile this primitive diviſion of Matter into parts, with their original notion of Matter, which is nothing but *Extenſion. But if Matter be ſo divided*, as *Des Cartes* ſuppoſes, *may we not reaſonably conclude, that there were three ſuch Elements as he ſpeaks of?* The Queſtion is not, Whether there be not a Diſtinction of the Particles of Matter anſwerable to theſe three Elements, *viz.* a more ſubtle and ethereal Subſtance, as in Fire; a leſs ſubtle and globular, as in Air; a groſſer, as in Earth; which are moſt made according to theſe Principles, out of ſuch different Particles: but the point is, Whether theſe Elements can be produc'd in ſuch a manner by the mere Motion of Matter? And *Des Cartes* will by no means allow them to be made round, for fear of his *Vacuum*, which would ſpoil all, but *that by length of time they would become round*; *nay they muſt become round: Eas non potuiſſe ſucceſſu temporis non fieri rotundas*, are his words. Now here lies the difficulty, to ſhew how theſe muſt become round by his own Laws of Motion, *i. e.* by a motion in a right line; for he ſaith, *It is done by various circular motions.* But how comes the Original Matter of it ſelf to deviate from the fundamental Law of Motion? That is, from whence came theſe Circular motions, without which the Elements could not be form'd? And if the firſt Particles were ſo ſolid, as is ſuppos'd, how came the Angles to be worn off? For when two ſolid Bodies meet, according to his own Laws of Motion, the one communicates motion to the other, and loſes of its own, which implies nothing but a mutual contact and rebounding upon the colliſion; but this doth by no means ſhew how theſe Bodies come to wear off each others Angles. And therefore this is only a product of fancy, but very neceſſary to his purpoſe. But let us ſuppoſe that by frequent colliſions ſome alterations would be made in the figure of theſe Bodies; what a long time muſt it be before they become ſpherical? Too long to be conſiſtent with ſuch a thing as *Creation*, which at the ſame time is pretended to be believ'd. But the only agreeable Suppoſition to this is, the exiſtence of matter from eternity, which having we know not how many Ages ſince been put into motion, then by a caſual courſe (for it was not by the Laws of Motion) theſe Particles juſtling one againſt another, at laſt rubb'd off the uneven Particles, ſo as to make them round. But what quantity was there of ſuch Particles in proportion to what was left? For it may eaſily be too great, and ſo the firſt Element be too powerful for the ſecond, as ſome have undertaken to demonſtrate that it muſt be, upon *Des Cartes* his own grounds. And the Anſwer given is inſufficient; becauſe the Proportion of the firſt Element will ſtill be too great, notwithſtanding all the uſes found out for it;

Part. 3. *n.* 46.

Tract. Phyſic. c. 21. *n.* 6.

N. 48.

Enchirid. Metaphyſ. c. 16. Huet *Cenſ. Philoſoph. Carteſ. c.* 6. Regis *Reponſe ch.* 6. *Art.* 2.

and therefore *Rohault* more wiſely avoided theſe attempts of forming the World out of the firſt *Chaos* of confus'd matter, which he found could give no ſatisfaction.

Let us now in the laſt place come to the Account he gives of the *Phænomena of the Univerſe* according to theſe Principles. And becauſe it would be too large a taſk to run thro' all, I ſhall confine my ſelf to theſe following: (1.) The formation of the Sun and Stars. (2.) The motion of the Air. (3.) The placing of the Earth. (4.) The Mechaniſm of Animals.

As to the formation of the Sun and Stars: which *Des Cartes* ſaith was in this manner; *That the matter of the firſt Element increas'd by the attrition of the particles of the ſecond, and there being greater quantity of it than was neceſſary to fill up the interſtices between the round particles of the ſecond Element, the remainder went to the centers of the ſeveral Vortices.* But here ariſes a difficulty, which takes away any appearance of ſatisfaction in this matter; which is, That *Des Cartes* owns *that in this matter of the firſt Element there are ſome parcels which are leſs divided and ſlower moved, having many Angles, and therefore unfit for motion.* Now why ſhould not theſe take up the *Center* of the *Vortex*, and not thoſe which have a quicker Motion, and endeavor to recede from it? For we muſt obſerve, that *Des Cartes* ſuppoſes *that theſe bigger fragments are mix'd with the leſſer, and that they tranſfer their motion to them: according to the Laws of Nature* (which ſerve his turn as he pleaſes) *greater Bodies do eaſier tranſfer their motion to leſſer, than receive motion from them.* So that here we have theſe bigger fragments of the firſt Element mix'd with the leſſer, and communicating their motion to them. Now, who could expect any other than theſe ſhould have fix'd in the centre of the *Vortex?* But if this be ſuppos'd, his whole *Hypotheſis* is loſt; for then the Sun and Stars muſt be *Opaque*, and not *Luminous Bodies.* But *Des Cartes* hath found out a notable Invention to ſend them far enough from the centre; which is, *That they move in the way between the Poles, towards the middle of the Heaven in a right line, and there are gathered into little maſſes, ſome from the North, and others from the South. But when they are in the Body of the Sun or a Star, then they make thoſe ſpots which hinder their Light, and are thrown off like a thick ſcum from heated Liquors.* But when he aſſigns the reaſon of Gravity, he ſaith, *It comes from hence, that thoſe particles which have a quicker motion preſs down thoſe which are not ſo fit for it, and by that means they get nearer to the centre.* How comes it then to be ſo much otherwiſe in theſe parts of the third Element; how come they not to be preſs'd down in the ſame *Vortex* towards the center? Eſpecially when himſelf there ſaith, *That the particles of the firſt Element have more power to depreſs the earthy particles than of the ſecond, becauſe they have more agitation*; and here he ſpeaks of the motion within the *Vortex:* So that according to his Principles, the matter of the third Element ought to ſubſide and be near the center, being leaſt apt for motion. But this would overthrow his whole Theory about the Sun and Stars; and about Light, and the ſpots of the Sun, and of Magnetic Particles, &c. ſo that theſe Particles of the third Element muſt be diſpos'd of as he thinks fit, leſt they put all out of order. And it is ſtrange he ſhould parallel the Scum made by the fermenting of Liquors, with the natural Motion of the Matter of his Elements. And if this Principle were true, that the Matter of the third Element might get above,

I. *Princip.* *Part.* 3. *N.* 54. *N.* 88. *N.* 89. *N.* 91. *N.* 94. *Princip.* *Part.* 4. *N.* 23. *N.* 25.

and leave the thinner and more ſubtle Matter neareſt the center, I do not ſee how the Earth could be habitable; for then we could breath nothing but thin and ethereal Air, which we could not bear. As appears by the famous inſtance of *Acoſta*, who ſpeaks by his own ſad experience, as well as of others, that he was in great danger of his Life, by going over one of the higheſt Mountains of *Peru*. From whence it is obſerv'd, that the moſt ſubtle Air is too thin for Reſpiration. But how comes it to paſs, according to theſe Principles, that the heavier part of the Air is moſt towards the center, and the lighter aſcends higheſt? For Air, according to *Des Cartes*, is *a Congeries of the Particles of the third Element very thin and diſ-joyn'd*; and yet we find this comes nearer the center according to its Gravity; and the lighter Air goes higher, and hath very different effects on Mens Bodies, tho' the motion of it be not ſtrong nor violent. For *Acoſta* ſaith, That Air which is ſo fatal to Paſſengers on thoſe Mountains of *Peru* (which are ſo high, that he ſaith, the *Alps* and *Pyrenees* were but as ordinary Houſes to lofty Towers) is ſo ſtill, that it is but *as a ſmall Breath, neither ſtrong nor violent*; and yet it pierces ſo that it often kills Men without feeling, and makes their Hands and Toes drop off; as he affirms from his own knowledg.

Acoſta *of the Indies, l.* 3. *c.* 9. Boyle's *Experiments of Air, p.* 182.

From whence it appears to be a mere fetch in *Des Cartes* to keep theſe Particles of his third Element from being nearer to the center, altho' they are more weighty and indiſpos'd to motion than others are.

But his whole *Hypotheſis* is overturn'd concerning the Celeſtial Bodies, if there be a Principle of *Gravitation* in *Matter*; which makes a Natural tendency towards the *Center*, according to the *Quantity* and *Diſtance* of it. The opinion of *Des Cartes* his great ſkill in *Geometry*, hath gone much farther towards perſuading the World of the truth of his Theory, than any evidences that appear'd in his Principles themſelves: For Men who are not deeply ſkill'd in thoſe matters, are very apt to be ſawy'd by the Authority of thoſe that are. But as it falls out in this caſe, we have this *Theory* of *Gravitation* fully demonſtrated by a very Learned and Judicious Mathematician of our own, to whom I refer the Reader, who hath given a *Mathematical Account* of the *Celeſtial Bodies*; not only of *the Sun and Stars, but of Comets, and the Moon, from the Principle of Gravitation*; not inherent and eſſential to Matter, but by a force given and directed by Divine Power aud Wiſdom. Which being granted, we have no reaſon to be diſpleas'd with the cleareſt Account can be given, in a Mathematical manner, of the chief *Phænomena* of the Univerſe. And the ſame Perſon ſaith, *He hath many Reaſons to ſuſpect that the reſt may depend upon ſome ſecret Powers, by which the Particles of matter do either cohere or fly from each other; for want of the knowledg whereof, Philoſophers have hitherto blunder'd in Natural Philoſophy.* But we proceed in *Des Cartes* his Account of his *Cœleſtial Vortices*.

Iſ. Newton *Philoſoph. Natural. Principia Mathem.*

Præfat.

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